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National and international standards have ruled notifiable animal disease surveillance 
programmes for the last 100 years. Over the past two decades a shift from input 
based standards towards output based standards is observed with an obligation of 
results (i.e. achieve given objectives) rather than means (fixed sample size, 
diagnostic tests). This major shift towards the implementation of a more ‘fit for 
purpose’ surveillance programme design enabled taking into account the specific 
disease as well as the country specific characteristics, risk factors and husbandry 
practices. Because animal health surveillance reliability is a major concern for free 
trade as well as for consumer trust, proving effectiveness and efficiency of 
surveillance remains a constant challenge. The current thesis aims at describing and 
applying scenario tree methods (output based methods) for different surveillance 
programmes in Belgium as a tool to assess effectiveness and efficiency of these 
surveillance systems. The overarching objective across all studies in the current 
thesis was to provide an extensive overview of the possibilities offered by these 
methods as well as discuss their limitations and assumptions. This thesis aims to 
provide a conceptual framework for assessing effectiveness and efficiency of 
notifiable animal disease surveillance programmes. 
A first study aimed at redesigning the Belgian avian influenza active surveillance 
programme for domestic birds in professional poultry holdings based on a risk 
analysis approach. Stochastic quantitative analysis was run to obtain effective 
probabilities of infection and sensitivity estimates for the detection of an infected bird 
in the different risk groups identified, using national animal identification registries, 
together with past outbreak data found in literature. An optimal number of holdings 
for each risk group was then estimated on the basis of the different effective 
probabilities of infection and sensitivities obtained. In certain risk groups the 
optimized sampling size decreased drastically such as in chicken farms without 
outdoor facilities in non-risk zones while in other risk groups the initial sample size 
was underestimated such as for chickens raised in risk zones with outdoor facilities. 
In addition it was recommended to focus surveillance in certain seasons as well as 





This study was a useful tool for decision makers to reallocate the total amount of 
samples to be taken in the next year(s) in Belgium, thus optimizing the field 
resources, and improving efficiency of disease surveillance such as required by 
international standards.  
The second study investigated different surveillance components of the bovine 
brucellosis surveillance system in Belgium and how this surveillance programme 
could be optimized to ensure freedom of infection in Belgium. The current 
surveillance system (prior to 2009) and the impact of reducing surveillance in certain 
risk groups on the whole surveillance system sensitivity were simulated together 
stochastically. Results demonstrated that a significant decrease in the total number 
of samples was feasible whilst maintaining a 99% confidence level of disease 
freedom. The ideal number of samples was estimated to be around 30,000 (thus a 30 
fold decrease from pre 2009 levels) under the condition that the new surveillance 
would target risk groups. Hence increasing the number of reported and tested 
abortions by farmers and veterinarians was necessary to reach a minimal annual 
number of reports of 8,000 abortions instead of 4,000. The reporting of abortion was 
strongly stimulated, via the abortion protocol. Furthermore, it was advised to test a 
random selection of 15,000 cattle from all herds which did not declare any abortions 
during the past years, these cattle were investigated for bovine brucellosis during 
winter screening. In addition, it was recommended to test 8,500 cattle during 
purchase (randomly selected in regional laboratories) and 8,500 cattle from intra 
community trade from officially free countries, as well as all cattle from intra 
community trade from non-officially free countries. The new surveillance programme 
led to the detection of one case in 2010 following an abortion investigation.  
The third study used scenario tree modelling to evaluate and to identify alternatives 
to optimize the bovine tuberculosis surveillance system in accordance with European 
legislation (Council Directive 64/432/EEC). Data from 2005-2009 regarding cattle 
population, movement and surveillance were collected to feed the stochastic 
scenario tree simulation model, using 10,000 iterations per simulation. A total of 
7,403,826 cattle movement history records were obtained for the 2,678,020 cattle 
from 36,059 cattle herds still active in 2009. The sensitivity analysis showed that the 





from the uncertainty distribution around the sensitivity of the diagnostic tests used 
within the bTB surveillance. Provided all animals are inspected and post mortem 
inspection is highly sensitive, slaughterhouse surveillance was the most effective 
surveillance component. However it also highlighted that in 25% of the cases an 
infection could go unnoticed using only slaughterhouse surveillance and it was 
therefore advised to increase the sensitivity of surveillance in other components as 
well. Using for instance different diagnostic tests instead of the intradermal skin test 
during winter screening, purchases and import would increase greatly the sensitivity 
and the confidence level of Belgium’s posterior probability of freedom from bTB 
infection status (negative predictive value of the surveillance system). 
The aim of the fourth study was to assess the sensitivity of the four major bluetongue 
surveillance components implemented in Belgium in 2007 for farmed animals and 
prescribed by the European Union regulation: winter serological screening, sentinel 
system, passive clinical surveillance and export testing. Scenario tree methodology 
was used to evaluate the relative sensitivity of detection and targeted approach of 
each component in terms of early detection and freedom of infection substantiation. 
Field data collected from the previous years’ outbreaks in Belgium were used to 
determine the risk groups to be considered. The best sensitivities at herd level, taking 
into account the diagnostic test sensitivity, design prevalence and the number of 
animals tested within a herd were obtained with the winter screening and sentinel 
component. At component level, sensitivity analysis showed that this sensitivity 
would be all the more increased if targeted towards the right risk groups. Despite the 
very low herd sensitivity, passive clinical surveillance turned out to be the most 
sensitive component in terms of early detection, under the condition of high disease 
awareness, absence of vaccination and visible clinical signs. The conclusions of this 
study showed that passive clinical surveillance could be suitable for early detection 
and substantiation of freedom but because of its limitations it was all together 
advised to maintain a repeated cross sectional monthly survey or 4 months period 
during the vector season and in certain risk groups for substantiation of disease 
freedom.  
The last study compared the relative efficacy and cost efficiency of different 





early detection of vector-borne diseases in cattle populations within different 
countries (using bluetongue as case study). Bluetongue outbreak and surveillance 
data from the epidemic that occurred in the Netherlands, France and Belgium, in the 
years 2006 and 2007 provided reliable input data for evaluating the different 
surveillance components in place in each country. In a first stage, the different 
surveillance components (sentinel, yearly cross sectional and passive clinical 
reporting) in 2006-2007 within each country were evaluated in terms of efficacy for 
substantiating freedom of infection. The yearly cross sectional survey and passive 
clinical reporting within each country performed well with sensitivity of detection 
values ranging around 0.99. The large number of cattle and herds sampled and the 
high diagnostic tests sensitivity contributed to these high sensitivity values within 
each of the surveillance components. In a second stage, it was investigated how 
effective the components were for (early)-detection and whether syndromic 
surveillance using reproductive performance data, milk production and mortality data 
could be of an added value. To account for the timeliness of detection, epidemic 
curves obtained from Reed-Frost models were used to estimate the input to feed the 
scenario tree models. Depending on the expected within herd prevalence, passive 
clinical reporting and syndromic surveillance performed much better than the active 
components, with a 0.99 median sensitivity value. Depending on the assumed direct 
costs of running each of these surveillance components, passive clinical surveillance 
together with syndromic surveillance (based on reproductive performance data) 
turned out to be the most cost efficient for detection of vector-borne diseases such as 
bluetongue. To conclude, for emerging or re-emerging vector-borne disease such as 
bluetongue, it is recommended to use passive clinical and syndromic surveillance as 
early detection systems for maximum cost efficiency. Once an infection is detected, a 
cross sectional screening is recommended for substantiating freedom of infection. 
Sentinel surveillance is useful for monitoring the disease evolution provided sufficient 
herds are sampled and risk based targeted.  
When evaluating surveillance programs, the key questions are: (i) how better 
surveillance could be achieved with less money; and (ii) is surveillance effective as 





To conclude tools explored during this thesis revealed interesting perspectives for 
evaluation and design of surveillance taking into account Belgian country specific 
data and risk factors. Alternatives explored enable conciliating different objectives 
encountered by the different animal heath surveillance industry and stakeholders, 
thereby increasing compliance and acceptability of surveillance. Cost could be 
optimised by improving sensitivity while taking into account specificity not only to 
improve confidence level in freedom but enhancing disease detection too. In addition, 
consumers and various partners in animal health become ever more concerned with 
the reliability of surveillance effectiveness and its cost efficiency. Local initiatives to 
improve surveillance of non-notifiable diseases, for which mutual trust is desirable to 
allow free trade but as well to implement sustainable production, safe public health 
and economy. The tools described in the current thesis do certainly offer promising 
perspectives to assess cost efficiency of other non-regulated diseases and 











Nationale en internationale normen hebben de afgelopen 100 jaar de inhoud bepaald 
van officiële dierziektenprogramma’s. In de laatste twee decennia vond een shift in 
de wetgeving plaats van een verplichting tot het behalen van resultaten in plaats van 
middelen (vaste steekproefgrootte, diagnostische testen). Deze belangrijke 
verandering naar een meer 'fit for purpose' surveillance design maakte het mogelijk 
rekening te houden met de ziekte- en landspecifieke kenmerken, risicofactoren en 
veehouderijpraktijken. Omdat de betrouwbaarheid van het diergezondheidsstatuut 
’van belang is voor vrijhandel en consumentenvertrouwen, blijft de effectiviteit en de 
doeltreffendheid van de surveillance een constante uitdaging. Het huidige proefschrift 
heeft tot doel om scenario-tree methodologie (output-gebaseerde methoden) te 
beschrijven en te gebruiken voor verschillende aangifteplichtige dierziekten en toe te 
lichten hoe deze instrumenten kunnen helpen bij het beoordelen van de effectiviteit 
en efficiëntie van surveillancesystemen. De overkoepelende doelstelling van dit 
proefschrift is het geven van een uitgebreid overzicht van de mogelijkheden die deze 
methoden bieden en om hun beperkingen en aannames te bespreken. Hiermee 
beoogt dit proefschrift  een conceptueel model te bieden voor de beoordeling van de 
effectiviteit en efficiëntie van bewakingsprogramma’s voor de officiële 
aangifteplichtige dierziekten. 
De eerste studie was gericht op het herontwerpen van het Belgische actieve avian 
influenza bewakingsprogramma in professionele pluimveebedrijven, op basis van 
een risicoanalyse-aanpak. Een kwantitatieve stochastische analyse werd uitgevoerd 
om effectieve waarschijnlijkheden van infectie en schattingen van de gevoeligheid 
voor detectie van een besmette vogel in de verschillende geïdentificeerde 
risicogroepen te bekomen, met behulp van nationale registers voor dierenidentificatie 
en gepubliceerde gegevens van vroegere uitbraken. Een optimaal aantal te 
bemonsteren bedrijven werdgeraamd voor elke risicogroep op basis van de 
verkregen effectieve waarschijnlijkheden van infectie en gevoeligheden. In bepaalde 
risicogroepen daalde de geoptimaliseerde steekproefgrootte drastisch t.o.v. de 
oorspronkelijke steekproefgrootte zoals bij kippenboerderijen zonder 





aanvankelijke steekproefgrootte onderschat werd zoals bij kippen in risicogebieden 
met openluchtfaciliteiten. Daarnaast werd aanbevolen om in bepaalde seizoenen het 
toezicht aan te scherpen en de frequentie van steekproeven in bepaalde 
risicogroepen te verhogen om vroegtijdige detectie mogelijk te maken. Deze studie 
was een nuttig instrument voor beleidsmakers om de totale hoeveelheid van de, over 
het (de) komende ja(a)r(en) te nemen monsters in België ,te herverdelen , en 
zodoende de middelen op het terrein te optimaliseren en de efficiëntie van 
ziektebewaking te verbeteren, zoals vereist door de internationale normen. 
In het tweede onderzoek werden verschillende bewakings componenten van het 
boviene brucellosis surveillancesysteem in België onderzocht en werd bekeken hoe 
dit surveillanceprogramma optimaal geoptimaliseerd zou kunnen worden om de 
vrijheid van infectie in België te waarborgen. Het huidige bewakingssysteem (vóór 
2009) en de impact van het verminderen van bewaking in bepaalde risicogroepen op 
de gevoeligheid van het gehele bewakingssysteem werden samen stochastisch 
gesimuleerd. Resultaten toonden aan dat een significante daling van het totale aantal 
monsters haalbaar was en toch een 99% betrouwbaarheidsniveau van ziektevrijheid 
behouden bleef. Het ideale aantal monsters werd geschat op ongeveer 30.000 (dus 
een 30-voudige afname van wat voor 2009 gedaan werd) onder de voorwaarde dat 
het nieuwe toezicht zich op risicogroepen zou richten. Zo was het verhogen van het 
aantal gerapporteerde en geteste abortussen door de boeren en dierenartsen 
noodzakelijk om een  minimaal jaarlijks aantal meldingen van 8.000 abortussen te 
bereiken in plaats van 4.000. De melding van abortus werd sterk gestimuleerd via het 
abortusprotocol. Verder werd geadviseerd om een willekeurige selectie van 15.000 
runderen te testen uit alle kuddes die de afgelopen jaren geen abortussens hebben 
aangetoond. Daarnaast werd aanbevolen om 8.500 runderen te testen tijdens de 
aankoop (willekeurig geselecteerd in regionale laboratoria) en 8.500 runderen uit de 
intracommunautaire handel van officieel-vrije landen, evenals alle runderen uit de 
intracommunautaire handel uit niet-officieel vrije landen. Het nieuwe 
bewakingsprogramma leidde tot de opsporing van één geval in 2010 na een 
abortusonderzoek. 
De derde studie gebruikte scenario-modellering voor de evaluatie van de 





surveillanceprogramma, en voor de identificatie van alternatieven voor optimalisatie 
van dit programma, in overeenstemming met de Europese wetgeving (Europese 
richtlijn 64/432/EEC). Gegevens van 2005-2009 betreft de runderpopulatie, beweging 
en bewaking werden verzameld om het stochastische scenario boom-simulatiemodel 
te voeden, met behulp van 10.000 iteraties per simulatie. In totaal werden 7.403.826 
historische dierbewegingsrecords verkregen voor de 2.678.020 runderen uit 36.059 
veestapels die in 2009 actief waren. De gevoeligheidsanalyse toonde aan dat de 
meest invloedrijke invoerparameter die de variabiliteit rond de output verklaart, 
afkomstig was van de onzekerheidsverdeling rond de gevoeligheid van de 
diagnostische tests die worden gebruikt binnen de bTB-surveillance. Op voorwaarde 
dat alle dieren onderzocht werden en het post-mortem onderzoek zeer gevoelig is, 
was de slachthuisbewaking de meest effectieve bewakingscomponent. Als niet aan 
deze voorwaarden werd voldaan, was de onzekerheid over de gemiddelde 
gevoeligheid van deze component belangrijk. Toch bleek ook dat in 25% van de 
gevallen een infectie onopgemerkt zou kunnen blijven met enkel slachthuisbewaking; 
daarom werd aangeraden de gevoeligheid van toezicht in andere componenten te 
vergroten. Met behulp van bijvoorbeeld verschillende diagnostische tests in plaats 
van de intradermale huidtest, onderzoek bij aankoop en invoer, kan de gevoeligheid 
en het vertrouwensniveau sterk verhogen (negatief voorspellende waarde van het 
surveillancesysteem).  
De doelstelling van het vierde onderzoek was het beoordelen van de gevoeligheid 
van de vier grote blauwtong surveillancecomponenten die in België in 2007 voor 
dieren werden geïmplementeerd, zoals voorgeschreven door de EU-verordening: 
winter serologische screening, sentinel systeem, passief klinisch toezicht en export 
testen. De scenario boommethode werd gebruikt om de relatieve gevoeligheid van 
detectie en de gerichte benadering van elke component te evalueren in termen van 
vroegtijdige detectie en vrijheid van infectieonderbouw. Veldgegevens verzameld in 
België tijdens de uitbraken van de vorige jaren werden gebruikt om de risicogroepen 
te bepalen die overwogen zouden moeten worden. De beste gevoeligheid op 
beslagniveau, rekening houdend met de diagnostische testgevoeligheid, de 
ontwerpprevalentie en het aantal dieren dat in een beslag werd getest, werd 





toonde de gevoeligheidsanalyse aan dat deze gevoeligheid nog hoger kan, indien 
gericht op de juiste risicogroepen. Ondanks de zeer lage beslag niveau gevoeligheid 
bleek passief klinisch toezicht de meest gevoelige component in termen van vroege 
detectie, onder de voorwaarde van een hoog ziektebewustzijn, afwezigheid van 
vaccinatie en zichtbare klinische symptomen. Uit de conclusies van deze studie 
bleek dat passief klinisch toezicht geschikt zou kunnen zijn voor vroegtijdig opsporen 
en onderbouwen van vrijheid van ziekte, maar door de beperkingen werd 
geadviseerd om een herhaalde cross sectionele survey per maand of per 4 
maandelijkse periodes gedurende het vectorseizoen en in bepaalde risicogroepen te 
behouden ter onderbouwing van het vrij zijn van ziekte.  
Het laatste onderzoek vergeleek de relatieve doeltreffendheid en kostenefficiëntie 
van verschillende bewakingscomponenten om de afwezigheid van infectie 
(infectievrijheid) aan te tonen of om de vroegtijdige detectie van vector-
overdraagbare ziekten bij runderpopulaties in verschillende landen toe te staan (met 
behulp van blauwtong als case study). Blauwtong uitbraak- en bewakingsgegevens 
van de epidemie die zich in Nederland, Frankrijk en België voordeed in de jaren 2006 
en 2007, hebben betrouwbare invoergegevens verstrekt om de verschillende 
bewakingscomponenten in elk land te evalueren. In een eerste fase werden de 
verschillende surveillancecomponenten (sentinel, jaarlijkse cross-sectionele studie 
en passieve klinische rapportage) in 2006-2007 in elk land geëvalueerd in termen 
van werkzaamheid om de vrijheid van infectie te ondersteunen. De jaarlijkse cross-
sectioneele studie en passieve klinische rapportage binnen elk land scoorden goed, 
met een detectiegevoeligheid rond 0.99. Het groot aantal bemonsterde dieren en 
beslagen en de hoge gevoeligheid van de diagnostische tests droegen bij aan de 
hoge gevoeligheidswaarden binnen elk van deze bewakingscomponenten. In een 
tweede fase werd onderzocht hoe effectief de componenten waren voor (vroege) 
detectie en of syndroombewaking met behulp van fertiliteitsgegevens, melkproductie- 
en sterftegegevens van toegevoegde waarde kunnen zijn. Om rekening te houden 
met de tijdigheid van detectie werden epidemische curves, verkregen uit Reed-Frost-
modellen, gebruikt om de input voor de scenario-boommodellen te schatten. 
Afhankelijk van de verwachte prevalentie binnen de beslagen, bleek passieve 





met een mediaan van 0.99 voor de gevoeligheidswaarden. Afhankelijk van de 
veronderstelde directe kosten van het uitvoeren van elk van deze 
bewakingscomponenten bleek passief klinisch toezicht samen met 
syndroombewaking (gebaseerd op fertiliteitsgegevens) het meest kostenefficiënt 
voor het opsporen van vector-overdraagbare ziekten zoals blauwtong. Tenslotte, 
voor (her)opkomende  vector-overdraagbare ziekten zoals blauwtong, is het 
aanbevolen passieve klinische bewaking en syndroombewaking te gebruiken als 
vroege detectiesystemen voor een maximale kosten-efficiëntie. Zodra een infectie is 
gedetecteerd, wordt een cross-sectionele screening aanbevolen om de vrijheid van 
infectie te ondersteunen. Sentinel surveillance is nuttig om de ziekteontwikkeling te 
monitoren, op voorwaarde dat voldoende kuddes worden bemonsterd via risico 
gebaseerde selectie.  
Bij het evalueren van bewakingsprogramma's zijn de sleutelvragen: ‘hoe kan betere 
bewaking worden bereikt met minder geld’ en ‘is het toezicht effectief en het het geld 
waard’?  
Men kan besluiten dat de methoden die tijdens dit proefschrift werden onderzocht 
interessante perspectieven aan het licht brachtten voor evaluatie en ontwerp van 
bewaking, rekening houdend met Belgische landspecifieke gegevens en 
risicofactoren.. De onderzochte alternatieven, maken het mogelijk om verschillende 
doelstellingen waarmee de verschillende commerciële en andere belanghebbenden 
in de dierengezondheidsbewaking worden geconfronteerd aan te pakken, waardoor 
de naleving en acceptatie van het toezicht wordt verhoogd. Kosten kunnen worden 
geoptimaliseerd door de gevoeligheid te verbeteren, waarbij rekening wordt 
gehouden met de specificiteit, niet alleen om het betrouwbaarheidsniveau tijdens 
vrijheid van ziekte te verbeteren maar ook om de detectie van ziekten te verbeteren. 
Bovendien zijn consumenten en verschillende partners in dierengezondheid steeds 
meer bezorgd over de betrouwbaarheid van de bewakingsdoeltreffendheid evenals 
over de kosten-efficiëntie ervan. Lokale initiatieven zijn ontstaan voor het verbeteren 
van het toezicht op niet-meldingsplichtige ziekten, waarvoor wederzijds vertrouwen 
wenselijk is om vrijhandel toe te staan, maar ook om duurzame productie te 
implementeren. De werkwijzen die in het huidige proefschrift zijn beschreven, zouden 





beoordelen van de kostenefficiëntie van andere niet-gereguleerde ziekten, en voor 
een duurzame ‘one health’ gezondheidsbewaking op de verschillende niveaus en in 
de verschillende sectoren die onder toezicht staan. 
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The word surveillance originates from the French words “sur” and “veiller” meaning to 
‘watch over’. The word can take different meanings and sometimes can be mistaken 
with the word monitoring. However, in the case of animal diseases, surveillance 
usually signifies the action of collecting information on populations' health status, in 
order to plan interventions; whereas monitoring means more specifically all activities 
aimed at detecting changes in the epidemiological parameters of a particular 
disease, without implementing any control actions (Bisdorff et al., 2016; FAO, 2017; 
Hoinville et al., 2013). Thus, surveillance involves all activities from the collection and 
analysis of data to its interpretation, as well as communicating on the nature and 
implementation of specific intervention strategies whenever a positive signal is 
detected (Drewe et al., 2012; FAO, 2017, 2011; Hoinville et al., 2013; OIE, 2017a). 
Growth in human population together with globalisation, which have resulted in 
increases of livestock production and animal movements, have both played a major 
role in the spread of animal diseases. Major epidemics for example, bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), avian influenza (Elbers et al., 2004), foot and 
mouth (Valarcher et al., 2008), bluetongue (de Koeijer et al., 2006; Méroc et al., 
2009), as well as re-emergence of well-known ‘old’ diseases such as tuberculosis 
and brucellosis (FAO, 2017, Gilbert et al, 2005), have occurred at the beginning of 
the 21st century with devastating impact for farmers and economy as a whole. Faced 
with the new challenges, created by emerging and re-emerging diseases, by 
increases in demand for food products and by trade across the European Union (EU) 
or with third world countries, as well as faced with the substantial evolution of science 
and technology, the need for clear guidelines and rules to guarantee safe feed, food 
and trade have emerged. Indeed, to allow mutual trust and recognition between the 
different livestock production stakeholders, and public health partners, evidence of 
safety is a prerequisite. This can be obtained by mandatory rules established by 
authorities as well as non-regulatory -local initiatives. In this context, the existing 
animal health policies drawn when the EU had only 12 Member States have had to 
be updated (EU, 2016). In parallel, involvement of all animal stakeholders (other than 
authorities) in surveillance for so called regulated but also non-regulated diseases 
was shown to be of main importance for successful control of disease. In such a way, 
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several local and national initiatives emerged (Bisdorff et al., 2016; Calba et al., 
2015, 2016; Cowie et al., 2015; More et al., 2015). 
SURVEILANCE LEGAL BACKGROUND  
International animal health standards 
Following a rinderpest epidemic in Belgium, the OIE, formerly known as the ‘Office 
International des Epizooties’ was founded in 1924 to coordinate disease control at an 
international level to avoid its spread across borders. After World War II, the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, 1946) was established under the United Nations 
(UN, 1945), as well as the World Health Organisation (WHO, 1948). The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, first agreed in 1947 and finalised in Uruguay 
in 1994) included Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures. This later gave rise to 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO, 1995). In 2003, the OIE was renamed to 
become the ‘World Animal Health Organisation’ but kept its acronym (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 shows the main legal bodies that are involved in animal health surveillance 
and in drafting animal health regulation. 




Figure 1: International, European, and national legal entities involved in animal health surveillance and 
in editing animal health legislation and standards: United Nations (UN), World Animal Health 
Organisation (OIE), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO), World Health Organisation (WHO), World Trade Organisation (WTO), European Economic 
Community (EEC), European Commission (EC), European Union (EU), European Food Safety Agency 
(EFSA), European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Health Food Audits and 
Analysis (FVO), European Medicine Agency (EMA). 
 
Following SPS measures, concepts such as equivalence, transparency, risk analysis 
and science based decision-making were introduced in order to mitigate risk of 
contracting infections through the movement of animals or products of animal origin, 
to ensure mutual trust and safe trading amongst partner countries. The OIE was later 
mandated by the WTO as the organisation responsible for drafting international 
standards for animal health. The tasks entrusted to the OIE are designed to: 
 guarantee transparency on the status of diseases around the world; 
 collect, assess and distribute information generated by veterinary science; 
 mobilise expertise and stimulate international collaboration on the control of 
animal diseases; 
 ensure safe trading in animals and animal products issuing health standards; 
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 promote legal frameworks and veterinary service resources at national levels; 
 guarantee food safety and promote animal health following a scientific 
approach; 
 provide science based guidelines and regulation for surveillance and control 
programmes, to ensure safe trading between countries. 
All standards feature in the “Terrestrial Animal Health Code” and the “Manual of 
Diagnostics tests and vaccines for Terrestrial Animals” (as well as their equivalent for 
aquatic species) (OIE, 2017a,b). 
In its Manual on Livestock Disease Surveillance and Information System together 
with its competencies on food and agriculture, the FAO also issues rules to consider 
while setting up and assessing surveillance programmes (FAO, 2017). 
It must be stressed however that neither the OIE nor the FAO have legal authority, 
they only draft standards. 
European animal health standards 
In contrast to the OIE and FAO, the European Commission (EC) has legal authority 
and power to decide on what actions to be taken in case of deviation from baseline 
standards (which, in effect, derive from or are inspired by those laid down by the OIE 
(OIE, 2017a,b). There are three main institutions involved in EU legislation. European 
parliament (represents and is directly elected by EU citizens), Council of European 
Union (represents the Member State governments and the presidency is on a 
rotational basis), the EC (represents the interest of the Union as whole). The EC is 
supported by European agencies such as the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA), the European Medicine Agency (EMA), the Health Food Audits and Analysis 
(FVO) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) for 
drafting laws and policies. EC proposes the new laws and policies and the parliament 
and council adopt them. It’s then EC and Member States that implement them and 
EC have the mandate to check that they are implemented and correctly applied. 
The three main legally binding type of official documents from the EU, namely 
Regulations, Directives and Decisions differ in that (i) Regulations are similar to 
national legislation and apply directly as such within each Member State, (ii) 
Directives set the rules that must be incorporated into all national legislations, 
according to local situation, and (iii) a Decision addresses specific issues and might 
apply to member states or organisations that are mentioned specifically and is 
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directly applicable (EU, 2017). The current body of legally binding EU documents 
covering the food chain consists of nearly seventy pieces of legislation.  
A few examples of different legislations ruling animal disease surveillance in EU, are 
mentioned here below, those are also the ones addressed and or used along this 
thesis: 
Maybe the most pivotal official document ruling animal health is the directive 
64/432/EEC dating from 1964. This regulation lays down the minimum requirements 
to meet for achieving bovine and swine disease-free status enabling free trade in 
animals and products between member states enjoying similar disease status (EC, 
1964). More recently are 2010/367/EU and 456/2012/EU documents that apply to 
Avian Influenza and Bluetongue respectively (EC, 2010, 2012) in response to those 
new (re-)emerging epidemics. In addition, mandatory reporting by each Member 
State on surveillance results 92/117/EC revealed important issues regarding 
insufficient or incomplete data collection (EC, 1992). Consequently, directive 
2003/99/EC emphasised the need to harmonise data collection to ensure better 
comparison of trends and sources of different zoonosis, allowing better prevention of 
risk and threat for public health and safe trading (EC, 2003a). Later, partly as a 
consequence of the BSE crisis, amongst others, the need for better traceability of 
animals and animal products triggered the emergence of various regulations and 
directives on the identification and registration of cattle and its products (i.e., 
1760/2000/EC, 911/2004/EC, 1082/2003/EC and 644/2005/EC that rule on ear tag 
identification, the holding of registers and the issuing of passports, the minimum level 
of controls to be carried out in the framework of the system and the need to keep 
data) (EC 2000, 2003b, 2004, 2005). This in turn provides huge data sources that 
enable better risk assessment.  
Faced with a constantly evolving legislation, EC decided to lay down a new animal 
health policy that would replace the existing series of interconnected policy actions 
by a single framework encompassing all aspects (not only the absence of disease, 
but also taking into account animal welfare, feed, food safety and public health).  
Main issues of gaps in key areas and deliverables faced with the previous 
legislations were assessed in order to provide a modernised, simplified, more risked-
based approach for the protection of health and to ensure the use of efficient control 
tools so that regulation guiding processing along the food chain is applied effectively. 
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This led to the new Animal Health Law: Regulation EU 2016/429 (31st March 2016), 
establishing a clear and transparent regulatory framework in order to prevent losses 
and reduce disease impacts on animal health, the economy and public health (EU, 
2016). Through the years, a drift from input based standards towards output based 
standards is observed. Meaning by this more freedom but also more responsibility is 
given to Member States for setting up there guidelines and proofs of meeting 
minimum requirements. 
National animal health standards and surveillance in Belgium 
In Belgium, the Federal Public Service for Health, Safety of the Food Chain and 
Environment (FPS) together with the Federal Agency for Safety of the Food Chain 
(FASFC) and the sanitary fund have the mandate to draft relevant animal & plant 
health national regulation (FPS, 2017). This is done in collaboration with the involved 
stakeholders (farmers, traders, veterinarians’ organisations, regional and national 
reference laboratories, slaughterhouses andfood business operators). These 
legislations cover a range of activities in addition to EU requirements. The mandate 
of the FASFC is also to control, ensuring that legislation is respected. These entities 
are inspired by the minimum requirements laid down in EU and International 
documents, as well as those emanating from the Scientific Committee hosted by 
FASFC. For surveillance of notifiable (but also non-notifiable) disease in Belgium, 
farmers and local veterinarians (practitioners) are at the frontline for the detection of 
symptoms and collect samples. If they see alarming symptoms they are obliged to 
report to official veterinarian authorities at the FASFC. The FPS co-operates with the 
FASFC and the representatives of farmers (AGROFRONT) for the regulated 
diseases. Regional animal health organisations (ARSIA and DGZ) as well as other 
private laboratories collect and analyse samples obtained by the practitioners 
according to a quality system (ISO 17025). They centralise results, communicate with 
the practitioners and farmers and they report at national level or send samples that 
need to be tested for confirmation to the National Reference Laboratory (CODA-
CERVA). CODA-CERVA operates at the national level, organising, coordinating, 
centralising and analysing samples that require confirmation testing from all regional 
laboratories. The epidemiology, risk assessment and surveillance unit (ERASURV) at 
CODA-CERVA supports authorities (FASFC and FPS) for the organisation and 
assessment of national surveillance programmes and it provides epidemiological and 
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scientific background information. Exchanges between these partners are 
permanent, taking place during formal technical working groups by sector (cattle, 
poultry, pigs, small ruminants, milk) or by disease (Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis 
(IBR), Bovine Viral Diarrhoea (BVD), Bovine Tuberculosis (TBC), Salmonellosis, and 
Bovine Brucellosis …etc.) (Figure 2). In addition other private organisations (i.e. 
rendering plants, milk collection units) or community funded organisations (i.e. 
universities) are also involved in animal health surveillance and are of main 
importance, however for readability purpose, only those strongly involved in notifiable 
disease surveillance are mentioned here. 
 
Figure 2: Main actors involved in the Belgian surveillance system for regulatory 
diseases (Federal Public Service for health, food safety and the environment (FPS), 
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain (FASFC), Veterinary and 
Agrochemical Research Centre (CODA-CERVA) Public Health Institute (ISP-WIV), 
Regional animal health organisations (DGZ, ARSIA), Universities, Veterinarians, 
Slaughterhouses, Millk collecting Units, Fertility Centres, Agriculture Farming 
Organisations, Farmers syndicate (AgroFront (ABS, Boerenbond, FWA). 
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Efficiency in tracing sources of infection or diseases and in implementing control 
measures will be driven by the quality of data (FAO, 2017; OIE, 2017a, b). To comply 
with the European legislation 1760/2000/EC, Belgium has created a database to 
gather information on animal identification and movements. The SANITEL database, 
a national computerised identification and registration system for all bovine, swine, 
ovine, caprine, cervids herds and poultry farms, contains for some species 
information regarding date and place of birth, previous and current place of holding, 
dates of on-farm and off-farm movements and date and reason of death. Although 
SANITEL has not been implemented specifically for disease surveillance, it is of high 
use as information regarding the disease status and certification of herds for official 
surveillance programmes such as Aujeszky, IBR, BVD, TBC, and Bovine Brucellosis. 
The day-to-day management of this national data base is entrusted to the FASFC 
though regional laboratories (ARSIA and DGZ) are at first line for entering the data. 
LIMS (Laboratory Integrated Management System) data are laboratory data obtained 
from all laboratories involved in national animal health monitoring and surveillance 
programmes in Belgium. Data is recorded at regional level by the different labs then 
centralised at the national level where responsibility lies for data validation, enabling 
later surveillance analysis and evaluation for the whole country by epidemiologists 
from the Veterinary and Public Health Institutes (WIV-ISP and CODA-CERVA). 
Farmers and veterinarians are at first line for collecting the data and ensuring the 
correct implementation of sanitary measures. In Belgium to encourage participation 
of farmers in surveillance, a sanitary fund system was created. This sanitary fund 
enables compensation in case of notifiable regulated disease outbreaks that requires 
specific measures, but also enables surveillance and control measures for non-
notifiable disease. The interplay and involvement of all animal stakeholders (from 
farmers to authorities) challenged by regular working groups for each animal species 
and disease enables to take sound decisions and the implementation of sustainable 
surveillance systems and animal health in Belgium. However, tools to assess 
whether established standards are met or not or assess how confident one can be in 
surveillance are required. 
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THE ESSENTIAL STAGES AND FEATURES FOR 
EFFECTIVE SURVEILLANCE  
Stages and features of surveillance 
Containment and control of epidemic diseases depend on timely and good-quality 
information about disease events in order to understand the disease situation, 
support decision-making and prevent potential disease incursion. Various tools for 
collecting information on animal health at national and regional levels have emerged. 
However, to assess the drivers of animal disease and the patterns of transmission 
and spread, there remain challenges relating to the sensitivity of surveillance 
systems to capture information about new hazards or re-emerging threats. 
Epidemiologists and laboratories network play an important role in collecting, 
collating and analysing data on diseases and in providing epidemiological 
interpretation of the obtained results and converting these results into information to 
guide planning of disease control and risk management (Drewe et al., 2012; FAO, 
2017). A brief guideline of key principles and strategic framework for effective 
surveillance is presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Strategic framework and key features for effective surveillance  
Essential stages and features to consider in surveillance 
Stakeholders involved  Decision makers (regional and/or federal), Authority (regional and/or federal), Laboratories 
(regional and/or federal), Universities, Field veterinarians, Farmers, Consumers, Food business 
Operators 
Description and aims of 
surveillance  
 Importance of the hazard: (frequency/severity/economic/zoonotic impact) 
 Objective: 
o Baseline level: assess spread and impact of disease or intervention 
o Case detection: (early-)detection of (re-)emerging disease 
o Substantiate freedom of disease 
 Purpose (rules, education, social behaviour, ethical, animal welfare and tools) 
 Resources: time/funds/field labour 




 Passive, Active, Syndromic surveillance and ontologies 
Surveillance 
Population 
 Representative population, Target population, Sample frame, Study population 
Surveillance design  Sample size, Diagnostic tests characteristics, Sample frequency,  
 Sampling strategy: 
 Non Probability sampling: judgement, convenience, purposive  
 Probability sampling: simple random sampling, systematic random sampling, stratified 
random sampling, multistage sampling, cluster sampling, targeted hazard versus risk-
based sampling 
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Stakeholders involved  
Whereas public and animal health surveillance is a tool to assess the health status 
and the impact of measures implemented by authorities in charge of agriculture, 
health and finance—or other sponsors and donors — data from effective surveillance 
systems is also useful for these same bodies to target resources and assess 
programmes. Thus, legal entities (national governments, international authorities) 
certainly have a decisive role to play to ensure public health and to respond to 
threats. However, on the other hand, animal owners, the health industry and carers 
are probably better placed to mitigate risk. Stakeholders’ needs and priorities might 
differ from those of authorities, but commitment and participation of all parties are 
essential for effective and successful surveillance (Calba et al., 2015; Dufour and 
Hendrikx, 2007; EC, 2014). 
Description & aims of surveillance  
Disease surveillance activities are designed to ascertain a given population's health 
status, for either early detection, or to assess prevalence and impact or to prove 
absence of animal diseases (Figure 3). Ultimately disease surveillance will inform 
and guide actions to its control (vaccination, eradication, or contingency planning). 
The design will be tailored to the goals and disease status. However, economic, 
political, social and welfare aspects can also determine surveillance activities. The 
various stakeholders in surveillance can sometimes contribute to the apparent 
inconsistency of surveillance goals since they can vary according to stakeholders’ 
priorities and needs (Cowie et al, 2015; Stark & Häsler, 2015).  
 
Figure 3: Surveillance based on disease status and goals. While disease is endemic, 
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the aims are to assess prevalence, deviation from baseline trends, impact 
assessment (e.g. vaccination coverage) and eventually eradication. Later, once 
disease has been successfully eradicated early detection of emergence or re-
emergence of disease together with proving absence below the maximum tolerable 
prevalence will be the main aims guiding surveillance activities. 
Although surveillance systems may vary widely in methodology, scope and 
objectives, such variability can be harnessed by encouraging the definition of clear 
objectives and purpose, and by reporting according to a standardised terminology 
(Bisdorff et al., 2016; Drewe et al., 2012; Calba et al., 2015; Hoinville et al., 2013).  
To ensure surveillance meets desired objectives, several attributes are mentioned 
throughout the literature and official standards to implement and assess surveillance 
(i.e. objectivity, acceptability, accuracy, transparency, data quality, efficacy, 
efficiency, feasibility flexibility, positive predictive value, negative predictive value, 
relevance, representativeness, security, sensitivity, specificity, simplicity, stability, 
timeliness, usefulness) (Cameron, 2012; Drewe et al., 2012; Hoinville et al., 2013). It 
is recommended to not only rely on one or two attributes to set up or assess 
surveillance (Drewe et al., 2012), but efforts to improve certain attributes — for 
instance the ability of a system to detect a health event (sensitivity) might be 
detrimental for other attributes, such as simplicity or timeliness. Therefore success of 
a surveillance system will depend on the right balance of characteristics on the one 
hand and, on the other, the ability to adapt these characteristics according to the 
system's requirements and resources (Drewe et al., 2012).  
Surveillance components  
A wealth of necessary information to assess surveillance can be gathered from data 
collected by farmers, slaughterhouses, laboratories, dairy collection units. Each 
separate flow or source of data generated defines the components of surveillance. 
The wide variety of data collection sources, storage format and flows of information 
obviously make management more complex but they can be summarised as three 
main categories of surveillance component: passive surveillance components (such 
as clinical or abortion notifications), active surveillance components (such as 
sentinels or repeated cross-sectional serological surveys) and syndromic surveillance 
components (defined by the collection and analysis of non-disease-specific 
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production data (i.e. milk production data; reproductive performance data; mortality 
data) to detect deviations of the baseline trends). 
More specifically, from an animal disease angle or at a national level, surveillance 
can be seen as a system comprising several surveillance components (defined as 
surveillance portfolio) which are characterised by their specific population coverage 
and data processing system, each of them contributing to inform on surveillance 
objectives and targets; i.e. bulk milk testing will only cover dairy herds and data 
generated will be recorded separately; slaughterhouse surveillance will cover a large 
population and, consequently, the flow of recorded data will be large too and belong 
to a separate stream (Hoinville et al., 2013). Surveillance components though mainly 
described as active or passive surveillance are occasionally described as 
respectively proactive or reactive (Dufour and Hendrikx, 2007), however along this 
thesis we will stick to the two former. Passive surveillance relies on notification and 
goodwill from farmers/veterinarians only, who report/notify suspicious animals. This 
can be considered as a frontline tool, where farmers and animal care workers, in 
close contact with animals daily, are relied upon to provide a constant and immediate 
picture of the disease status in a given population. Fear of ethical repercussions or 
economic repression, visibility of clinical signs, and the awareness of farmers and 
animal care workers are the main constraints that hamper the efficacy of such 
surveillance components (ARSIA, 2013; Dufour and Hendrikx, 2007; Elbers et al., 
2010; Humblet et al., 2011). While public health surveillance mainly relies on passive 
surveillance, animal health surveillance, to ensure food safety or fulfil trade 
requirements, triggers the need of sufficient data and its representative collection via 
active surveillance. Active surveillance implies testing individuals from a sample of 
the target population, regardless of whether or not they show clinical signs. It 
provides a representative and/or snapshot image of the disease status in the 
population or it detects sero-conversion through the routine serological testing of 
sero-negative individuals (Racloz et al., 2006). The fact of planning limits detection to 
predetermined indicators, thereby hampering early detection of an unexpected (re)-
emerging disease. Syndromic surveillance makes use of non-specific data on animal 
health, production or mortality. Investigation of routinely collected data (i.e. milk 
production data, reproductive performance data), or population levels (laboratory 
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data) enables the assessment of deviations from baseline trends. Over recent years, 
this form of surveillance has gained popularity (Hoinville et al., 2013). 
Surveillance population & surveillance design 
Because census sampling is not feasible for practical and economic reasons, 
inference towards the target population is made on its disease status from a sample 
of the reference population. Sampling can hamper accuracy and precision of the 
population estimates such as totals and means.  This is particularly the case when 
the study population (selection from the sample frame (fraction of population from 
which we can draw a sample)) characteristics differ from the target population (one 
for which surveillance is meant for) (Dohoo et al., 2012; Molenberghs, 2009). 
Lack of accuracy is called bias. Bias is the deviation of the sample estimate from the 
true population value and is the result of a systematic error. Bias can be caused by 
different aspects of the study's design, such as: 1) the sampling (selection bias); 2) 
diagnostic test characteristics sensitivity and specificity (measurement bias) or 3) the 
method of analysis (analysis bias). Precision is the estimate of the variation and 
uncertainty around an estimate, and it is the result of random error. The (lack of) 
precision is affected by the number of samples and variance in population. Because 
of bias and precision uncertainty, the inference for the obtained statistics (population 
estimates) can result in errors. Each inference is accompanied by probability errors. 
Type I error (alpha), which is concluding an effect exists when in fact there is no 
effect. In surveillance, type I (alpha) error is related to the herd specificity (Alpha=1-
herd specificity), which indicates the false positive rate. Type II error (beta), which is 
concluding there is no effect or differences when in fact there is. In surveillance this is 
related to the herd sensitivity (Beta=1- herd sensitivity), which indicates the false 
negative rate. 
Because tests are imperfect, a combination of different tests or components will be 
considered to increase the confidence about sensitivity or specificity of detection. 
Sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, negative predictive value, 
repeatability and reproducibility constitute the main parameters used to evaluate 
diagnostic test (Banoo et al., 2010). 
Frequency of sampling can be adapted depending on disease characteristics 
(epidemic or endemic disease, slow or fast spreading, incubation or latency periods). 
The reproductive ratio (R0), defined as the number of secondary cases caused by 
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one typically infectious case (Velthuis et al, 2007; Graat et al., 2001), enables 
prediction of likelihood of major or minor outbreaks. An infectious disease with an R0 
below 1 will eventually die out without intervention, whereas an infection with an R0 
above 1 will likely spread and require intervention strategies to stop the spread of the 
disease. The likelihood of a major or minor epidemic, can be estimated as 1-1/R0, 
e.g. an infection with an R0 of 5 will have a probability of 80% to cause a large 
outbreak. By contrast, an endemic situation is characterised by diseases that are 
present within the country at low or high prevalence but that do not have a “sudden” 
onset in space or time (Buehler, 1998; Comin et al., 2012). 
As the sampling design concerns, many possibilities exist. Probability sampling or 
non-probability sampling are the main sampling techniques. Non probability 
sampling, such as convenience sampling (i.e, holdings close to each other or all dairy 
herds), purposive sampling (holdings with a known exposure to the risk factor or 
having a specific disease status (i.e. only Salmonella positive holdings) or judgment 
sampling (based on researchers decision or human decision only) are easy to carry 
out. Yet, their disadvantage is that they are likely to introduce selection bias. 
Probability sampling has the advantage of allowing inference to the population. 
Simple random sampling implies that individuals have non-zero and equal probability 
of being sampled. This method allows inference to the whole population taking into 
account sampling weight (one only selects a fraction of all existing holdings). In 
systematic sampling, a fixed interval is used to decide what individuals to select from 
a list of the population to be sampled. Stratified and proportional to size sampling, 
allows greater precision of the overall estimates. Usually, stratified sampling is 
carried out as a proportion of the size of a stratum (i.e., number of herds per 
provinces or regions). Hence, small size region are sure to be selected, which would 
not have been the case if done by a simple random sample. However, larger strata 
will then have less weight in the overall estimates, as would have been the case in 
simple random sampling. Also, depending on sample size allocation per strata, the 
stratum specific estimates might have lower precision. When clustering effects are 
ignored (i.e. two pairs of overshoes of the same farm will be correlated), there will be 
lack of accuracy and precision. Multistage selections of holdings and of animals 
takes into account the clustering effect. The variation within and between herds must 
be known to estimate the correct sample size. The sample size required will be larger 
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for a same desired precision. Clustered sampling is based on the principle that 
selecting holdings—and within those holdings sampling all animals—is easier to 
carry out, as often the list of holdings exists, which is not the case for animal IDs. It is 
also cheaper to sample all individuals from a small selection of herds than it is from a 
selection of individuals from a large number of herds. However, due to the correlated 
structure of the data for a given sample size (animals from the same farm are more 
likely to behave the same way or have the same disease status); the variation within 
herds will be small whereas variation between herds is larger. Depending on the 
correlation within a herd— in particular when within-herd correlation is high —   it is 
better to sample many different herds than many animals within a limited number of 
herds in order to get a precise and unbiased estimate of disease status prevalence 
(Faes et al., 2011). 
Targeted sampling can be considered as a special case of cluster sampling and it 
can also be referred to as risk based surveillance, where the aim is to detect specific 
hazards that are more likely to occur in specific strata of the population. Despite 
increasing the efficacy of sampling and reducing field work, precision and accuracy of 
estimates will be altered and need for correcting on the basis of within and between 
classes correlations will be generated. Risk based surveillance offers a very useful 
alternative to improve efficiency under the following conditions: epidemiological 
expertise, knowledge regarding target population, good data quality, and 
transparency. Only under these conditions, risk based surveillance can outperform a 
random sampling to detect disease or follow up the implemented measures. 
Combining different sources of evidence is also an alternative to improve efficacy of 
surveillance as well as accounting for historical data (Bisdorff et al., 2016; Cameron 
2012; EU, 2016). This automatically triggers the need of tools to correct the precision 
and biased nature of the sampling in order to allow inference from data generated by 
the surveillance system (Dohoo et al., 2012; Molenberghs, 2009). More attention to 
this topic will be addressed further in the thesis. 
SURVEILLANCE EVALUATION 
Models and simulations in surveillance 
Where time and budgetary restrictions prevent the conduct of field experiments, 
simulation models may offer good alternatives. To model disease processes in 
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animal populations or to quantify the impact of measures from standard risk factor 
analysis by means of regression techniques to simulate spreading (simulating 
outbreaks or estimating reproductive ratio), simulation models can provide better 
prediction than what one can simply observe in an experimental unit. Models can be 
built from field data in order to realistically simulate real life scenarios.  
Simulation models can be deterministic or stochastic. Deterministic models are 
relatively easy to implement because they simulate results of a given scenario for a 
set of predetermined values and returns one single outcome value. However, 
conclusions from such models do not take into account the possible variation and 
uncertainty of events. In contrast, stochastic models simulate events as a function of 
a range of different values. Biological variability, complexity of disease transmission, 
uncertainty around current knowledge and a country’s disease situation can all be 
factored in by means of probability density functions and reflected in the output 
characterised by an outcome distribution. The appropriate probability density function 
or distributions will be defined by the probability that a random variable will fall within 
a particular range of values. The parameters will describe the shape of the probability 
density function. For instance a normal distribution will be characterised by the mean 
and the variance. The binomial probability distribution is often used to characterise 
diagnostic tests, and is characterised by the parameters n (number of trials) and p 
(probability of success). The pert distribution often used in stochastic simulation 
models, and used to describe variability and uncertainty originating from expert 
opinion. It is characterised by the parameters minimum, maximum and most likely 
value. These same parameters are used to define the triangular distribution, 
however, in contrast to the triangular distribution; the pert distribution will give more 
emphasis to the tails of the distribution. The combination of all probability density 
functions will generate the output probability distribution. 
Common processes for stochastic simulation are the “Monte Carlo” algorithms but 
others exist as well such as the “Latin hypercube” sampling amongst others. The 
differences lie in the iteration processes. Whereas “Monte Carlo” will randomly pick 
up random values out of the input distribution, the “Latin hypercube” sampling 
process will pick up more values in the mean of the distribution and it places less 
emphasis on the tail of the distribution. The output of a stochastic simulation model 
can be seen as a probability density function, reflecting the uncertainty and the 
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variability of possible outcomes of a given scenario. Stochastic modelling has gained 
increased recognition in veterinary epidemiology. However, one must take care when 
interpreting results from such models. Indeed, one of the pitfalls of these models is 
that outputs are strongly dependent on inputs; the “NINO” concept (Nonsense In, 
Nonsense Out) is sometimes used to describe this pitfall. Therefore, validation of the 
model outcome as well as the used probability density functions, is an important step.  
One of the fields where simulation techniques have gained considerable interest is in 
the assessment of probability of freedom from a specific disease. In other words, 
given that no positive reactors are observed, what is one's level of confidence in true 
freedom, taking into account the surveillance system's design (Boklund, et al., 2013; 
Frossling et al., 2013; Knight-Johnes et al, 2010). Rather than evaluating input based 
standards, one sets the output based standards (i.e. confidence level in freedom of 
disease in a surveillance setting of a certain disease with low prevalence). 
Simulations are then used to ‘mimic’ the sampling process within certain target/risk 
groups as well as ‘mimicking’ the combinations of sampling processes in the different 
risk groups. It allows assessing which sampling process might be the most 
successful taking into account the different surveillance attributes described above in 
Table 1. In addition, cumulative confidence gained through time with the disease 
surveillance process can be modelled using Bayesian theorems.  
Assessment of surveillance effectiveness and efficiency 
Obviously, it is of the highest importance that surveillance should be capable of 
achieving its objectives; this is what is commonly defined as effectiveness. Whereas 
it is clear that in a context of emerging and remerging diseases there is a need for 
effective and cost-efficient surveillance systems (as much for public health as for 
animal welfare and trade), criteria and tools that can provide mutual trust and 
sufficient confidence about the country’s surveillance are still lacking (Bisdorff et al., 
2016; Calba et al., 2015; Drewe et al.; 2012; Hoinville et al., 2013; Stärk and Häsler, 
2015). Stark et al. (2002) and Salman et al., (2003) introduced the need of quality 
assurance and assessing surveillance. Later, Martin et al. (2007) and Cameron 
(2012) summarised the evolution from input based standards to output based 
standards, the latter allowing better comparison of quality equivalence. Furthermore, 
striking a balance between benefits from a surveillance system and the cost of 
running it, in other words surveillance efficiency, is important too. It is important to 
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consider the attributes for evaluation in relation to the objectives of surveillance 
(Drewe et al., 2012; Calba et al., 2015). Studies used to assess surveillance systems 
can either be quantitative or qualitative. In Table 2, all methods used in the context of 
animal health are summarised. 
Amongst qualitative methods, the most common one is Expert Knowledge 
Elicitation (EKE). This method uses a scoring system from experts who assess 
surveillance components. These methods were widely used in the past to forecast 
disasters and were later applied to other fields of risk assessment. The drawback of 
the method comes from two main assumptions:  (i) subjectivity around scoring and (ii) 
group judgement is given more importance than individual judgement. Different 
techniques can counter these assumptions such as different weighing of the scores 
per expert — based on expertise — and reducing variability by repeating the process 
until consensus is reached. Logic models are an expanded subset of these tools, 
including all aspects of surveillance under consideration. In addition to scores, 
comments can be given too. Not only experts can be considered but all stakeholders 
in animal health surveillance. Consensus on scores is less important, the emphasis is 
placed on detecting similarities and differences in surveillance priorities, gaps and 
needs and present output visually by different means, which allows the capture of 
socio economic and cultural aspects (Calba et al., 2014, 2016). Also, in contrast to 
“top down evaluations” (i.e., where surveillance evaluation is carried out from 
authorities’ angle and objectives essentially), it will ensure that points of view from 
the field as well as their expectations and perceptions are included in a “bottom up 
evaluation” and it can also bring together stakeholders, authorities, decision makers, 
program funders and beneficiaries (Calba et al., 2014, 2016; Queenan et al., 2016). 
However, these participative and social epidemiology methods require a 
representative number of stakeholders to sample, it will also require time to schedule 
interviews separately, in order to avoid bias in answers (interviewing authorities 
together with a community of farmers could change perceptions and answers). 
Finally, quantitative output results are hard to obtain as a scoring system remains 
subjective. This subjectivity around the output means that evaluation and validation 
of methods will be difficult to measure and, in the field, applying recommendations 
from lessons learned will be hard too.  
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Amongst the quantitative methods, case reports generated from data collection and 
summarising information obtained from different data collection streams is the 
primary step in surveillance. This can be done by simply a proportionate comparison 
of incidence or prevalence rates obtained either from surveillance components or 
from different regions (Bronner et al., 2014).  
Although simple, common regression techniques (logistic, linear, longitudinal…) 
can be adapted and encompass a larger range of evaluation techniques than a 
simple risk factor analysis (Méroc et al., 2012). Timeliness, compliance and coverage 
can be assessed taking into account random effects linked to veterinary practitioners 
and other factors; and provide reliable information on solutions that could be 
implemented to increase compliance and timeliness and thus offer promising options 
for better surveillance (Del Rocio et al., 2010). Also, in terms of timeliness and 
geographical coverage, correlation between data collected from different surveillance 
systems and national or global data bases, provides useful information on the quality 
of a surveillance system (Farnsworth et al., 2010). For zoonotic diseases, extending 
comparison of animal disease surveillance components with human outbreak data 
provides interesting insight on transmission characteristics and predicting disease 
outbreaks, but also can help to identify important gaps in surveillance (Rabinowitz et 
al., 2012).  
After identifying gaps, measuring the effect of efforts made is an important element to 
assess the quality of surveillance (for instance before and after stimulation 
campaigns and understanding reasons and motifs why cases are reported or not) 
(Elbers et al., 2010; Humblet et al., 2011).  
However, the evaluation of the quality and timeliness of data is more complex. 
Simulating epidemics and their spread in space and time based on spread 
parameters, risk factors and intervention measures enable the evaluation of how well 
the intervention or surveillance protocols are capable of reducing the size of the final 
epidemic. Reproductive ratios, movement patterns, network analysis and spatial 
clustering can be used to simulate the spread of a specific disease and assess the 
impact of control measures (such as bans on movements), and efficacy of diagnostic 
testing protocols; or, alternatively, if different strains were to emerge with different 
reproductive ratios, they can assess their impact on surveillance (de Koeijer et al., 
2011; Ensoy et al, 2013, 2014; Hasala and Boklund, 2014).  
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Syndromic surveillance, based on routinely collected production data (milk or 
fertility), mortality data and laboratory data provides an insight into the impact of 
certain diseases and their spread in space and time, which also provides valuable 
information to quantify efficacy of surveillance compared to conventional surveillance, 
(Dórea et al., 2013; Marceau et al., 2014; Perrin et al., 2012; Welby et al., 2016). 
Capture recapture methods, initially developed and widely used for environmental 
surveys, are methods designed to estimate true population sizes mainly but they can 
be used in epidemiology to measure the thoroughness of disease records (i.e., 
quantify expected abortions and compare with reported abortions (Bronner et al., 
2013). However, these methods are subject to constraints due to the assumptions on 
which these methods rely. The assumptions are that every animal in the population 
has the same probability of capture each time it is sampled; the probability of 
recapture does not change with time (Vergne et al., 2014). 
Cost benefit analysis provides valuable information to assess surveillance 
efficiency. In addition to all techniques developed in this section, the principle here is 
to compare the benefits gained from surveillance (i.e., sensitivity) with efforts made; 
field requirements and budgetary burden. However, major limitations of this method 
are the value of information and inputs. Direct costs may easily be estimated but 
indirect costs or benefits may be difficult to estimate; i.e., what is the cost if 
surveillance is less sensitive, leading thereby to disease spread and production 
losses. The subjectivity around cost estimates, the different weights given to 
expected costs depending on stakeholders' views together with the lack of 
standardisation can explain the limited number of available studies for animal 
disease surveillance (Häsler et al., 2012; Drewe et al., 2014; Stärk and Häsler, 
2015).  
Output based methods, which will be developed in detail in the next section, is an 
example of a method used for evaluation of surveillance. Ultimately it is conceived to 
measure whether surveillance meets the design targets. Different surveillance 
components can be compared with each other based on their relative efficacy 
(sensitivity) and the surveillance system as a whole; taking into account all 
information provided by the various components can be estimated too (Boklund, et 
al., 2013; Frossling et al., 2013; Knight-Johnes et al, 2010). 
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Table 2: Various quantitative and qualitative methods to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of surveillance systems (adapted from Drewe et al., 2012) 
Methods Description of the method Reference 
Participatory 
epidemiology  
Social epidemiology   
Logic model 
Assess qualitatively and score experts and animal 
health stakeholders’ priorities, gaps and needs for 
surveillance. The output is then visualised with 
different graphs, which enables identification of gaps 
and priorities in surveillance 
Calba et al., 2014, 
2016; Hendricks et 
al., 2011 ; Queenan 
et al., 2016; Roelandt 
et al., 2015 
 
Case reports Assess the incidence or prevalence from different 
components or measurements of increased 
notifications before and after disease awareness 
campaigns 
Alfonso et al., 2014 ; 
Bronner et al., 2014; 
Humblet et al., 2011; 
Elbers et al., 2010 
Regression 
techniques 
Odds of detection, relative risk of detection, correlation 
between different surveillance components data, 
compliance, timeliness of surveillance methods 
Del Rocio et al., 
2010; Farnsworth et 
al., 2010; Méroc et 
al., 2012; Rabinowitz 
et al., 2012; Welby et 
al., 2011 
Spatial and spread 
models  
Simulating and assessing impact of different 
surveillance and intervention strategies on spread or 
transmission of disease  
Claes et al., 2013; de 
Koeijer et al., 2011; 
Ensoy et al., 2013, 




Identification of deviation from baseline trends  Dórea et al., 2013; 
Marceau et al., 2014 ; 
Perrin et al., 2012  
Capture, recaptures 
models 
Resampling method  Bronner et al., 2013 ; 
Vergne et al., 2014 
Cost Benefit Estimates cost in comparison with gained benefits; 
(i.e.,. sensitivity of detection) 
Häsler et al., 2012; 
Drewe et al., 2014; 
Rutten et al., 2012; 




Modelling disease surveillance process quantitatively 
within the different populations of interest taking into 
account their differential risk of infection or detection 
enables assessment of the effectiveness of 
surveillance in relation to prescribed minimal 
standards 
Boklund, et al., 2013; 
Cameron, 2012; 
Frossling et al., 2013; 
Knight-Johnes et al, 
2010; Welby et al., 
2010, 2012, 2013, 
2016 
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Output based simulation models for substantiating freedom of disease 
Traditional sample size calculation systems, developed by Canon and Roe (1982), 
have shown their limitations as they assume perfect test sensitivity and specificity. 
More generally tests used do not have these perfect test characteristics and survey 
results deliver estimates with a much lower confidence than expected. Cameron and 
Baldock (1998a, b), as well as Jordan and McEwen (1998), adapted these formulas 
to include herd level uncertainty and imperfect test characteristics, but they assumed 
representative sampling (Cameron, 2012). Doherr and Audigé (2001) introduced the 
need to combine data from different sources when claiming freedom of disease. They 
also underlined the need to demonstrate freedom whilst enabling detection too. 
Later, scenario tree, output based methods, introduced by Martin et al. (2007a, b) 
provided tools to account for non-representative sampling and differential risk of 
infection. Martin et al. (2007a, b) also enabled to account and combine data obtained 
from different surveillance components and data processes in order to indicate 
surveillance system sensitivity. In addition Cameron (2012) provided tools to account 
for historical information regarding surveillance over time.  
The principles of such risk based scenario tree methods lie on the fact that one has 
more chances of detecting the disease if one has prior knowledge of where it 
clusters. By targeting surveillance in populations where disease tends to cluster, one 
can thereby increase efficacy (sensitivity). Each surveillance component activity is 
summarised into a bifurcation chart called scenario tree. For instance, components in 
Belgium that can be considered as pillars of Brucellosis surveillance in cattle are: 
abortion notification, purchase tests, import tests, bulk milk testing of dairy herds, 
tracing herds after breakouts over five consecutive years as well as breakouts from 
herd contacts showing equivocal results and, finally, yearly random sample. Figure 4 
shows three scenario trees for 3 different surveillance components (abortion testing, 
testing cattle during ‘intra-country purchase’ and bulk milk testing of dairy cattle). 
Populations under review for these three components are different. The abortion 
component will concern female cattle essentially, purchase component will cover all 
cattle moved from one farm to another following purchase and bullk milk testing will 
concern dairy cattle in large enough dairy herds delivering milk via tank milk to milk 
collecting units. In spite of fairly distinctive population coverage, overlaps exist. 
Methods developed by Martin et al.. (2007a, b) allow adapting for the overlap. 
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However, it is quite common not to take this overlap into account, as in practice 
information generated by one component will not impact sampling in other 
surveillance components.  
Figure 4: Scenario tree developed to evaluate the performance of different 
surveillance components (abortion testing, testing cattle during ‘intra-country 
purchase’ and bulk milk testing of dairy cattle herds) for detection of bovine 
brucellosis in Belgium. PPr, SPr are the relative population and sampled proportions 
in each risk group and RR are the relative risk of infection in each risk group.  P* is 
design prevalence at herd (h) and animal leve (a) while TSe is the diagnostic process 
sensitivity. 
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The scenario tree is characterised by its nodes describing each event from infection 
to detection. Each node splits the population sampled (n) and the representative 
population (N) according to the branches representing the differential probabilities of 
infection or detection. Three types of nodes are considered: risk category nodes, 
infection nodes and detection nodes. They are placed in a chronological order 
(representing the sequence of events from infection to detection), according to 
decreasing size. The design prevalence (P*), at herd (h) or animal level (a), used for 
the model design differs from the actual prevalence and enables drawing conclusions 
on surveillance effectiveness of the component against an agreed standard. It is a 
set benchmarking value used to estimate the effective probability of infection (EPI) 








For each risk group i, the effective probability of infection (EPI) for holdings and 
animals is calculated as follows:  
𝐸𝑃𝐼 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑃
∗ 
The combination of each branch and node constitute the limbs of the tree, defining 
the subpopulation groups and their respective relative effective probability of infection 
and detection. Too many details about different components and their particular data 
collection processes tend to distance the output from the main issues to be 
addressed. Therefore, it is crucial that during this phase only major components are 
described. Only if sampled populations under review and the diagnostic processes 
are different should a new component be considered. Whereas each component can 
be evaluated and described separately, an overall output can be obtained for the 
whole surveillance system too. 
The effective probability of detection (EPD) is the result of the whole diagnostic 
process in the given component (i) (probability of clinical signs or diagnostic test 
sensitivity (TSe)). The surveillance sensitivity of the component under consideration 
(CSe) is then obtained using the following formula:  




Where EPI is the probability of infection; EPD the probability of detection of an 
infected/affected unit after going through each of the stages to consider within the 
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specific limb of the given component; n is the number of units processed through that 
limb of N population size. For each surveillance component, including its own 
specificities and data collection process, a new and separate tree is considered. 
To estimate the overall sensitivity of the surveillance system components (SSe), the 
following equation is used: 
SSe = 1 − (∏(1 − CSei)) 
In order to design a tree, preliminary knowledge on risk factors affecting the 
probability of detection or infection must be known. Assumptions can be used in the 
absence of existing knowledge. Simulations can be carried out when no knowledge 
exists. However, one must then make sure that validation is carried out for those 
assumptions. This can be done by internal and external validation (Gustafson et al., 
2013). Both differ in the way they are carried out. Most of the known software use 
internal validation. In other words, the sensitivity analysis will mainly be affected by 
the uncertainty and variability around inputs within the model and those factors will 
be the most decisive. External validation of the model's robustness for instance can 
be done by testing the assumptions by setting some parameters in the model and 
changing others. External validation can also be done by confronting outputs of the 
simulation model and inputs with different inputs obtained from field data, or using 
data originating from a different country or a different component. Alternatively, 
validation can be conducted using an empirical model to test some outputs. 
However, the question “how can one be sure that disease is truly absent when all 
samples test negative?” will still remain; even if the surveillance system and different 
components reveal themselves as being effective. This is where methods introduced 
by Martin et al. (2007a, b) may help by using a Bayesian approach to the problem. 
The prior knowledge of confidence in freedom, obtained from the surveillance, is 
taken into account for calculating the posterior probability in freedom. Thus gathering 
an accumulation of evidence over time ultimately gives you more and more evidence 
of disease status knowledge and the probability of freedom. These approaches also 
allow simulating various scenarios and measuring how well the infection could be 





   
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡𝑖 = (1 − 𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖−1) + 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖 − (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖−1)) 
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Where the posterior probability of freedom (Pfree) is obtained given prior probability 
of infection (Pinf) of the previous year and the surveillance component sensitivity 
(CSe) of the component under consideration (i) of the previous year. The Pinf can be 
determined arbitrarly, ie the expected design prevalence, the very first year. Then, for 
the following years, it will be function of 1 − Pfreeti−1  and the probability of 
introduction (Pintro), which can also be set arbitrarly. One assumption deems that if a 
country is free of disease, any positive reaction will be further investigated until truly 
positive or negative. Therefore, specificity is considered to be 100%. In practice of 
course, this is not the case. However, this will not hamper the output as the question 
addressed by these methods is: “given one does not observe any positive (meaning 
truly positive after all confirmation tests have been carried out (serial testing until 
specificity nears 1), how confident can one be of enjoying a disease freedom status?” 
Distributions are fitted to most of the input parameters allowing stochastic 
simulation modelling. The advantage of this method is that all quantitative 
parameters and stages in the disease detection process can be summarised, from 
expected prevalence, differential risk of infection or detection, test characteristics 
(sensitivity and specificity) to representative population proportion sampled. In 
addition, the advantage of these methods is to allow combining evidence of disease 
status from different sources or components when evaluating the combined national 
surveillance system (i.e., slaughterhouse data, bulk milk data, purchase testing data, 
export testing data). The relative efficacy of each separate component can also be 
estimated. 
Also, the relative costs of surveillance within the different evaluated surveillance 
components can be computed and thus the cost efficiency ratio of surveillance can 
be obtained using the same methodology, as shown in Welby et al. (2016). 
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In the last years standards have evolved from input based (when it was compulsory 
for each member state and national authority to use the same tests and follow the 
same sampling scheme or frequency of testing) to adopt output based (where each 
member state is free to choose its own surveillance strategy but where it must also 
demonstrate it achieved the required objective; i.e., disease-free situation). Local, 
national and international standards detail minimum requirements and provide 
flexible guidelines allowing enough freedom to encompass all country specific 
epidemiological situations when implementing and designing national surveillance 
programmes. Thus, over time, rules have evolved from an obligation of means 
(sample 40 animals per farm no matter the herd size and herd characteristics; e.g., 
closed herd, limited movements versus large herd frequent movements) towards an 
obligation of results (demonstrate that one can detect a minimal prevalence of 30% 
with a 95% confidence level). This major shift to “fit for purpose surveillance”, has 
given rise to more freedom for member states to design and tailor surveillance 
systems according to national needs, local risk factors and husbandry practices 
allowing for heterogeneous population and epidemiological situation. However, to 
maintain mutual trust between countries for trading, economic and political purposes, 
having similar approaches in surveillance eases comparison and auditing, thereby 
offering firm guarantees. Thus, these changes implied the need for tools to measure 
whether output standards were delivered (Cameron, 2012; Salman et al., 2003). 
Responsibility is left to the risk managers to opt for the best testing scheme (test, 
sample size and sampling framework) that will enable achievement of required 
standards. Although this approach to surveillance has the potential of higher 
flexibility, auditing the cost efficiency performance of such surveillance will be more 
complex. 
The present thesis aims at defining a comprehensive and objective quantitative 
approach for evaluation of notifiable animal disease surveillance systems by testing 
their performance against defined purposes and objectives, according to needs and 
priorities expressed by stakeholders involved and compared with other countries.  
More specifically, the output based method (scenario tree methods) were adapted for 
four important animal diseases (avian influenza, bovine brucellosis, bovine 
tuberculosis, bluetongue) in Belgium for which the surveillance programmes had to 
Chapter II: Aims of the thesis 
65 
 
be adapted accordingly. The aim was to explore the different possibilities offered by 
these tools together with the advantages and disadvantages. 
Specific issues addressed in the following chapters are: 
 How can we define risk based surveillance, risk cause versus risk 
consequence? 
 How to handle perception of risk and varying objectives? 
 Can combining components and historical information over time increase 
negative predictive value of surveillance?   
 What are the assumptions limiting assessment of surveillance performance: 
design prevalence, diagnostic process, input/output validation?   
 How to conciliate performance and cost of surveillance systems: comparing 
surveillance strategies across countries?  
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This study was aimed at redesigning the Belgian active surveillance program for 
domestic birds in professional poultry holdings based on a risk analysis approach.  
Stochastic quantitative analysis, combining all data sources, was run to obtain 
sensitivity estimates for the detection of an infected bird in the different risk groups 
identified.  
An optimal number of holdings for each risk group were then estimated on the basis 
of the different sensitivities obtained. This study was a useful tool for decision makers 
to reallocate the total amount of samples to be taken in the next year(s) in Belgium, 
thus optimizing the field resources, and improving efficiency of disease surveillance 
such as required by the international standards. 
INTRODUCTION 
Avian Influenza (AI) is caused by type A Influenza viruses, which are RNA viruses 
that belong to the Orthomyxoviridae family. Among type A, the viruses can be further 
sub-typed based on the characteristics of two viral proteins, i.e. hemagglutinin (HA) 
and neuraminidase (NA). Among all possible combinations between the 16 different 
haemaglutinins and 9 neuraminidases, to date only H5 and H7 have the potential of 
causing highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). Any highly pathogenic avian 
influenza isolate is classified as notifiable avian influenza (NAI) virus. Although all 
virulent strains isolated up to now have been either of the H5 or H7 subtype, most H5 
or H7 isolates have been of low virulence. Due to the risk of a low virulent H5 or H7 
becoming virulent by mutation in poultry hosts, all H5 and H7 viruses have also been 
classified as NAI viruses (OIE, 2008). Wild birds are a natural reservoir of LPAI and 
can introduce it into domestic poultry populations, especially in outdoor birds 
(Hinshaw et al., 1980). Moreover, wild birds can transport the HPAI across borders 
when migrating and spread the infection in different countries along their migratory 
route (Alexander., 2000, 2007a, b; Gilbert et al., 2006a, b). As a secondary route of 
spread, human behavior is probably the main reason responsible for the 
maintenance of the infection within certain areas, through intensive farming and 
inappropriate bio-security measures, as well as trading and smuggling (Alexander, 
2007a,b; Elbers et al., 2008; Gilbert et al., 2006a,b; van den Berg and Houdart, 
2008). A worldwide pandemic of HPAI H5N1 occurred in 2003-2004, which had its 
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origin in a low-level but endemic circulation of the virus in Chinese ducks which 
started in 1996. Following the devastating economical and ethical repercussions the 
eradication of HPAI had in Italy, it was suggested that the European Member States 
must set up survey programs in order to detect the LPAI before it actually spreads 
from farm to farm causing sanitary problems and carrying the risk of mutation into 
HPAI (Capua and Marangon, 2000). Also the outbreak of AI in the Netherlands led to 
the conclusion that serological monitoring of LPAI was needed in addition of reporting 
of HPAI (EC, 2005). Similarly in Belgium, it was suggested that adaptive measures to 
detect the virus before it spreads must be set in order to prevent the use of drastic 
measures (van den Berg and Houdart, 2008). In addition, the fear of a huge 
pandemic in humans and animals together with its dramatic consequences in the 
poultry industry underlined the need of detecting the pathogen before it actually 
spreads. Decision 2007/268 of the European Commission (EC, 2007) modifying the 
decision 2004/450/CE prescribes compulsory surveillance programs to be 
implemented in all European Member States for the detection of AI. This decision 
insists as well on targeting the surveillance in particular populations more at risk. 
The Belgian surveillance program for AI is carried out in accordance with the 
Commission Decisions 2005/734 and 2007/268 (EC 2005, 2007). It concerns both 
domestic poultry (e.g. chickens, turkeys, geese, ducks, ratites, other poultry (guinea 
fowl, partridges, pheasants, meet pigeons)) and wild birds and consists in both 
passive and active surveillance. Commission Decision 2005/734 (EC, 2005) aims at 
an early detection system in professional poultry holdings to detect an introduction of 
an infection with HPAI serotypes H5N1 or H7N7. Commission Decision 2007/268 
(EC 2007) sets up guidelines for active surveillance in professional poultry holdings: 
1) detection of sub-clinical infections of LPAI H5, H7 2) targeting of the detection of 
LPAI H5, H7, in poultry populations which are more at risk due to their exposure, 
their rearing method, or due to their specie susceptibility 3) substantiation of freedom 
of disease status from a particular region or zone, in the context of international 
trade. Commission Decision 2007/268 (EC, 2007) also implements the standard 
guidelines for implementing passive and active surveillance in wild birds. The active 
surveillance in domesticated poultry aims at detecting the LPAI circulation through 
serological sampling except in ratites where the sample collection is cloacal and 
tracheal swabbing. The active surveillance in wild birds consists in cloacal and 
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tracheal swabbing during the ringing of wild birds and during the hunting season. The 
passive surveillance aims at early detecting HPAI in professional poultry holdings 
and is based on the reporting of any increase in mortality or morbidity or any 
decrease in water consumption, feed intake, or egg production. In wild birds the 
passive surveillance consists in the reporting of any suspicious increase of mortality 
in wild birds to the Royal Belgian Institute of Natural Sciences (RBINS). 
The risk for a bird population to become infected with AI is influenced by numerous 
factors. The presence of migrating wild birds (usually characterised by presence of 
larger water surfaces), high population density, outdoor housing, regions with bird 
movements, numerous external contacts with other farms, inappropriate bio-security 
measures may all increase the risk for infection. The response to infection also differs 
between birds’ species. Infected chickens and turkeys will most often show clear 
clinical symptoms whereas geese and ducks will have more sub-clinical infections. 
The fact that virus can circulate in the latter species without notice and thus can be 
transmitted to poultry where mutation can occur into a HPAI, makes them high risk 
species (Alexander 2000; Bavinck et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2003; Capua et 
Marongon, 2000; Elbers et al., 2004; Fang et al., 2008; Homme et al., 1970; Tumpey 
et al., 2004). All these factors which influence the probability of infection should be 
considered in the design of a risk based surveillance system in a country, as the 
sampling should focus on sub-populations with higher probability of infection. 
The aim of this study was to evaluate the sensitivity of the Belgian serological active 
surveillance program for detecting LPAI in professional poultry holdings. In other 
words, to test the capability of the current active serological surveillance program to 
detect the infection if the country is infected. The sensitivity was estimated for 
different risk groups (sub-populations): based on region (five different regions were 
considered according to the relative risk zone surface within each region), risk zone 
(defined as zones where in between farm distance and likelihood of disease 
introduction was higher), holdings with or without outdoor facilities and species. 
Secondly, we aimed to propose targeted surveillance protocol to allow an optimal 
probability of detecting an infection in the different risk groups. This optimal sample 
size took into account the sensitivities that were obtained for the current surveillance 
and the legal requirements. An optimised sample scheme, redistributing the samples 
foreseen to be taken in 2009, was proposed following the optimal results obtained.  
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Martin et al (2007) have proposed methods for the analysis of complex surveillance 
systems which are in place for substantiating freedom from disease. These studies 
have been led in the past for different diseases and proved their efficiency (Hadorn et 
al., 2008; Martin et al., 2007a,b; Stark et al., 2006). The consecutive events which 
contribute to the detection of an infection in a population are described as nodes in a 
scenario tree. Each node is related to a risk for infection or probability of detection 
and following their differential risk of infection or probability of detection, respective 
reference population proportions (PPr) and the number of animals processed through 
the surveillance system component (SPr) are attributed to each category node in the 
tree. PPr defines the population proportion within each branch to the overall 
reference population in that category node, whilst SPr defines the number of sampled 
population in that branch. Data out of passed experience, literature figures as well as 
expert elicitation can be used to provide the input parameters in the tree.  
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
Active surveillance for LPAI in domesticated poultry 
Domesticated poultry over 13 weeks of age and present on professional holdings are 
considered as study population. The sampling frame consists of Belgian professional 
holdings as identified in the Animal Identification and Registration System (SANITEL) 
with more then 200 birds or with more than 15 ratites, excluding holdings with 
broilers. The sampling is stratified by regions (FASFC, 2007) to ensure 
representative sampling of the total population. The number of holdings to sample 
per region must be sufficient to ensure the detection of an infected holding with 95% 
confidence, if 5% (design prevalence) of the holdings are infected, except for turkey, 
geese and ducks where a 99 % confidence level is required. The number of birds to 
be sampled per holding must guarantee the detection of a 30% design prevalence 
with a 95% confidence level for all poultry types, except for turkey, geese and ducks 
where a fixed number of 40-50 animals must be sampled in each holding. These 
requirements were set by the Community Reference Laboratory (VLA, Weybridge, 
UK) for the AI Monitoring program. All holdings are sampled once per year, except 
holdings in risk zones or with turkeys, geese and ducks at risk which are sampled 
twice per year. 
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Scenario tree description 
The methods proposed by Martin et al (2007) were adopted for estimating the 
probability of detecting LPAI in case it would be introduced in one of the risk 
populations in Belgium. A scenario tree was designed in Microsoft Visio comprising 
nodes, branches, and outcomes (Figure 1). Three different types of nodes were 
used: 1) category nodes distinguish different population proportions homogeneous 
with regard to the risk of infection or detection; 2) infection nodes involve steps in the 
process related to the introduction of infection; 3) detection nodes involve steps in the 
process of detecting the infection. They characterise the different effective probability 
of infection or detection (i.e.; farm status, animal status and lab sensitivity). The tree 
starts with country status as infection node, then region status also an infection node, 
followed by a category node with five branches representing the regions that were 
established for the sampling stratification in Belgium. Then category nodes ‘risk zone’ 
and ‘outdoor facilities’, with each two branches, classify the different holdings 
according to the fact of being in a risk zone or having outdoor facilities, respectively. 
As following, the farm status infection node indicates the effective probability for a 
farm to be infected, within each branch. From farm status, a category node ‘species’ 
differentiates bird’s species within farms according to the risk of infection represented 
by the different species. At the end of each limb of the tree, different risk groups 
according to risk zone, outdoor facilities, and type of species are obtained, each 
having a specific effective probability of infection and a probability of detection. A risk 
group is defined by the set of possible combination of the different categories. For 
instance a risk group RiskZoneOutdoorChicken combines the categories chicken in 
category farm with outdoor facilities in category risk zone. Separate trees were 
developed for each region in Belgium and for the whole country.   
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Figure 1:  Scenario tree representing the different steps between the introduction of LPAI in domestic poultry in Belgium and it’s 
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Parameters in the different nodes  
In order to estimate the sensitivity of detecting an infection in the different risk 
groups, parameters were allocated to the different categories in the tree. Population 
proportions (PPr) of holdings or animals and the number of holdings or animals 
sampled (SPr) were allocated to each category node or the different risk groups 
respectively. Population proportions (PPr) of holdings or animals and the holdings or 
number of animals processed by the surveillance component (SPr) were obtained 
from the SANITEL dataset.  
To obtain the effective probability of infection for holdings (EPIH) and animals (EPIA) 
in the different risk groups, the overall herd (PH) and within-herd (PA) design 
prevalence as imposed by Commission Decision 2007/268 (PH=5 % and PA=30 %) 
was weighted by a risk group specific (adjusted) relative risk. The relative risks for 
infection regarding being in a risk zone, having outdoor facilities, species at risk, lab 
sensitivity were obtained from either passed experience or literature. The AR’s 
(equation 1) were obtained by dividing the relative risks (RR) for infection by the sum 








For each risk group i, the effective probability of infection for holdings (EPIH) and 
animals (EPIA) was calculated as follows (equation 3, 4):  
𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐻 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐻(2) 
𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐴 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐴(3) 
Per risk group, the sensitivity of detecting an infected holding (equation 4) and an 
infected animal within a holding (equation 5) was calculated taking the EPIH and 
EPIA, the sensitivity of the laboratory diagnosis (Lab Se), the number of animals 
sampled (na), and the number of holdings sampled (nh) into account.  
𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑒𝑖 = 1 − (1 − (𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑏 𝑆𝑒))
𝑛𝑎   (4) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑆𝑒𝑖 = 1 − (1 − (𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐻𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑒𝑖))
𝑛𝑎 (5) 
The Lab Se was derived from the test Se, obtained from a study done in the 
Netherlands on the inhibition of haemagglutination (Koch, 2003). The specificity 
wasn’t included as it assumed to be 1, which can be motivated by the fact that each 
positive result will be further investigated until it truly shows positive.  
Chapter III: Redesigning Belgian avian influenza serological surveillance programme 
75 
 
Rationale and methods for obtaining sensitivities 
The scenario trees were modelled in Microsoft Excel. Separate trees were 
constructed in different spreadsheets for each region and for the whole of Belgium. 
Within each spreadsheet, different worksheets were created to facilitate the 
modelling exercise. All the inputs of the population proportion, relative risk, and 
design prevalence were introduced in an ‘Input/Output’ worksheet to calculate the 
adjusted risks, effective probabilities of infection and detection (equations 1 and 2). In 
a ‘Proportion Calculation’ worksheet, the actual SANITEL dataset was worked 
through in order to obtain the different populations (representative and sampled) 
counts in different categories with the help of pivot tables. In a ‘Tree’ worksheet the 
effective probabilities of infection obtained in the Input/Output sheet was recalled to 
calculate the sensitivities for the different risk groups taking the sampling fraction in 
the different risk groups into account (equations 3 and 4). 
The outputs were computed using @risk software (Palisade, 2007) taking the 
uncertainty and variability of parameters into account by fitting appropriate parameter 
distributions. The sensitivity estimates for the different risk group were obtained by 
separate hypergeometric simulation for each region with 10000 iterations in each 
simulation. This offers the opportunity to consider all the possible pathways in the 
scenario by sampling from the parameter distributions. 
Rationale and methods for sample size calculations 
An optimal sample size was calculated per risk group using the methods proposed by 
Cameron and Baldock (1998) using the Freecalc software (Survey Tool box (Ausvet, 
2008)) based on the effective probabilities of infection and the sensitivities that were 
obtained from the scenario trees. The optimal sample sizes were estimated for both 
the number of samples within holdings as well as the number of holdings.  
Here again the specificity was assumed to be 100%. For the Type I and Type II error 
(for falsely rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis of presence of infection) the 
desired confidence levels in Commission Decision 2007/268 (EC, 2007) were used, 
i.e. 95% for all bird species except turkeys, geese and ducks where a 99% 
confidence level is required. 
Because in 2010, Belgium had an EU provision for taking 10000 samples for avian 
influenza surveillance, based on the estimated optimal sample size, we proportionally 
redistributed the 10000 samples accordingly (optimised sample size). This 
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proportional redistribution over the different risk groups enabled to achieve a risk-
based surveillance program.  
RESULTS  
Descriptive statistics study population 
Population proportions (PPr) and sampled populations proportions were obtained 
from the Sanitel dataset. A total of 47,395,827 birds present on 2,097 professional 
holdings were considered in this study and 13,450 birds in 2,016 holdings were 
sampled. Population proportions were allocated to category nodes, whilst numbers of 
animals processed were mainly attributed to risk group nodes which enabled the 
sensitivity calculation of the given risk group. Table 1 shows population total and 
relative proportions to each category node in Belgium whereas Table 2 shows the 
number of birds and holdings sampled in each risk group. Holdings were allocated to 
risk groups with higher risk if a mixture of risk groups were present on the holding, 
e.g. if a holding had a minor number of birds reared in outdoor facilities next to a 
majority of birds raised inside then it was classified as holding with outdoor facilities.  
 
Table 1: Proportion of total domesticated bird population in each category 
Risk category Population size Proportion of total 
Domesticated bird 
Population 
Risk Zone Population 3,589,154 0.076 
Non Risk zone population 43,806,673 0.924 
Outdoor facilities population 9,252,265 0.195 
Indoor facilities population 38,143,562 0.805 
Chicken 46,355,175 0.978 
Turkey 317,371 0.007 
Geese and Ducks 79,628 0.002 
Ratites 0 0 
Other Poultry 643,653 0.013 






















Outdoor Chickens 6 10x2* 140 10 
Outdoor Turkeys 2 10x2* 9 10x2* 
Outdoor Geese and 
Ducks 
0 50x2* 8 50x2* 
Outdoor Ratites 2 10x2* 38 10 
Outdoor Other Poultry 0 10x2* 16 10 
Indoor Chickens 46 10x2* 564 10 
Indoor Turkeys 4 10x2* 36 10x2* 
Indoor Geese and 
Ducks 
0 50x2* 26 50x2* 
Indoor Ratites 0 10x2* 20 10 
Indoor Other Poultry 4 10x2* 30 10 
*Twice yearly 
Input parameters 
For estimating the relative risk of being in a risk zone compared to a non-risk zone, 
the between-farm distance was estimated to be influential. Therefore the spatial 
transmission characteristics (representing the different transmission ratios according 
to the in between farm distance) of the 2003 AI epidemic in the Netherlands as 
presented by Boender et al.(2007), were used to obtain the RR for the risk zone 
compared to the non-risk zone. The choice of appropriate distributions was estimated 
following Vose (2000). A triangular distribution TR(0.46; 12; 16) was used to express 
the RR in the risk zone whereas a uniform distribution U(1, 1) was used for the RR in 
the non-risk zone. The RR for having outdoor facilities was derived from data 
presented by Elbers et al. (2004). In this study the evolution of the 2003 Dutch AI 
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epidemic was investigated in 5 different farms and the housing system was found to 
be an explanatory factor for differences in mortality rate between farms. Out of the 
different mortality rates, a RR was approximated with this explanatory variable and 
was introduced as a triangular distribution TR (0.1; 1; 5) in our model. Again a 
uniform distribution U (1,1) was used for the RR in farms with no outdoor facilities. 
The RR associated with the different birds species were derived from proportional 
mortality rates in the different species holdings of the EU Member States that were 
affected by the 2003 AI epidemic (Brown, 2003). Chickens were considered as 
reference group and therefore the RR was expressed as an uniform distribution U (1; 
1). For the other species the RR’s were again expressed as triangular distributions:  
 Turkeys: TR (0.3-0.7-8); 
 Geese and ducks: TR (1; 1.6; 7); 
 Ratites: TR (0.8; 1.1; 1.4); 
 Other poultry: TR (1.1; 1.5; 3.1). 
The resulting AR’s and EPI’s for all risk groups are summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3:  Relative risk, adjusted risk and effective probabilities of infection 






Holding in Risk Zone with Outdoor 
facilities 
RiskTR (0.46, 12, 
16) 
5.775 0.49 
Holding in Risk Zone with Indoor 
facilities 
RiskU (1,1) 0.609 0.24 
Holding in Non Risk with Outdoor 
facilities 
RiskTR (0.1, 1, 5) 1.692 0.05 
Holding in Non Risk with Indoor 
facilities 
RiskU (1, 1) 0.832 0.02 
Chicken RiskU (1, 1) 0.972 0.29 
Turkey RiskTR (0.3, 0.7, 
8) 
2.915 0.87 
Geese and Ducks RiskTR (1, 1.6, 7) 3.109 0.93 
Ratites RiskTR (0.8, 1.1, 
1.4) 
1.069 0.32 




The input parameter for Lab sensitivity of the inhibition of haemagglutination was 
expressed as a beta distribution beta (0.46; 0.03), based on the sensitivity with 95% 
confidence interval that was estimated by Koch (2003). 
Estimated category effective probabilities of infection, sensitivities, and 
sample sizes per risk group. 
In Table 3 as mentioned above the results of the different relative risk, adjusted risk 
and effective probabilities of infection are shown. The initial sample sizes, the optimal 
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sample sizes obtained following our model and the risk-based redistribution of the 
10,000 samples foreseen for 2009 in Belgium (optimised sample size) are stated in 
Table 4. We notice that the effective probability of infection is higher in risk zones 
with outdoor facilities, and the species more at risk is geese and ducks. 
Table 4: Summary for Belgium of the sensitivities, initial as well as optimal and 
optimised sample sizes (SS) estimation obtained in each risk group in Belgium 
 

















0.99 120 70 450 0.99 1400 90 580 
Out 
Turkey 
0.93 40 30 200 0.61 180 60 380 
Out 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0.57 800 300 2000 
Out 
Ratites 
0.93 40 50* 250* 0.86 380 90 580 
Out 
OtherP 
0 0 0 0 0.57 160 80 500 
In 
Chicken 
0.99 920 90 580 0.99 5640 90 580 
In 
Turkey 
0.89 80 30 200 0.84 720 40 260 
In 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0.74 2600 200 1300 
In  
Ratites 
0 0 0 0 0.39 200 200 1300 
In 
OtherP 
0.88 80 40 260 0.54 300 90 580 
 
The tables for the different regions can be found in the appendix. From Table 4 it can 
be observed that under sampling occurred in risk zones and species at risk but over 
sampling occurred in non-risk zones. 
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Table 5 is a summary of the actual optimised total sample size in each category 
group redistributed according to the number of holdings, and birds per holding to be 
sampled. 
Table 5: Summary for Belgium of the number of holdings to sample in each risk 
group and the number of samples/holding in each risk group 
RG Risk zone Non risk zone 
 Holdings  SS Animal/Holding SS Holdings  SS Animal/Holding SS 
Out 
Chicken 
45 10 58 10 
Out 
Turkey 
20 10 38 10 
Out 
GD 
0 50 40 50 
Out 
Ratites 
25 10 58 10 
Out 
OtherP 
0 10 50 10 
In 
Chicken 
58 10 58 10 
In 
Turkey 
20 10 26 10 
In 
GD 
0 50 130 10 
In  
Ratites 
0 10 130 50 
In 
OtherP 
26 10 58 10 
DISCUSSION  
Modelling the active surveillance of LPAI in domestic birds by using scenario trees is 
a useful tool to estimate the sensitivity of detection in the different risk groups 
(Hadorn et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2007a,b; Stark et al., 2006). Based on the risk-
group specific EPI’s and Se’s that resulted from the model a risk-based reallocation 
of the current sampling protocol was possible. This increases the confidence in 
detecting a probable new infection with the same total number of samples to be 
taken. This corroborated what was expected. In certain risk groups the estimated 
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ideal sampling size decreased drastically such as in chicken farms without outdoor 
facilities in non-risk zones. This can be easily understood, as in those highly density 
populated holdings, if the virus was present; it would spread fairly quickly, and 
therefore enhance the chance of detection. In other risk groups the initial sample size 
was underestimated such as chickens raised in risk zones with outdoor facilities. 
Thus it is important to increase the sampling in those populations. The larger sample 
size required in ratites reflects the low probability of infection in that population 
together with the very low initial sample size in those populations. This must be 
interpreted cautiously. Because those populations are so small, it might actually be 
totally insignificant to sample in those categories, as they would probably not 
constitute a high risk. 
The Commission Decision 2007/268 (EC, 2007) insists on having an active 
surveillance system in domesticated birds to substantiate freedom of disease, as well 
as an early detection system and prevalence estimation of circulating LPAI. The 
sampling design imposed by this Decision is only able to substantiate freedom of 
disease with a certain confidence level. Therefore this study aimed at evaluating the 
efficacy of the surveillance system in substantiating freedom of disease, with a 
statistical confidence level based on risk quantification. The sampling design 
disregards sampling in time, and the likelihood of disease introduction between 
different sampling periods. The actual surveillance system substantiates freedom 
from H5 or H7 LPAI strains with yearly intervals. Using Bayes theorem, the results of 
the surveillance programme of previous years can be used to enhance its confidence 
during the following years (Martin et al., 2007a,b). Also accounting for disease 
introduction from year to year would be interesting to consider in a future study. 
For an early detection system of circulating LPAI, a different sampling design is 
required. First, sampling would need to be repeated frequently, taking the time 
between incubation and seroconversion for LPAI into account. Moreover, sampling 
would need to be intensified or could even be restricted during periods or in 
subpopulations with higher risk for introduction of infection. For example sampling 
could be intensified during migration season for wild birds, within migration zone (risk 
zones), in densely populated areas, in holdings with outdoor facilities or in areas 
where more poultry transport occurs. The results of this study provide insight on risk 
groups where intensifying the sampling would be appropriate. In Belgium 
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concentrating the sampling from mid-September to end of October and from the 
beginning of March to the end of April (Moniteur Belge, 2008) in risk zones and more 
specifically in holdings with outdoor facilities, and in species at risk such as turkeys, 
geese and ducks, would constitute an optimal early detection system. Also intensified 
sampling during cold winters could be suggested as those periods are considered at 
higher risk as migrating geese from Siberia and Denmark tend to come down south. 
Those birds are susceptible to carry AI. The proposed methodology can be extended 
to evaluate the efficiency of the early detection system by taking the repeating 
sampling and the repeating probability of introduction into account, of ongoing 
surveillance results. This would require a dynamic approach. Alternatively, a node 
season could be incorporated in the static approach, thus representing the sampling 
during migration periods, which could constitute a way to account for early detection.  
For early detection of HPAI passive surveillance based on clinical findings is more 
relevant as stipulated in the Commission Decision 2005/734 (EC, 2005). 
The objective of Commission Decision 2007/268 (EC, 2007) is also to estimate the 
design prevalence in order to estimate a target prevalence to reach in each Member 
State. When estimating prevalence in a population, diagnostic test sensitivity and 
specificity are two crucial parameters. The set guidelines of the commission is mainly 
aimed at detecting the infection if were present, thus focusing on the minimum 
sample required for detecting the disease if it was present. In order to estimate 
prevalence of disease the sample size would be different (Dohoo 2003; Thrushfield, 
1995).  
All these figures must be cautiously interpreted, as the model was built on 
assumptions which were not scaled. The distributions for the input parameters were 
obtained from available information and not from empirical data. Sometimes this 
might have biased the imputations. Laboratory sensitivity was derived from studies 
aiming at evaluating detection of antibody directed against HPAI influenza and not 
LPAI for which the sensitivity might be very different (Koch, 2003). Similarly the 
estimation of transmission ratio was based on spatio-temporal characteristics of the 
HPAI epidemic in the Netherlands, but those characteristics were mainly based on 
farm density and not really on disease introduction or migratory pathways, and does 
not reflect the strengthened biosecurity measures in place following these epidemics 
(Boender et al., 2007). Also the housing systems characterising the farm type node, 
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was estimated from difference observed between five farms with different housing 
systems (Koch and Elbers, 2006). This provided good estimation of disparities in 
disease evolution within different holdings but does not truly reflect the pattern of 
disease for LPAI evolution specifically in farm type as defined in the Tree. Finally 
species at risk were estimated from proportions of infected holding in each Member 
State. These differences were assumed to be linked to species sensitivity, but other 
hidden factors could have potentially influenced those results. The housing systems 
and contact pattern for the different species holdings might have been very different, 
and thus influenced this outcome. Nevertheless all these inaccurate estimates 
remain valuable data. Taking into account this uncertainty around our estimates, by 
fitting appropriate distributions to represent the range of possible outcomes, 
reinforces the value of this data. This still remains the most objective data to estimate 
the relative risk from one species to another. In the future, studies purposely 
designed to obtain those figures would strengthen the power of such model.  
Taking the risk of introduction into account, different pathways (import, wild birds, 
migration period) should be investigated (Elbers et al., 2004; Fang et al., 2008; 
Gilbert et al., 2006b; Webster et al., 2006). Emphasizing the surveillance programs to 
LPAI backyard poultry and the proper application of biosecurity measures is 
important to consider too (Bavinck et al., 2009; de Wit et al., 2004; Capua and 
Marongon, 2000). Human behaviour constitutes the secondary route of spread, 
therefore respecting proper biosecurity measures is important (Bavinck et al., 2009, 
Bos et al., 2009, Elbers et al., 2004). The fear of repressive measures or negative 
consequences can bring farmers more reluctant to report or accept sampling of their 
poultry. The relationship between the farmer and the authorities as well as with the 
official vets is important to consider, too. It is important to integrate this aspect in the 
surveillance program as this will further enhance the sensitivity evaluation and 
therefore reorient efforts in a more efficient surveillance program (Elbers et al., 2008).  
Also an important issue is how confident we are in substantiating disease freedom 
with the set requirements by the EU Decision 2007/268 (EC, 2007). As the sampling 
scheme proposed by the Decision is directed to ensure the identification of an 
infection if 5% of the holdings are infected which in Belgium would mean 105 
holdings. Because decreasing these design prevalence’s would involve further costs, 
targeting in risk group where disease is more likely to cluster due to biological or 
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farming system reasons would be an alternative to enhance the efficacy of detection 
whilst keeping the cost and field work at a feasible  level. 
This study has enabled the identification of risk groups where disease tends to 
cluster according to biological, ecological or housing systems differences. Even 
though data used for the quantification of these differential risk was not based on 
empirical data, the fact of accounting for this inaccuracy by fitting appropriate 
distributions and taking in account this uncertainty, actually enhances the value of the 
risk estimate in a first stage and sensitivity in a later stage. Being able to quantify this 
sensitivity accounting for the complexity of the surveillance system provides great 
advantage to such models. Furthermore the more accurate sensitivity obtained 
through this model enables us then to conduct a more efficient target sampling. For 
assessing surveillance system in a country, this model is a valuable tool as it enables 
not only to provide a sensitivity but also a distribution around this sensitivity, thus 
substantiating freedom from disease with set statistical confidence level as required 
by the international standard guidelines. 
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Table 6: Summary for East Flanders of the sensitivities, previous sample sizes, as 
well as optimal and optimised sample sizes estimation obtained in each risk group in 
East Flanders 

















0.52 20 150* 150 0.33 120 260* 250 
Out 
Turkey 
0.79 40 40 40 0.13 40 380* 370 
Out 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0.13 200 200 200 
Out 
Ratites 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Out 
OtherP 
0 0 0 0 0.07 20 500* 480 
In 
Chicken 
0.99 300 80 100 0.74 850 120 120 
In 
Turkey 
0 0 0 40 0.09 60 500* 450 
In 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0.21 750 1100* 1100 
In  
Ratites 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In 
OtherP 
0.3 200 170* 40 0.99 60 500* 450 
*
It was impossible to achieve the desired accuracy by sampling every unit in that category, therefore 
the optimal number of samples to be taken was given; but it could be considered to spread this 
number of samples over the year to reach the goal. 
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Table 7: Summary for West Flanders of the sensitivities, previous sample sizes, as 
well as optimal and optimised sample sizes estimation obtained in each risk group in 
West Flanders 

















0.94 40 70* 70 0.77 270 100 100 
Out 
Turkey 
0 0 0 0 0.29 60 160* 150 
Out 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0 0 34 0 
Out 
Ratites 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Out 
OtherP 
0 0 0 0 0.25 50 190* 180 
In 
Chicken 
0.99 360 90 100 0.99 2280 120 120 
In 
Turkey 
0.83 60 40 40 0.75 500 50 50 
In 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0.15 300 350 340 
In  
Ratites 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In 
OtherP 
0.83 60 50 40 0.1 40 500* 450 
*
It was impossible to achieve the desired accuracy by sampling every unit in that category, therefore 
the optimal number of samples to be taken was given; but it could be considered to spread this 
number of samples over the year to reach the goal. 
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Table 8: Summary for Antwerpen of the sensitivities, previous sample sizes, as well 
as optimal and optimised sample sizes estimation obtained in each risk group in 
Antwerpen 

















0.78 20 60* 60 0.91 420 90 100 
Out 
Turkey 
0 0 0 0 0.11 20 30 30 
Out 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Out 
Ratites 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Out 
OtherP 
0 0 0 0 0.06 10 10 10 
In 
Chicken 
0.99 220 80* 80 0.98 1450 100 100 
In 
Turkey 
0.47 20 30 40 0.1 60 300* 300 
In 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In  
Ratites 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In 
OtherP 
0 0 0 0 0.03 10 10 10 
*
It was impossible to achieve the desired accuracy by sampling every unit in that category, therefore 
the optimal number of samples to be taken was given; but it could be considered to spread this 
number of samples over the year to reach the goal. 
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Table 9: Summary for Limburg of the sensitivities, previous sample sizes, as well as 
optimal and optimised sample sizes estimation obtained in each risk group in 
Limburg 

















0.74 20 100* 100 0.79 290 110 110 
Out 
Turkey 
0 0 0 0 0.21 40 40 40 
Out 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0.11 100 450 450 
Out 
Ratites 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Out 
OtherP 
0 0 0 0 0.21 40 260 250 
In 
Chicken 
0.82 60 60 60 0.7 460 130 130 
In 
Turkey 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0.39 900 100 100 
In  
Ratites 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In 
OtherP 
0 0 0 0 0.28 120 170* 170 
*
It was impossible to achieve the desired accuracy by sampling every unit in that category, therefore 
the optimal number of samples to be taken was given; but it could be considered to spread this 
number of samples over the year to reach the goal. 
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Table 10: Summary for Wallonia of the sensitivities, previous sample sizes, as well as 
optimal and optimised sample sizes estimation obtained in each risk group in 
Wallonia 

















0.81 20 60* 60 0.84 200 90 100 
Out 
Turkey 
0 0 0 0 0.12 20 30 30 
Out 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0.47 500 80 400 
Out 
Ratites 
0.97 40 40 40 0.91 0 80 80 
Out 
OtherP 
0 0 0 0 0.23 40 220* 200 
In 
Chicken 
0.48 20 150* 150 0.83 600 110 110 
In 
Turkey 
0 0 0 0 0.27 100 170* 200 
In 
GD 
0 0 0 0 0.36 700 600 600 
In  
Ratites 
0 0 0 0 0.45 200 170 160 
In 
OtherP 
0 0 0 0 0.2 70 240* 240 
*
It was impossible to achieve the desired accuracy by sampling every unit in that category, therefore 
the optimal number of samples to be taken was given; but it could be considered to spread this 
number of samples over the year to reach the goal. 
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CHAPTER IV: EVALUATION OF THE 
BELGIAN SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMME 
FOR BOVINE BRUCELLOSIS THROUGH 
SCENARIO TREE SIMULATIONS 
Adapted from Epidemiol. et Santé Animale, 55, 1-6, Epub 2009. 
Evaluation du programme de surveillance pour la Brucellose et la Leucose 
Bovine enzootique en Belgique. 
Welby S, Letellier C, Fretin D, Hooyberghs J, Vanholme L, Godefroid J, Van der 
Stede Y.














Having maintained the bovine brucellosis officially free status for at least 5 
consecutive years, an evaluation of the Belgian brucellosis surveillance program in 
compliance with the OIE and EU legislation (Council Directive 64/432/EEC) was 
performed. Scenario trees were used to analyse the bovine brucellosis surveillance 
data from 2007-2008, in order to evaluate the on-going surveillance components 
within this program and determine how this program could be optimised. Differential 
risks of infection or detection partitioned the population structure in infection and 
detection category risk nodes. The current surveillance system and the impact of 
reducing surveillance in certain risk groups on the whole surveillance system 
sensitivity were simulated together stochastically. Results demonstrated that a 
significant decrease of the total number of samples was feasible and yet maintain a 
99% confidence level of disease detection. The total sensitivity for an early detection 
program would be importantly increased if surveillance activities were targeted 
towards passive surveillance meaning reinforcing the legal obligation of declaration, 
reporting and testing of abortions by the farmers and veterinarians. In addition the 
continuation of testing a certain number of traded animals (within BE) as well as 
imported cattle remains of utmost importance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Bovine brucellosis (BB), caused by Brucella abortus (a gram negative bacteria), is a 
notifiable disease according to the World Organisation of Animal Health (OIE) list 
(OIE, 2011a). The burden of this highly infectious disease is measured by its 
economical and public health impact. BB is also important disease for livestock and 
the most frequent isolated species are Brucella abortus in cattle, Brucella suis in pigs 
and Brucella melitensis in small ruminants.  
The main clinical symptoms in cattle are abortions and ‘abortion storms’ may occur in 
a naïve population. Humans might get infected by the consumption of contaminated 
raw milk and/or meat, or by close contact with infected cattle and their secretions. In 
humans flue like symptoms can be observed and may remain for several months. In 
some circumstances, infection can lead to chronic liver and spleen lesions as well as 
infertility in men. Cattle mainly get infected by secretions of contaminated animals, 
mainly after calving.  Brucella bacteria may survive for months in the environment if 
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the conditions are favourable, such as high humidity and cold weather. Consequently 
these bacteria can remain a constant source of infection on holdings and calves can 
get infected following suckling or drinking of raw milk from a contaminated animal 
(OIE, 2011b; Wilkinson,1993).  
Within the European Union (EU), at the time of the study, BB due to Brucella abortus 
was eradicated in most of the 27 Member States (MS) (AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, FI, FR, 
IE, LU, NL, SE, SI, SK, PL) while in some other MS only specific areas were declared  
free of brucellosis (IT, PT, ES, and UK). This means that within the EU the disease is 
still prevalent in 10 MS (2003/467/EC).  
The OIE and the European Commission requires a compulsory surveillance program 
in order to either eradicate or obtain/maintain the officially ‘freedom of disease’ status 
in each MS, and allow trade (64/432/EC; OIE, 2011c). In order to monitor a potential 
re-emergence of the disease, and allow trade, a continuous serological testing 
scheme is carried out in BE according to EU Directive 64/432/EEC (Godefroid et al., 
2002; Godefroid and Kasbohrer, 2002; OIE, 2011b, c; Seleem, 2010).  
In Belgium, the surveillance program for BB consists in active and passive 
surveillance components that run in parallel (MB, 1978). The active surveillance 
component consists of antibody detection in serum and milk, in beef and dairy cattle 
respectively. This serological (serum) screening is carried on all imported cattle from 
officially free, or non-officially free countries, traded cattle in Belgium and on 33% of 
all Belgian beef cattle farms during the winter screening (November-March) ensuring 
that the whole population is tested every 3 years. All imported female cattle, above 
24 month of age, originating from non-officially free countries, whether introduced in 
dairy or beef herds, are serologically tested for three consecutive years during the 
winter screening. The milk testing is carried out on dairy herds at least 4 times a year 
with the Milk ring test (MRT) test.  The passive surveillance consists of clinical 
surveillance and reporting all abortions cases by the field veterinarians. These 
abortions are further investigated in the regional laboratories via coloration and primo 
culture (OIE, 2011c). 
Using these different surveillance components, Belgium has obtained the officially 
free status for brucellosis since 2003 (2003/467/EC). Council Directive 64/432/EC 
determines that a Member State with an officially free status (for BB) for 5 
consecutive years is allowed to re-evaluate its surveillance programme in relation to 
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frequency of sampling and sample size (64/432/EC). Following a demand of the 
Belgian Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain (FASFC), the current study 
aimed at evaluating the current Belgian surveillance programmes of BB, in order to 
estimate the relative sensitivity of each surveillance component and identify the most 
optimal surveillance system protocol. 
For this study, quantifying the sensitivity of the surveillance programme to 
substantiate freedom of disease, assuming 100% specificity, was the major aim.  
The use of scenario trees has been chosen to conduct this study and accounts for 
number of tested samples, diagnostic tests applied, the minimum design prevalence 
to be detected and the differential risk of infection or detection. This method offers 
interesting tools to quantify the surveillance system sensitivity and has proven its 
efficacy in the past (Frossling et al., 2009; Hadorn et al., 2008; Knight-Jones et al., 
2010; Martin et al., 2007a,b; Stark et al., 2006; Welby et al., 2010). 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Scenario tree for surveillance of bovine brucellosis in Belgium 
A scenario tree was created for BB as described in detail by Martin et al. (Martin et 
al., 2007a). All factors interfering with the probability of infection or detection were 
represented in the same tree by category, infection or detection nodes respectively 
which further would define the limbs of the tree (risk groups) for each category node 
combination. Category nodes (either of infection or detection), infection nodes and 
detection nodes, as described here below, have their respective parameters in order 
to obtain the probabilities of detection at animal level (ASe) and herd level (HSe) in 
each limb of the tree, given the country would be infected at a certain design 
prevalence. The combination of the obtained individual HSe enables the computation 
of the total surveillance sensitivity (SSe) (Figure 1). For illustration purpose only one 
possible risk node combination is illustrated in this figure though all possible 
combinations were accounted for in the analysis. 
  





Figure 1: Scenario tree for Belgian bovine brucellosis surveillance (only one 
combination is illustrated for clarity purpose).  
 
Data sources for each category, infection and detection node 
Expert elicitation was used to estimate the relative risk that could partition the 
population towards the differential risk of infection or detection. Different Belgian 
stakeholders as well as experts from the National Reference Laboratory (CODA-
CERVA), veterinary syndicates (UPV), farm syndicates (Boerenbond, FWA), FASFC 
and regional veterinary laboratories DGZ and ARSIA were consulted for this purpose. 
This enabled to identify the category nodes of the tree. 
All risk groups were assumed to be independent. The first node defined is an 
infection node “Country Status” with its targeted design prevalence at herd level 
(DPh) and animal level (DPa). Following the infection node country status, the 
infection category node “Herd Group” was represented. This node represents the 
different subpopulations in the Belgian cattle population namely: i) Abortions (Ab), ii) 
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Imported cattle from a brucellosis non-free country (IR), iii) Imported cattle from a 
brucellosis free country (IF), iv) Traded cattle in Belgium (Tr), v) Beef herds (WS), vi) 
Dairy herds (Da). 
The category node ‘Herd Group’, followed by its respective “Herd Status” infection 
node, was further subdivided into an infection category node “Animal Group” for 
which 2 different age categories (<24 month of age and ≥ 24 month of age) were 
considered according to the differential risk of infection  in each category.  
Subsequently, a next infection node at animal level namely the “Animal Status” could 
be defined. The diagnostic process for BB is represented in the detection category 
node. The parameter characterizing this node is represented by the diagnostic 
process sensitivity (TSe), which accounted for each diagnostic test used in the 
process namely: i) For dairy cattle, the milk ring test (MRT), ii) For traded cattle in 
Belgium and cattle tested during the WS, the Slow Agglutination Test with EDTA 
(SAT-EDTA) (OIE, 2011c) and commercial indirect ELISA test (Synbiotics®) were 
performed serially if the SAT-EDTA test was positive. If this indirect ELISA test was 
positive, the sample(s) were tested with an in house indirect ELISA carried out by the 
National Reference Laboratory (NRL) in Belgium (SAT-ELISA) (EFSA, 2006), iii) For 
imported cattle SAT-EDTA test and commercial indirect ELISA were performed in 
parallel. If at least one of these assays is positive the in house indirect ELISA is 
carried out by the NRL (SAT//ELISA), iv) For abortive tissues, coloration (Ziehl-
Nielsen) and a primo culture (primary culture for Brucella spp.) are performed in 
parallel. In addition the SAT-EDTA test and a commercial indirect ELISA is performed 
on the serum of the aborted animal (COL/CULT//SAT//ELISA). 
 The DPh is obtained from the legal requirements defining the legal minimum 
detection level of disease according the EU and OIE. For BB, the DPh is set at 0.2%, 
maximum herd prevalence (64/432/EC; OIE, 2011c; MB, 1978). For the DPa, no 
minimum legal obligations were prescribed but a 30% DPa in a naïve population 
(after eradication) was assumed. This estimate was based on expert opinion and 
observed minimum within-herd prevalence for other epizootic disease with similar 
epidemiology as BB. In order to measure the impact of a fixed DPa, a sensitivity 
analysis was performed for this parameter. 
Regarding the category nodes, corresponding parameters for each representative 
subpopulation (PPr), sampled population (SPr) as well as relative risk (RR) were 
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attributed. Population proportions and sampled data were obtained from the 2007-
2008 Belgian Animal Identification and Registration system (SANITEL) of the FASFC 
as well as from the two official and accredited regional veterinary laboratories in 
Belgium (ARSIA, DGZ) involved in official animal disease surveillance. In order to 
estimate the real proportion (PrP) of abortive females in the Belgian cattle population, 
an abortion rate of 3 to 5 % was assumed, corresponding to an average minimum of 
1 abortion per Belgian cattle herd per year. In 2008 around 4,056 abortions were 
registered.  
For the diagnostic tests sensitivities, literature review (EFSA, 2006; Gall and Nielsen, 
2004; Godefroid et al., 2010) was carried out and expert opinion was elicited as well. 
Appropriate distributions were fitted to the data that account for the uncertainty and 
variability in the data. 
Parameters obtained and computed for each category, infection and 
detection nodes 
The different parameters obtained for each category node described above, namely 
the PPr and RR enabled the calculation of an adjusted risk of infection (AR) for each 
“Herd Group” by (Eq. 1);  




The infection status at herd level (=“Herd Status” infection node) is characterised by 
the EPIH and takes into  account the adjusted risk of infection as well as the design 
prevalence at herd level as shown in (Eq. 2); 
EPIHHerdGroup𝑖 =  DPh ∗ AR HerdGroup𝑖 (Eq. 2) 
The same was calculated at animal level where for each “Animal Group” and for each 
age category (<24 month and ≥ 24 months) with the corresponding differential risk of 
infection for the proportion of cattle in each category (Eq. 3); 
ARAnimalGroup𝑖 =  
 RRAnimalGroup𝑖
∑  RR𝐴𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖∗PPrAnimallGroup𝑖
 (Eq. 3) 
The infection status at animal level (=“Animal Status” infection node) is defined by its 
respective probability of infection (EPIA) and derived from the adjusted risk and 
design prevalence at animal level as shown in (Eq. 4); 
EPIAAnimallGroup𝑖 =  DPa ∗ ARAnimallGroup𝑖 (Eq. 4) 
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Using the diagnostic test sensitivity (TSe) used and the fraction of population 
sampled (SPr) with that specific test, the effective probability of detection (EPD) was 
computed for each unit sampled in each limb of the tree (Eq. 5). 
EPDAnimalGroup𝑖 =  SPrHerdGroup𝑖 ∗ SPrAnimallGroup𝑖 ∗ TSe𝑖 (Eq. 5) 
For each limb of the tree (defined by each possible risk group combination), 
respective HSe and ASe were then estimated. These calculations were based on the 
parameters obtained above. 
For each ASe of each risk group identified, the binomial sampling approach was 
considered if the fraction of population sampled was <10% (Ab, (Eq. 6)) while the 
hypergeometric sampling approach was used in the estimation process if the 
sampled population was a fraction (>10%) of the total population (WS and Da) (Eq. 
7) and the exact sampling method was used if the whole population was sampled 
(IR, IF and Tr, shown in Eq. 8), as described  by Martin et al. (Martin, et al., 2007a) 
NAnimalGroupi characterized the total number of animals in that branch and 
nAnimalGroupi is the number of animals sampled. 
ASeAnimalGroup𝑖 = 1 − (1 − EPDAnimalGroup𝑖 ∗  EPIAAnimalGroup𝑖)
nAnimallGroup𝑖 (Eq. 6) 
ASeAnimalGroup𝑖 = 1 − (1 − EPDAnimalGroup𝑖 ∗
nAnimallGroup𝑖
NAnimallGroup𝑖
) EPIAAnimalGroup𝑖∗NAnimallGroup𝑖 (Eq. 7) 
ASeAnimalGroup𝑖 = 1 − (1 − EPDAnimalGroup𝑖)
 EPIAAnimalGroup𝑖∗NAnimallGroup𝑖 (Eq. 8) 
The same was calculated for each HSe: for abortions a binomial distribution was 
used (Eq.9) as the fraction of herds reporting abortions was only 7%, while for beef 
herds a hypergeometric approach was used (Eq. 10). For imported cattle, national 
traded cattle, as well as dairy herds the exact method was used (Eq. 11) because all 
herds were tested. NHerdGoupi characterized the total number of herds in that 
branch and nHerdGroupi is the number of herds sampled. 
HSeHerdGroup𝑖 = 1 − (1 −  ASeAnimalGroup𝑖 ∗ EPIHHerdGroup𝑖)
nHerdGroup𝑖 (Eq. 9) 
HSeHerdGroup𝑖 = 1 − (1 −  ASeAnimalGroup𝑖 ∗ (
nHerdGroup𝑖
NHerdGroup𝑖
))NHerdGroup𝑖∗ EPIHHerdGroup𝑖 (Eq. 
10) 
HSeHerdGroup𝑖 = 1 − (1 −  ASeAnimalGroup𝑖 )
NHerdGroup𝑖∗ EPIHHerdGroup𝑖 (Eq. 11) 
Finally, the whole SSe was estimated based on the following formula (Eq. 12);  
SSe = 1 − ∏(1 −  HSeHerdGroup𝑖) (Eq. 12)  
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Scenarios simulation  
The scenario tree was designed in an Excel spread sheet (Excel, 2007). Firstly, the 
outputs for the HSe and ASe were estimated through hypergeometric simulations, 
with 10,000 iterations per simulation, using ModelRisk 3.0® (Vose, 2010). Taking the 
uncertainty and variability of parameters into account by fitting appropriate parameter 
distributions, allowed to account for the range of possible situations.  
First the current surveillance system was evaluated.  
Secondly, the impact on the total surveillance system sensitivity if one or more 
surveillance components were reduced or skipped was evaluated.  
Thirdly, the monthly posterior probability of freedom (PostFreemonth) was calculated 
and based on the surveillance system sensitivity observed (simulated) that specific 
month, as well as the prior probability of introduction (PIntro) and probability of 
infection (PriorInfmonth) (Eq. 13, 14). The prior probability of infection was 
considered at 0.5 for the first month and the probability of introduction was held 




 (Eq. 13) 
PriorInfmonth = PIntro +  PostInfmonth−1 – PIntro ∗ PostInf month−1 (Eq. 14) 
Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was carried out, (using @risk 4.5®, Palisade) to validate the 
use of the given parameters and to evaluate the most influential input parameter on 
the SSe.  
In order to determine the most relevant RR for each risk category node, different 
simulations were carried out. A first analysis, data not shown, was conducted to 
estimate the impact of choosing RR according to expert opinion, RR equal to 1 in all 
risk category nodes, very high RR and unrealistic RR for each category node. Finally 
the most appropriate RR of a given node, taking into account the respective 
population proportion in that given node separately and the risk perception of the 
stakeholders were estimated using the SOLVER option of Excel (2007). 
In a second step, separate univariate analysis for each HSe were conducted to 
estimate the influence of each input parameter on the HSe, looking at the rank order 
correlation statistic ρ. The higher the ρ, the strongest the correlation was between the 
selected input variable and the output. 
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Finally in a third step to assess the impact of the different HSe on the CSe, the rank 
order correlation statistic ρ was used as well to estimate the most influential HSe 
when changes in sample sizes were simulated. Results 
Data sources for each category, infection and detection node  
Table 1 illustrates each risk node with the respective parameters PPr, RR. The 
population proportions were derived from the Belgian Animal Identification and 
Registration system (SANITEL) of the FASFC. The RR were obtained following 
multiple iterations trials which took in account expert opinion, very high RR, 
completely wrong RR and RR equal to 1. Finally the RR which reflected the better 
the Belgian situation was estimated using Solver in Excel. The same RR was given 
to IR and Ab, as both constituted a very high risk of disease introduction. 
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Table 1: Population proportions (PrP) and relative risks (RR) distributions (Distr)  for 
each category risk node identified in the scenario tree for Bovine Brucellosis in 
Belgium. 
Herd level NHerdGroup PPr Distr RR Distr 
Ab 36000 Normal(0.369;0.037) Pert(270;300;330) 
IR 114 Normal(0.001;0.000) Pert(270;300;330) 
IF 2415 Normal(0.025;0.002) Pert(90;100;110) 
Tr 23000 Normal(0.236;0.024) Pert(45;50;55) 
WS 26000 Normal(0.267;0.027) Uniform(0;1;1) 
Da 10000 Normal(0.103;0.010) Uniform(0;1;1) 
Animal level NAnimalGroup PPr Distr RR Distr 
Ab<24month 0 Normal (0.000;0.000) Uniform(0;1;1) 
Ab>24 month 4056 Normal (1.000;0.1000) Pert(2.5;3;3.5) 
IR<24 month 6471 Normal (0.905;0.090) Uniform(0;1;1) 
IR>24 month 683 Normal (0.095;0.009) Pert(2.5;3;3.5) 
IF<24 month 39748 Normal (0.752;0.075) Uniform(0;1;1) 
IF>24 month 13141 Normal (0.248;0.025) Pert(2.5;3;3.5) 
Tr<24 month 402010 Normal (0.677;0.068) Uniform(0;1;1) 
Tr>24 month 191974 Normal (0.323;0.032) Pert(2.5;3;3.5) 
WS<24 month 1075800 Normal (0.489;0.049) Uniform(0;1;1) 
WS>24 month 1124200 Normal (0.511;0.051) Pert(2.5;3;3.5) 
Da<24 month 244500 Normal (0.489;0.049) Uniform(0;1;1) 
Da>24 month 255500 Normal (0.511;0.051) Pert(2.5;3;3.5) 
Representative population data (NHerdGroup, NAnimalGroup); representative population distribution (PPr Distr(Normal(mean, sd)) and 
relative risk distribution (RR Distr(Pert(minimum, most likely, maximum); Uniform(minimum, most likely, maximum));  Traded 
cattle within Belgium (Tr); Dairy cattle (Da); Winter screening surveillance (WS); Import from non-free BB countries (risk 
countries) (IR); import from free BB countries (IF); Abortions (Ab), above (>24mth) and below 24 month (<24mth). 
Parameters obtained and computed for each category, infection and 
detection nodes 
Table 2 illustrates the SPr at animal and herd group level, corresponding to the 
diagnostic TSe used for each respective risk node as the ASe and HSe resulting 
from each simulation.  
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Table 2: Sampled population proportion (SPr), Test sensitivity (TSe), calculated 




nAnimal nHerd TSe  Ase HSe 








IR<24mth 6471 114 SAT//ELISA(Pert(0.9;0.92;0.95)) 1(1-1) 1(1-1) 
IR>24mth 683  SAT//ELISA(Pert(0.9;0.92;0.95)) 1(1-1) 1(1-1) 
IF<24mth 39748 2415 SAT//ELISA(Pert(0.9;0.92;0.95)) 1(1-1) 1(1-1) 
IF>24mth 13141  SAT//ELISA(Pert(0.9;0.92;0.95)) 1(1-1) 1(1-1) 
Tr<24mth 402010 23000 SAT-ELISA(Pert(0.8;0.86;0.9)) 1(1-1) 1(1-1) 
Tr>24mth 191974  SAT-ELISA(Pert(0.8;0.86;0.9)) 1(1-1) 1(1-1) 
WS<24mth 0.000 8600 SAT-ELISA(Pert(0.8;0.86;0.9)) 0(0-0) 0(0-0) 








Da>24mth 255500  MRT(Pert(0.85;0.89;0.95)) 1 (0.999-1) 0.987 (0.940-1) 
Sampled population data (nAnimalGroup, nHerdGroup); test sensitivities (TSe) (Pert(minimum, most likely, maximum); risk group 
sensitivity obtained at animal (ASe) and herd (HSe) level (minimum and maximum values are between brackets); Traded cattle 
within Belgium (Tr); Dairy cattle (Da); Winter screening surveillance (WS); Import from non-free BB countries (risk countries) 
(IR); import from free BB countries (IF); Abortions (Ab), above (>24mth) and below 24 month (<24mth). 
 
The higher sensitivities were obtained for the imported and traded (within BE) cattle.  
The mean, minimum and maximum values across the 10,000 iterations history 
process are illustrated for the ASe and HSe in each risk group.  Despite the poor 
sensitivity of the MRT, systematic testing of all dairy herds resulted in a high HSe. As 
the number of cattle tested within herd is high, WS had high ASe, but due to the fact 
that only 1/3 of the total cattle herd population is tested in that group, low HSe was 
observed for that herd group. Due to the limited number of abortions tested this risk 
group had very poor ASe and HSe, despite the very high sensitivity of diagnostic test 
used. 
Scenarios simulation  
The whole surveillance system sensitivity was equal to one. Results showed the 
impact of stopping surveillance in one of the risk groups, namely; i) Only testing Ab, 
IR, IF, Tr, Da, leaving out WS ii) Only testing Ab, IR, IF, Tr, WS, leaving out Da, iii) 
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Only testing Ab, IR, IF, Tr, leaving out Da and WS, iv) Only testing Ab, Tr, WS, Da, 
leaving out IR, IF, v) Only testing Ab leaving out IR, IF, Tr, WS, Da. 
None of these modifications turned out to be influential on the whole surveillance 
sensitivity which remained one. This indicated that reduction in the total number of 
samples was allowed and yet maintain the same sensitivity of detection. However to 
obtain an optimal detection level, a targeted approach is required. 
Figure 2 illustrates the monthly evolution of the posterior probability of freedom in 
each risk group. A sufficient guarantee with relation to the posterior probability of 
freedom is obtained if imported cattle from free or non-free countries are tested 
(Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Monthly evolution of Posterior Freedom Probability for bovine brucellosis in 
Belgium. 
Testing the WS group and Da group is of limited value as it only happens once in a 
year (WS), or 4 times a year (Da). The current number of abortions tested per year is 
of very poor value to insure a posterior probability of freedom. 
Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis showed that the Ab surveillance component is the most 
influential parameter on the SSe, especially when sample size changes were 
simulated. A 10% increase in the sensitivity was observed when the number of 
reported was doubled! 
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The input parameter affecting most the individual HSe was the diagnostic test used 
namely the COL/CULT//SAT//ELISA and the MRT (ρ=0.73-0.68). The RR attributed 
to Ab, and Tr, had a small influence (ρ=0.35-0.28). All the other input parameters had 
only a very poor (ρ < 0.01) influence.  When a pert distribution reflecting a large 
variation around the DPa (min =0.05, most likely=0.3 and max=0.7), this parameter 
had only little influence on the HSe and SSe (ρ<0.01), compared to all the other input 
parameters in the model.  
DISCUSSION  
The results in this study showed that the overall surveillance system sensitivity for 
BB, mainly based on serological screening, in Belgium was very high. This is 
probably due to the large amount of herds processed within the different risk groups 
as shown in Table 1. Moreover, the impact of suppressing surveillance in a specific 
risk group did not have huge impact on the whole surveillance system sensitivity. 
Testing at import, or following introduction of cattle in a herd seem to play a crucial 
role with regard to proving freedom of disease and for early detection, as shown in 
Table 2 and Figure 2. Indeed, in Belgium around 450,000 to 500,000 trade ‘activities’ 
(purchases) are recorded each year and allows a systematic control on a daily basis. 
Interestingly, despite the poor TSe of the MRT, testing of dairy cattle turns out to be 
quite effective (Table 2), partly due to the large amount of herds tested and the low 
RR attribute to this risk group, but remains of limited value as it is only carried out 4 
times a year (Figure 2). For WS, the ASe is quite high, this is because during WS in 
the tested herds, nearly all animals are sampled (one stage sampling). Of course 
because only a fraction (33%) of the herds is tested once per year, the HSe is low as 
well as the posterior probability of freedom (Table 2, and Figure 2). Strikingly, 
through this study it was obvious that the ASe and HSe in the Ab component were 
very low. The sensitivity analysis showed however that increasing the number of 
samples taken in that risk group would have a high impact on the HSe in that group. 
The 4,056 abortions registered in 2008 suggest that underreporting for this ‘sampled’ 
population fraction is substantial and that reporting of abortions by field veterinarians 
should be stimulated.   
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It should be noted that the output of the scenario tree simulations depends on the 
input parameters which have been set up in the model. This is why in the present 
study a thorough sensitivity analysis was conducted on each input parameter. From 
that sensitivity analysis it became clear that the expected within herd design 
prevalence had no influence on the output. This means that results of this model are 
quite robust despite the uncertainty around this parameter (0.05-0.7). Interestingly 
the TSe of testing abortions was seen as the most influential parameter, and further 
underlines the importance of increasing the efforts to rise up these values either by 
improving the diagnostic methods or the number of samples. The value of the MRT 
was also influential on the results; this can be easily explained by its large range. 
Thus an alternative testing protocol for dairy herds is advisable. Finally the RR 
attributed to abortions and purchased animals was also influential. It must be stated 
however that in this study the most optimal value was estimated following the 
numerous sensitivity analysis, thus it can be assumed that the chosen values truly 
reflected the ‘real life’ situation (Table 1). However obtaining more empirical data for 
these values would be interesting in the future.  
Nevertheless these models provide insight and understanding on how to improve the 
efficiency of a surveillance program.  
Through this study new questions have arisen. Although it was found that focusing 
the surveillance on reporting and investigation of abortions would constitute an 
increased confidence level towards probability of freedom, it will be hard to put into 
practice due to farmer’s difficulty to notify an abortion. Indeed, some distrust to the 
competent authority and the fear of economic consequences as well as the ethical 
impact of a notification should be considered (Elbers et al., 2010). Therefore it would 
be useful to evaluate how this notification could be improved, e.g. through 
information campaigns, or by stressing the legal obligation by the veterinarians, or by 
providing a financial compensation to those farmers reporting their abortions. This 
certainly will improve the passive surveillance not only for BB but also other 
infectious diseases possibly leading to abortion such as e.g. listeria, leptospirosis, 
bovine viral diarrhea and Q-fever. Recently an ‘abortion’ protocol for cattle in Belgium 
is installed in the 2 official regional veterinary laboratories and allows the 
simultaneous detection of various pathogens such as Brucellosis, Listeriosis, BVD, 
BTV, Q Fever, Neospora, IBR, Leptospirosis, Listeriosis, Mycosis (champignons), 
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other pathogens (E coli, pseudomonas,...). Furthermore a random selection of 
15,000 cattle from all herds which did not declare any abortions during the past year 
were investigated for BB during WS by the means of SAT ELISA test.  
With regard to the diagnosis of imported cattle it is of utmost importance to implement 
the most optimal testing protocol, the time to seroconvert after infection in bovines 
with Brucella abortus, varies between 3-4 weeks (in case of an acute infection) to 
sometimes 2 years (in case of a latent infection). In order to optimize the surveillance 
programme, a protocol taking into account this physio-pathological lag period must 
be applied. Another important issue to take into consideration is the time lag before 
the results of tested traded cattle are available. Indeed, actually almost no quarantine 
or biosecurity measures are respected at purchase. The cattle are sampled upon 
arrival at the farm of destination, and cattle remain there until receipt of the laboratory 
results. During that lag phase the infection could probably further spread within a 
herd or between herds if no quarantine or biosecurity measures are respected. 
Therefore, the estimation of the RR should also be based on this knowledge. That’s 
why high (and even higher) estimations of RR for introduced cattle are to be 
considered. The opinion of different stakeholders, related to the import and export 
movements of cattle was useful in order to have more accurate quantification of the 
RR for this specific risk category of bovines.  
CONCLUSION  
Following this study, stakeholders agreed on the importance of testing imported 
cattle as well as abortions. To ensure a minimal awareness amongst farmers and 
labs as well as to maintain minimal technical resources and technician expertise in 
case of a re-emergence of the disease, it was agreed that testing of a minimum 
number of samples during WS and Tr should be continued.  The surveillance 
program in Belgium was modified in 2010 (FASFC, 2011). Within the modified 
surveillance program the number of samples was estimated to be around 30,000. 
The reporting of abortion was strongly stimulated, via the abortion protocol. Via this 
protocol the aim was to reach an annual number of reports of 8,000 abortions instead 
of the 4,000. Furthermore a random selection of 15,000 cattle from all herds which 
did not declare any abortions during the past year were investigated for BB during 
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WS by the means of SAT ELISA test. In addition, it was recommended to test 8,500 
cattle during purchase (randomly selected in regional laboratories) and 8,500 cattle 
from intra community trade from officially, as well as all cattle from intra community 
trade from non-officially free countries. 
The new surveillance program led to the detection one case in 2010 (OIE, 2011d) 
following abortion investigation. This finding corroborated the usefulness of the 
present study. 
  
To conclude, this study evaluated, as best as possible, the real life situation of the 
current brucellosis surveillance program. The results of the analysis provide insight 
on how the surveillance can more efficiently be redesigned. Also this study 
constitutes a valuable tool to provide a required confidence level to the surveillance 
system in order to respect the international standard requirements.  
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Belgium obtained the bovine tuberculosis (bTB) officially free status in 2003 (EC 
Decision 2003/467/EC). This study was carried out to evaluate the components of 
the current bTB surveillance program in Belgium and to determine the sensitivity of 
this program. Secondly, alternatives to optimize the bTB surveillance in accordance 
with European legislation (Council Directive 64/432/EEC) were evaluated. 
Separate scenario trees were designed for each active surveillance component of the 
bTB surveillance program. Data from 2005-2009 regarding cattle population, 
movement and surveillance were collected to feed the stochastic scenario tree 
simulation model. A total of 7,403,826 cattle movement history records were obtained 
for the 2,678,020 cattle from 36,059 cattle herds still active in 2009. The current 
surveillance program sensitivity as well as the impact of alternative surveillance 
protocols was simulated in a stochastic model using 10,000 iterations per simulation. 
The median (50% percentile) of the component sensitivities across 10,000 iterations 
was 0.83, 0.85, 0.99, 0.99 respectively for i) testing the cattle only during the winter 
screening ii) testing only imported cattle iii) testing only purchased cattle and iv) 
testing only all slaughtered cattle. The sensitivity analysis showed that the most 
influential input parameter explaining the variability around the output came from the 
uncertainty distribution around the sensitivity of the diagnostic tests used within the 
bTB surveillance. Providing all animals are inspected and post mortem inspection is 
highly sensitive, slaughterhouse surveillance was the most effective surveillance 
component. If these conditions were not met, the uncertainty around the mean 
sensitivity of this component was important. Using an antibody ELISA at purchase 
and an interferon gamma test during winter screening and at import would increase 
greatly the sensitivity and the confidence level of Belgium’s freedom from bTB 
infection status. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although several European Union (EU) Member States have achieved the official 
bovine tuberculosis (bTB) free status (<0.1% annual herd prevalence), the possibility 
of a re-emergence of bTB infection cannot be excluded (EC Decision 2003/467/EC; 
EFSA, 2009).  
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Belgium has maintained the bTB officially free status since 2003 (EC Decision 
2003/467/EC). Yet, sporadic outbreaks do still occur, as was recently the case in 
Germany and in the Netherlands (FASFC, 2010; Humblet et al., 2011b; Probst et al., 
2010). Belgium had 7 reported breakdowns in 2003, 8 in 2004, 5 in 2005, 8 in 2006, 
5 in 2007, 12 in 2008 and 2 in 2009. In 2010, no cases were detected (FASFC, 
2010). 
To date, despite the decreased prevalence following the sanitary measures 
implemented during the last century, Mycobacterium bovis still remains a constant 
(re-)emerging threat for animal and public health as well as for free animal trade in 
Europe and worldwide. Mycobacterium bovis, a slow-growing microaerobic 
bacterium, is the main causative agent of tuberculosis in cattle, and can infect a wide 
range of different species. If clinical signs appear, the main signs in cattle are 
wasting, weight loss, and fever. Because the infection does not always cause clinical 
signs, it might go unnoticed for several years before eventually being detected at 
slaughter by enlarged and/or caseating lymph nodes.  
A national surveillance program according to the guidelines laid down in Council 
Directive 64/432/EEC and Royal Decree 17.10.2002 was in place in Belgium for 
many years. This program consists of four different surveillance components (SSC), 
each with its own sampling - and diagnostic process. The main aim of this ongoing 
surveillance program is to ensure the country is below the minimum required design 
prevalence required to be considered free from infection. In addition, the surveillance 
program should enable the early detection and eradication of sporadic cases. The 
Belgian Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain (FASFC) commissioned this 
study to evaluate the sensitivity of the current surveillance for bTB in Belgium and 
how this program could be optimized to enable efficient detection of outbreaks and 
maintain the bTB officially free status. Several studies have investigated the efficacy 
of bTB surveillance components separately, in Belgium (Humblet et al., 2009a, 2011) 
and elsewhere (Corner et al., 1990; Frankena et al., 2007). In the present study the 
different bTB surveillance components were evaluated together and for their relative 
efficacy. 
The scenario tree methodology developed by Martin et al. (2007a, b) has been 
proven to be a useful tool to quantify the sensitivity of a country’s surveillance system 
(Frossling et al., 2009; Hadorn et al., 2002, 2008; Knight-Jones et al., 2010; Martin et 
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al., 2007a,b; More et al., 2011; Stark et al., 2006; Welby et al., 2009a,b, 2010). The 
surveillance system sensitivity is the probability of detecting an infection given the 
country is infected at the set design prevalence by testing all samples of the 
surveillance system. The sensitivity of the diagnostic test (TSe) is taken into account 
as well as the number of samples processed. Furthermore, the differential risk of 
infection for the specific risk groups in the cattle population are taken into account to 
quantify the benefits of targeting surveillance in those risk groups. However, when 
quantitative information about the key parameters affecting the differential risk of 
infection is not available, one needs to rely on assumptions to simulate values 
(Dohoo et al., 2009).  
In the present study, the most representative values for the key parameters were 
estimated using historical data of the ongoing surveillance for bTB in Belgium. All 
available information regarding past outbreaks in Belgium was used to obtain 
quantitative values to feed the scenario tree model and obtain an output that 
reflected the Belgian situation, the sensitivity of its surveillance program and how it 
could be improved.  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Scenario tree methodology was chosen for the purpose of this study. Each event 
from infection to detection is represented by a node. A node has branches illustrating 
the possible event outcomes. Each outcome has a probability of occurrence. The 
combination of probabilities results in the probability of infection and detection for 
each limb, defined by a combination of nodes and branches, of the tree. The limbs 
define the different risk groups. The probabilities of detection are then combined to 
obtain the sensitivity of each SSC (CSe) and of the total surveillance system. 
Simulations are then carried out to see how changes in the current surveillance 
program could impact the CSe and surveillance system sensitivity, and how the 
surveillance program could be optimized in terms of efficiency of detection and 
provision of a guarantee of freedom from infection.  
Belgian surveillance program 
The four SSC of the current Belgian official surveillance program for bTB, in 
accordance with the guidelines laid down in Council Directive 64/432/EEC and the 
Royal Decree 17.10.2002, were: 
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 Imported cattle (IMP): all imported cattle are tested by single intradermal 
injection of bovine tuberculin (ID) at import. This SSC excludes young 
fattening calves (FC), which are sent to slaughter at the age of 6 months. 
 Slaughtered cattle (SLGH): all slaughtered cattle undergo a post-mortem 
inspection (PM) at slaughterhouse. 
 Purchased cattle (PUR): all purchased cattle, except FC for veal production, 
are tested with ID at purchase 
 Winter screening (WS): ID is carried out on: 
 all cattle older than 6 weeks from herds considered as neighbour or 
contact herds of a suspected or confirmed bTB positive herd, after tracing-
on and tracing-back investigation 
 all female cattle older than 24 months which belong to on-farm ‘milk-selling’ 
herds 
 all imported cattle, except FC for veal production, from non-bTB officially 
free Member States, are ID tested 3 consecutive years, during the winter 
period. 
An animal that tested positive with ID is consecutively tested for confirmation by a 
comparative skin test, using bovine and avian tuberculin. Animals that test positive to 
this comparative ID will be slaughtered and all suspect lesions and/or lymph nodes at 
post-mortem examination will be tested by Ziehl-Nielsen staining and bacterial 
culture. In case of a positive result (isolation and identification of M. bovis) all animals 
of that herd will be slaughtered and a complete epidemiological investigation will be 
performed. A herd is considered free of bTB if all animals, older than 6 weeks, react 
negatively to the ID test 6 and 12 months after slaughtering all infected animals of a 
confirmed case herd, or 60 days following the introduction of (new) animals into a 
fully depopulated herd (FASFC, 2010; Royal Decree 17.10.2002). 
A country or region is considered bTB officially free by the EU if for 6 consecutive 
years, 99.9% of the herds were tested and found negative. The annual herd 
prevalence must be <0.1% (Council Directive 64/432/EEC and Royal Decree 
17.10.2002). 
  




Four separate scenario trees, as described by Martin et al. (2007a), were designed 
for each SSC, namely, IMP, SLGH, PUR and WS. In each tree, the category nodes 
affecting the probabilities of infection were retained. Firstly considered was the risk 
category node ‘importing from risk country’. This node was split into two branches 
(yes/no). This node was followed by the nodes ‘previous bTB status’ 
(positive/negative), ‘animal movement rate’ (low/high), ‘herd type’ (FC for veal 
production or other bovines), and ‘herd size’ (low, medium, high). Subsequently, 
these nodes led to different risk groups for which a herd effective probability of 
infection and an animal effective probability of infection were obtained based on the 
design prevalence at herd and within herd level (DPh, DPa) and the differential risk of 
infection of each node in each risk group. The category nodes affecting the 
probability of detection in each risk group for PUR, WS, IMP were the ‘ID’ test and for 
SLGH component, the ‘PM’ test. Figure 1 shows the general structure of the scenario 
tree. Each limb of the tree was defined by the combination of each category node 
branch probabilities. Only one possible combination is illustrated, but in the current 
study all possible combinations were accounted for. 




Figure 1: Scenario tree illustrating each step between the probability of infection and 
detection of bovine tuberculosis in Belgium. The Belgian cattle population is 
categorised in different nodes according to their differential risk of infection or 
detection. The different parameters at each node enabled to compute for each 
combination of nodes a sensitivity of detection at animal and herd level. Only one 
combination is illustrated here above for clarity purpose, but all combinations were 
considered in the study. 




The choice and the sequence of the category nodes were developed following a 
review of literature (Humblet et al., 2009b, 2010) and consultation with four Belgian 
bTB experts from the national Veterinary Research Center (CODA-CERVA) and 
FASFC in Brussels. The Belgian national animal registration system (SANITEL) was 
then queried to extract data from the previous five years (2005-2009). The data were 
related to population data (cattle herd population structure), imported cattle, 
purchased cattle, slaughtered cattle, past status of bTB for each herd, and outbreak 
history of each reported bTB case in Belgium. The regional veterinary laboratories 
(ARSIA and DGZ) provided data regarding the cattle tested during the WS. 
A total of 7,403,826 cattle movement history records were obtained for the 2,678,020 
cattle and 36,059 herds still active in 2009. All datasets were standardized, 
formatted, merged and concatenated at herd level (SAS 9.2) and summarized in 
Table 1. For each herd that was still active in 2009 (reference year), the following 
parameters were obtained: import of cattle from risk country or not (binary variable), 
bTB status during the previous five years (yes/no), the average yearly movement rate 
(continuous variable), the herd type (FC or other bovines), herd size (continuous 
variable), the yearly number of slaughtered animals (continuous variable), number of 
purchased animals (continuous variable), number of imports (continuous variable), 
and the number of animals tested during WS (if WS was applicable, continuous 
variable). 
Table 1: Number of herds and cattle tested in each surveillance component in 2009 
in Belgium 
Surveillance system component  Herds Cattle 
Slaughterhouse  26,138 769,016 
Purchased  18,493 658,929 
Imports  3,804 109,283 
Winter screening  2,911 260,696 
 
To categorize the reference population and the population sampled into the different 
category nodes branches, separate univariable analyses were conducted to 
determine cut-off values and the mean number of herds and animals in each node 
branch (SAS 9.2).  
Chapter V: Bovine tuberculosis surveillance alternatives in Belgium 
123 
 
The differential risks of each nodes branch were obtained from a multivariable 
generalized linear model (SAS 9.2). The probability of having a bTB positive herd 
was modeled with a binomial distribution. The explanatory variables retained in the 
model, due to their biological plausibility or levels of significance, were: Import from 
risk countries (yes/no), previous status (positive/negative), movement rate (low/high), 
herd type (FC, other bovines) and herd size (small/medium/large). A pert distribution 
was fitted around the mean value of the relative risk estimate for each variable, using 
the 95% confidence intervals limits of the point estimate for the minimum and 
maximum value of the pert distribution. For the diagnostic test sensitivity values 
(TSe), literature (de la Rua-Domenech, 2006; Humblet et al., 2011; Cousins and 
Florisson, 2005) and expert opinion from the Veterinary and Agrochemical Research 
Centre (CODA-CERVA) and FASFC were consulted. The sources of information for 
the different nodes and branches input values are detailed in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Bovine tuberculosis (bTB) scenario tree nodes and branches cut-off values 




Cut off value, source of 
information 
Input value 











Previous5 year TB history 
of the herd 
Uniform(1;1) 
Uniform(30.7;30.7) 









Herd type  
Fattening Calves 
Other bovine 
Holding registration number 
Uniform(1;1)  
Uniform(100;100) 




































Spreadsheets were created in Excel 2007 to represent each surveillance component 
(IMP, PUR, SLGH, WS). Distributions were fitted to each input variable taking into 
account the variability as well as the uncertainty of the key parameters (ModelRisk 
3.0). 
Adjusted relative risks of infection 
The relative risk estimates (RR) obtained from above, used to describe the herd 
effective probability of infection (EPIH) in each risk group (i), were adjusted (AR) to 
take in account the herd population structure (PPr) (Eq. (1, 2)). The herd effective 
probability of infection for each risk group was then obtained from the ARi and the 
DPh (0.1%), obtained from Council Directive 64/432/EEC. 









𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐻𝑖 = 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝑆𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝑀𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐻𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐻𝑆𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑃ℎ(Eq. 2) 
Where IRi, Si, MRi, HTi, HSi stands for the nodes import from risk country, past bTB 
status, movement rate, herd type and herd size respectively. 
Animal and herd sensitivity estimation (ASe, HSe) 
The combination of TSe and sampled population proportion (SPr) enabled to obtain 
the effective probability of detection at animal level (EPDA) for each risk group (i) 
(Eq. (3)). 
𝐸𝑃𝐷𝐴𝑖 = 𝑆𝑃𝑟𝐼𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑆𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑀𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝑟𝐻𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝑟𝐻𝑆𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑒 (Eq. 3) 
The sensitivity at animal level (ASe) and the herd level sensitivity (HSe) for each risk 
group (i) can then be estimated by the following 2 equations (Eq. (4, 5)),  




𝐻𝑆𝑒𝑖 = 1 − (1 − (𝐴𝑆𝑒𝑖 ∗
𝑛ℎ𝑖
𝑁ℎ𝑖




     is the average number of animals tested, divided by the average 
numbers of animals per herd for each risk and  
𝑛ℎ𝑖
𝑁ℎ𝑖
   represents the average number 
of herds sampled divided by the total herd population. No values regarding the 
minimum DPa were available in the legislation, therefore these values were 
estimated from previous bTB outbreaks (2005-2009). The best distribution value for 
this parameter was selected based on the akaike information criterion (AIC) (Normal 
(0.17;0.20)). 
Component and system sensitivity estimation  
The component sensitivity (CSe) for each component investigated was estimated 
from the product of the individual herd’s sensitivity for each limb of the tree (Eq. (6)): 
𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑖 = 1 − ∏(1 − 𝐻𝑆𝑒𝑖 ) (Eq. 6) 
Once all these component sensitivities were estimated, the surveillance system 
sensitivity (SSe) could be computed by (Eq. (7)): 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑖 = 1 − ∏(1 − 𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑖 ) (Eq. 7) 
Model simulations  
The following scenarios were simulated through a stochastic iteration process 
(10,000 Iterations/Simulation) (ModelRisk 3.0): 
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 The CSe of each current ongoing SSC was estimated 
 The sample size and PM TSe were investigated to determine what measures 
could affect the SLGH CSe  
 The test sensitivity of the ID for WS and PUR was investigated to determine 
what reflected most accurately the TSe given the circumstances in which the ID is 
conducted.  
 Other diagnostic assays were simulated to measure the impact on CSe for 
WS, PUR and IMP.  
 The impact of targeting in certain risk groups was simulated as well for PUR, 
SLGH and WS.  
 
Finally, the confidence level around our posterior probability of freedom from infection 
was then simulated from year to year (2005-2009) given the discovery of new 





   (Eq. 8) 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡𝑖 = (1 − 𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖−1) + 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖 − (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖−1))   (Eq. 9) 
The posterior probability of freedom (Pfree) is obtained given prior probability of 
infection (Pinf) of the previous year and the CSe of the previous year. The Pinf was 
set to 0.001, the minimum design prevalence, the first year (<2005). Then, for the 
following years, it was equal to 1 − Pfreeti−1. The probability of introduction (Pintro) 
was equal to the bTB annual prevalence. 
Model validation 
An internal validation was done by running a sensitivity analysis to determine which 
risk groups of each SSC were most influential on the CSe. 
An external validation was done in parallel to validate the output of this model. For 
this purpose a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model was built to investigate 
what was the most significant reason that led to the detection of outbreak herds over 
the past five years, based on the p-value (p-value < 0.05) of the Wald test statistic 
(SAS 9.2).  
  




The median (50% percentile) of the component sensitivities across 10,000 iterations 
was 0.83, 0.85, 0.99, 0.99, respectively, for i) testing the animals only during the 
winter screening ii) testing only imported cattle iii) testing only purchased cattle and 
iv) testing only all slaughtered cattle. The uncertainty distribution of the CSe was 
wide around IMP SSC (Fig. 2). In 75% of the 10,000 iterations during the PUR and 
SLGH simulations, the CSe simulations remained above 0.9 (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2: Simulations history of each surveillance system component sensitivity 
(CSe) for bovine tuberculosis detection in Belgium. Box plots representing the 25th 
(bottom of the box) and 75th (top of the box) percentiles of the iterations history for 
each simulated scenario (CSe (Y axis) (winter screening (WS) with intradermal skin 
test (ID) (Test sensitivity (TSe) (defined by a pert distribution (Pert))=Pert(0.54; 0.68; 
0.95)),  import (IMP) with ID test (TSe =Pert(0.54; 0.68; 0.95)), purchase (PUR) with 
ID test (TSe =Pert(0.54; 0.68; 0.95)), slaughter (SLGH) with the post mortem 
inspection (PM) (TSe =Pert(0.5; 0.7; 0.99)) and DPa=Normal(0.17; 0.2)) (X axis). The 
midline corresponds to the 50th percentile (median).The lower and upper whiskers 
represent the 5th and 95th percentile. The height of the box shows the skew of the 
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data around the median. For PUR and SLGH, the 50th percentile was the same 
value as the 75th percentile. The dots represent the outliers. 
To determine what had the higher impact in SLGH SSC, simulations were carried 
out. Fixing the TSe of SLGH at 0.99, 0.75, or 0.5 did not have as much impact as 
reducing the sample size. When 50% of the sample size was simulated, the CSe 
showed a very wide uncertainty range. In all simulations, however, the mean CSe 
remained above 0.9 (Fig. 3). 
 
Figure 3: Simulations of the slaughter (SLGH) surveillance component sensitivity 
(CSe) for bovine tuberculosis detection in Belgium and some scenario simulations. 
Box plots representing the 25th (bottom of the box) and 75th (top of the box) 
percentiles of the iterations history for each simulated scenario (CSe (Y axis) (SLGH 
with post mortem inspection (PM) (Test sensitivity (TSe) (defined by a pert 
distribution (Pert))=Pert(0.5; 0.7; 0.99)), SLGH with PM (TSe= 0.99)), SLGH with PM 
(TSe=0.75)), SLGH with PM (TSe= 0.5), SLGH with PM (TSe=PERT(0.5; 0.7; 0.99)) 
and 75% cattle inspected), SLGH with PM (TSe= 0.99) and 75% cattle inspected, 
SLGH with PM (TSe=Pert(0.5; 0.7; 0.99)) and 50% cattle inspected, SLGH with PM 
(TSe= 0.99)and 50% cattle inspected), and design prevalence at animal level 
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(defined by a normal distribution (Normal))=Normal(0.17; 0.2)) (X axis). The midline 
corresponds to the 50th percentile. The lower and upper whiskers represent the 5th 
and 95th percentile. The height of the box shows the skew of the data around the 
median. The dots represent the outliers. 
History of the outbreaks over the previous five years indicated that WS was more 
effective in detecting outbreaks then PUR. Different ID TSe values were simulated to 
reflect the difference of TSe depending on the circumstances in which this test is 
carried out (Fig. 4). 
 
Figure 4: Simulations of the winter screening (WS) and purchase (PUR) surveillance 
component sensitivity (CSe) for the detection of bovine tuberculosis in Belgium and 
some scenario simulations. Box plots representing the 25th (bottom of the box) and 
75th (top of the box) percentiles of the iterations history for each simulated scenario 
(CSe (Y axis) for each surveillance component (PUR with intradermal skin test (ID) 
(Test sensitivity (TSe) (defined by a pert distribution (Pert))=Pert(0.08; 0.10; 0.12)) 
obtained from 2005-2009 data, PUR with ID (TSe=Pert(0.008; 0.010; 0.012)), WS 
with ID (TSe=Pert(0.38; 0.46; 0.53)) obtained from 2005-2009 data, WS with ID 
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(TSe=Pert(0.27; 0.33; 0.39), and design prevalence at animal level (defined by a 
normal distribution (Normal))=Normal(0.17;0. 20)) (X axis). The midline corresponds 
to the 50th percentile. The lower and upper whiskers represent the 5th and 95th 
percentile. The height of the box shows the skew of the data around the median. The 
dots represent the outliers. 
 We then investigated how the CSe could be improved in each SSC (Fig.5). Antibody 
ELISA (Ab ELISA) was considered for the PUR component; this increased the CSe 
and greatly reduced the uncertainty around the CSe. Interferon gamma (INFγ) was 
considered for WS and IMP. Only sampling FC in SLGH and PUR, and outbreak 
herds with a INFγ in WS was also simulated. This targeted approach was of limited 
value. 
 
Figure 5: Simulations of alternative options regarding diagnostic assays for each 
bovine tuberculosis surveillance component in Belgium. Box plots representing the 
25th (bottom of the box) and 75th (top of the box) percentiles of the iterations history 
for each simulated scenario (Component sensitivity (CSe) (Y axis) for each 
surveillance component (purchase (PUR) with Ab ELISA (Test sensitivity 
(TSe)=literature value), PUR targeting only fattening calves (FC) with IFNγ 
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(TSe=literature value), slaughter targeting only FC with IFNγ (TSe=literature value), 
winter screening (WS) with IFNγ (TSe=CODA-CERVA in house validation value), WS 
targeting only past outbreaks with IFNγ (TSe=literature value), import (IMP) with IFNγ 
(TSe=literature value), and design prevalence at animal level (defined by a normal 
distribution (NORMAL))=NORMAL(0.17;0.02)). The midline corresponds to the 50th 
percentile. The lower and upper whiskers represent the 5th and 95th percentile. The 
height of the box shows the skew of the data around the median. The dots represent 
the outliers. 
The TSe values of Ab ELISA (0.38; 0.5; 062), and INFγ (0.64; 0.80; 0.96) used for 
targeting were those found in literature (van Asseldonk et al., 2005). The INFγ (0.38; 
0.5; 062) values used for the whole population sampled during WS and IMP were the 
values found in the in-house validation test of the INFγ test (Govaerts et al., 2009).  
The posterior probability of infection was modeled for the past five years (Fig.6).The 
probability of infection was higher in years where more outbreaks were detected 
(2008), but always remained below the minimum design prevalence prescribed by 
the legislation. The PUR and SLGH SSCs each separately provide a good guarantee 
for Pfree, as seen for the surveillance system sensitivity. In contrast, testing either 
IMP or WS were less efficient.  
 
Figure 6: Posterior probability of infection of bovine tuberculosis in Belgium using 
each surveillance component (purchase (PUR), slaughterhouse (SLGH), winter 
screening (WS), import (IMP) with intradermal skin test (ID) or post mortem 
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From the internal validation, the sensitivity analysis of this model showed that the 
diagnostic method (TSe) was the most determinant factor on the variation of the 
output, followed by the intra-herd prevalence. Large herds of adult bovines, where 
movement rate was high, where no bTB infections were observed previously, and 
where no imports from risk countries were registered, were the most influential on the 
CSe in each SSC. Thus targeting surveillance or continuing the ongoing surveillance 
in those risk groups is the best approach to increase CSe of each SSC.  
The GEE model, carried out for external validation, showed that the most efficient 
surveillance method over the previous five years was SLGH (1.69, p-value ≤ 0.01), 
followed by WS (1.34, p-value ≤ 0.0001) for the detection of outbreaks. The PUR 
surveillance component was non-significant (p-value=0.91). 
DISCUSSION 
The output of this study has underlined features of the current surveillance program 
in Belgium, such as the importance of slaughterhouse surveillance (SLGH). It can be 
concluded from the simulations and the results of the external validation model, that 
SLGH provides the best CSe in Belgium. One possible explanation for the high 
sensitivity in the slaughterhouse component is the large sampling coverage. 
However, it is obvious that the efficiency of this component is highly dependent on 
the sensitivity of the post mortem examination (during meat inspection by 
veterinarians) and on the sample size. This was demonstrated by the simulation 
exercise and the sensitivity analysis (Fig. 3). An important feature found during this 
simulation exercise is that in 25 % of the iterations the sensitivity of the SLGH 
component was below 0.92 (Fig.2). This means that considering the different input 
parameters (TSe, population size, sample size and relative risk estimates), an 
infection present in the country at 0.1 % design prevalence could go undetected if 
only slaughterhouse surveillance were carried out. It is the combination of all 
surveillance components that counter this lack of CSe seen in SLGH. High variability 
in the sensitivity of visual inspection is also mentioned in literature (Corner et al., 
1990; Cousin and Florisson, 2005; Frankena et al., 2011; More and Good, 2006; 
Ryan et al., 2006). In the past, slaughterhouse surveillance has proven to be 
effective at national level, as in some other Member States, for the detection of bTB 
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outbreaks that were not detected at purchase by the means of ID testing (Collins, 
2006; Humblet et al., 2011b; More and Good, 2006; Probst et al., 2010; van 
Asseldonk et al., 2005). The GEE model, developed for validation purpose, supports 
these observations. 
Although the WS had low CSe, partly due the small fraction of the population 
sampled within this component, it was seen that WS was actually more efficient than 
PUR when the TSe of ID test was corrected, as shown in Fig. 4. The targeted 
approach of this WS component probably explains this high CSe, as shown by the 
GEE validation model. Data from the past five years showed that WS was more 
effective at detecting outbreaks than the PUR component in Belgium. Although the 
same ID skin test was applied, the TSe varied given the situations. The TSe of the 
WS was assigned a higher value because it was expected that in circumstances of 
outbreak investigation, the vigilance of the veterinarians carrying out ID would be 
higher compared to that in routine testing in normal circumstances, e.g. testing at 
purchase. When new simulations were carried out taking into account the difference 
of TSe between PUR and WS, WS turned out to have the highest CSe value (Fig. 4). 
However in 25% of the iteration process history, the CSe of WS was only 0.75. To 
counter the lack of sensitivity observed with the ID test alone and because the 
proportion of the population investigated during WS is limited, implementing an IFN-γ 
during WS in parallel of the ID test, could be a good, cost-effective alternative. This 
has been seen in the study and supported by literature (Collins et al., 2006; More and 
Good, 2006). 
The PUR SSC in the current bTB program in Belgium was of limited value. This 
reflects the Belgian experience, where for several years no outbreaks were detected 
during PUR. However, testing purchased animals remains important because cattle 
movement constitutes one of the major routes of bTB spread. Implementing a 
different diagnostic test, such as the Ab ELISA, could be a good cost effective 
alternative to counter this lack of Se of the ID carried out during PUR, as seen in Fig. 
5. But further studies would be needed to confirm the TSe value of the Ab ELISA 
simulated in this model. Furthermore, keeping good records of all animal movements 
is crucial to enable efficient tracing-back and tracing-on of infected animals or herds. 
This traceability is the only way to detect the route of dissemination of a bTB infection 
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(Collins, 2006; Gilbert et al., 2005; Humblet et al., 2011; More et al., 2011; Probst et 
al., 2010).  
The IMP SSC had a wide range of uncertainty around the CSe. During the previous 
five year outbreak history in Belgium, no case herd was found from herds that 
imported from risk countries. So targeting that risk group did not increase the 
probability of freedom from infection in our simulations. The low prevalence of 
infection within the country probably constitutes the source of these sporadic 
outbreaks. 
Targeting the surveillance on veal calves did not seem to enhance the CSe of each 
SSC (Fig.5). This is mainly due to the fact that in this study FC was not considered to 
be at risk of being infected by bTB, following the risk factor analysis. To date, no 
outbreaks have been found in FC in Belgium. This is not the case in some 
neighboring countries. At the moment there is no target sampling planned in the FC 
population by the actual surveillance program.  
A herd level spatial cluster analysis was performed to investigate if any significant 
spatial clustering of outbreaks existed at municipality level in (SaTScanTM 2005). A 
Poisson distribution was chosen to model the differential risk of municipalities 
containing positive herds. Two significant clusters were found: one in the province of 
Antwerp (relative risk of 19 with p-value of 0.001) and one cluster covering the 
provinces Liege, Limburg and Flemish Brabant (relative risk 8.5, p-value 0.033). 
However, it was decided not to take into account spatial aspects in the final scenario 
tree, as WS already accounts for this targeted approach. Walravens et al. (2006) 
have shown that bTB strain could still re-emerge five years after the whole herd was 
slaughtered and replaced. This could suggest the presence of an environmental or 
wildlife reservoir. To date, no bTB cases have been reported in wildlife. However, no 
active surveillance has been carried out and the conclusion is based only on passive 
reporting. The possibility of a wildlife reservoir should not be ruled out based on 
experiences in some neighboring Member States (Abernethy et al., 2006; Anses, 
2011; More et al., 2011; More and Good, 2006). Implementing wildlife active 
surveillance around these clusters should be considered to rule out this possibility. 
The spatial clusters, found in this study, were all near the Belgian national borders 
(provinces of Antwerp, Limbourg, Liege and Hainaut) suggesting that these regions 
are at high risk. However, it might be as well that the level of disease awareness was 
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higher in those areas, thus enhancing the number of cases found. Similar findings 
were observed in other publications (Collins, 2006; Elbers et al., 2010; Humblet et al., 
2011).  
CONCLUSION 
Depending on the infection status of a country, two situations can be distinguished. In 
an endemic situation, trade of animals should be controlled because this event can 
constitute a high risk of dissemination. In an infection-free situation, testing and 
controlling all possible routes of introduction is a key element of the surveillance 
program. Eradication success depends on a program that enables early detection of 
the infection. From the simulation results of this study, it was found that individual 
inspection of carcasses at slaughterhouse (meat inspection) plays a key role in the 
surveillance of bTB but mainly depends on the sensitivity of the meat inspection, 
which is the probability that veterinarians detect bTB lesions during meat inspection. 
The ID test carried out at PUR and WS was of limited value. To increase the 
sensitivity at PUR and WS, an Ab ELISA could be used during PUR and an IFN-γ 
during WS, as simulated in this study and published elsewhere (Collins, 2006; More 
and Good, 2006; Ramirez-Villaescusaet al., 2010; van Asseldonk et al., 2005; 
Vanholme, 2009). However, further studies are recommended to confirm these 
hypotheses. 
Obtaining empirical figures for the test sensitivities would enable us to increase the 
validity of this model. Nevertheless, the simulations carried out in this study provided 
good insight into the key elements to be considered when implementing or revising 
the bTB surveillance program in Belgium such as required by European legislation 
and International standards. 
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Background: The aim of this study was to assess the sensitivity of the four major 
bluetongue surveillance components implemented in Belgium in 2007 for farmed 
animals and prescribed by the European Union regulation ; winter serological 
screening, sentinel system, passive clinical surveillance, export testing. Scenario tree 
methodology was used to evaluate the relative sensitivity of detection and targeted 
approach of each component in terms of early detection and freedom of infection 
substantiation. Field data collected from the previous year’s outbreaks in Belgium 
were used to determine the risk groups to be considered. Results: The best 
sensitivities at herd level, taking into account the diagnostic test sensitivity, design 
prevalence and the number of animals tested within a herd were obtained with the 
winter screening and sentinel component. The sensitivities at risk group level, taking 
into account the obtained herd sensitivity, effective probabilities of infection and 
number of herds tested were high in all components, except for the export 
component. Component sensitivities ranged between 0.77 and 1 for all components 
except for the export component with a mean value of 0.22 (0.17-0.26). In terms of 
early detection, the probability of detection was best using the passive clinical 
component or the sentinel component. Sensitivity analysis showed that the passive 
clinical component sensitivity was mostly affected by the diagnostic process and the 
number of herds sampled. The sentinel and export components sensitivity were 
mainly affected by the relative risk estimates whereas the winter screening 
component was mainly affected by the assumptions about the design prevalence. 
Conclusions: This study revealed interesting features regarding the sensitivity of 
detection and early detection of different components and their risk based approach 
as requested by the international standards.  
INTRODUCTION 
Bluetongue is an arthropod-borne viral disease affecting both wild and domestic 
ruminants. The distribution of the bluetongue virus (BTV) is therefore limited to those 
regions where competent vector species are present and its transmission to those 
times of the year when climatic conditions are favourable for the cycle of transmission 
(Mellor et al., 2008; Wilson and Mellor, 2009). The vast majority of BTV infections are 
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subclinical. Though cattle are more likely to be infected by a biting midge, clinical 
signs are more apparent in sheep (Elbers et al, 2008a, b; Saegerman et al., 2010). 
BTV can cause mild to spectacular outbreaks and has an adverse impact on 
worldwide trade. Thus, it appears on the list of diseases notifiable to the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE).  
Following the epidemics of BTV-8 in 2006, 2007 and 2008,  Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 1266/2007 (EC, 2007) last amended in May 2012, prescribed the 
implementation of mandatory surveillance systems composed of i) passive clinical 
surveillance, ii) sentinel surveillance, iii) a combination of serological and/or 
virological surveillance, as well as targeted risk-based monitoring. More and more, 
rather than prescribing fixed guidelines, the aim of these current regulations are 
oriented towards minimum requirements to be fulfilled. As a consequence, 
regulations are more flexible and allow each member state to adapt its own 
surveillance activities and prove the effectiveness of its system towards the required 
objectives. The present study was carried out in this context. The four major BTV 
surveillance components implemented in Belgium in 2007 (winter screening, sentinel, 
export, and passive clinical) were evaluated for the relative efficacy in terms of their 
risk-based design, early detection and substantiation of infection freedom.    
The scenario tree methodology, developed by Martin et al. (Martin et al., 2007a, 
2007b), was used to conduct this study, as it has already proven its efficacy in similar 
contexts (Frossling et al., 2009; Hadorn et al., 2009; Knight-Jones et al., 2010; Stark, 
2006; Welby et al., 2012). In the present study, key parameters such as the risk 
nodes affecting the probability of infection or detection were estimated using 
historical data as a first step. The obtained sensitivities of detection at herd and risk 
group level were estimated for each component. In turn, the estimated component 
sensitivities enabled the computation of the monthly posterior probabilities of 
freedom, given different probabilities of introduction. Different scenario simulations 
provided insight about the impact of changes in the key input parameters on the 
components sensitivity results. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
BTV surveillance system in Belgium in 2007 
At the time of the study, 38805 cattle herds and 31777 sheep flocks were present in 
Belgium.  
The four major components for BTV surveillance in Belgium in 2007 were: 
 Passive clinical (Clinical): Clinical surveillance and notification of all ruminant 
case herds (sheep, cattle) (defined as positive as soon as at least one 
clinically infected animal was serologically confirmed  in the herd); 
 Sentinel (Sentinel): Monthly serological surveillance in 266 seronegative cattle 
herds during the vector high activity period (in 2007: April until December) to 
detect seroconversion (EC, 2007; FASFC, 2012); 
 Winter screening (WS): Yearly cross-sectional serological survey in 344 cattle 
herds during the winter season (December until February) to detect if there 
has been past infections during the last vector season and to estimate the 
disease prevalence;  
 Export (Export): Serological testing of all exported cattle and sheep 
(equivalent to 120 herds) all year round.  
In each component, in case a positive serological result was found a virological 
isolation test was carried out. 
Design of the complete disease process in a scenario tree 
A scenario tree was designed for each surveillance component (WS, Sentinel, 
Clinical and Export) in different Excel spread sheets (Figure 1). Each risk factor 
affecting the probability of infection was represented by a node and a node had 
different branches illustrating all possible outcomes. Each outcome had a certain 
probability of occurrence. For each risk group, defined by the combination of nodes 
and branches, a detection node was entered. The risk nodes retained to influence 
the probability of infection at herd level were “Risk Zone” (Low/ High), “Vector Activity 
period” (Low/High) and “Species” (Bovine/Ovine). These were the infection risk 
nodes in the following study for each component. The detection node “Diagnostic 
Process” was characterised by the different diagnostic tests used with its 
corresponding sensitivity and differed for each component.  
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The combination of each probability determined the probability of infection and 
detection for each risk group. The population at risk and sampled population were 
partitioned according to these risk nodes and groups in order to estimate the relative 




Figure 1: Scenario tree illustrating the successive events from infection to detection 
of BTV in Belgium 
 
Assumptions 
All surveillance system components were assumed to be independent. Information of 
one surveillance component was not taken into account in the other component.  
The country was assumed to be free of infection. For the Sentinel, Export and 
Clinical components, a conservative value of 2% was used as minimum design 
between-herd prevalence (DPh) and within-herd prevalence (DPa) (EC, 2007). For 
the WS component, a 20% DPh was assumed and a 23.8 (20.1-28.1)% DPa was 
assumed (EC, 2007; Méroc et al., 2008). For the Clinical component, it was assumed 
that all animals and all herds were susceptible to be infected and show clinical signs. 
However, in order to take into account situations with lower disease awareness or 
situations where animals would no longer show clinical signs (i.e. vaccinated or 
naturally immunised animals), additional simulations were performed where only a 
fraction of the herds and animals were looked at. 
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The risk nodes retained to influence the probability of infection (Zone, Vector Activity 
period, Species) were considered independent of each other and constant over time.   
A specificity of 100% was assumed in each component, as each positive result was 
further investigated.  
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Table 1 Parameters characterising infection and detection nodes and branches 
Node type Node Name Branch Description Parameter Data source 
Infection  Risk zone High risk zone: Antwerp, Brabant, Limburg, 
Liège 
Relative Risk: Pert (1.28; 1.53; 1.98) Collected field data: average predicted 
probability of infection per province  
Low risk zone: West Flanders, East 





High vector activity period: April, May, June, 
July, August, September, October, 
November, December  
Relative Risk: Pert (1; 1.9; 3.14) Collected field data: monthly proportion 
of infections in both periods 





Bovine Relative Risk: Pert (1.05; 2.61; 4.16) Literature: Durand et al., 2010 
Ovine Reference (1) 
Detection  Diagnostic 
process  




Triangular (0.78; 0.85; 0.91)
ovine 
 
Literature: Vandenbussche et al., 2008 
 




Triangular (0.99; 0.99; 1)
ovine 
 
Literature: Vandenbussche et al., 2008 
 
  Probability of showing clinical signs (only for 







Literature: Elbers et al., 2008b 








Literature: Elbers et al., 2008c 
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Infection and detection nodes with their branches parameters 
RISK ZONE 
Spatial factors have proven to play role in the spread of BTV (Faes et al., 2012). In 
the present study, risk zones were identified based on historical outbreak data. 
Results of spatial risk factor analysis were used to define the Belgian risk zones. A 
logistic regression was used to model the proportion of positive farms per 
municipality as a function of several risk factors. The risk factors are land coverage 
(proportion of forest, pasture area, urban area and crop area per municipality), the 
altitude of a municipality, as well as the interactions between land coverage and 
altitude. The parameter estimates corresponding with this logistic regression model 
are given in appendix A.  
A map, representing the predicted probabilities of infection obtained for each 
municipality, was produced using ArcView GIS 3.2. (ESRI). The average predicted 
probability of infection per municipality (1%) was used as cut-off point. The 
municipality was considered to be a high risk municipality if the predicted probability 
of infection per municipality was above 1% (red). Below the threshold of 1%, it was 
considered as low risk municipality (pink). Provinces borders were overlaid on the 
map (Figure 2). The average municipality predicted probabilities of infection per 
province were then computed. If it was above 1%, the province was considered as 
high risk zone and below as low risk zone. As a result, the provinces of Antwerp (3), 
Brabant (4), Limburg (5) and Liège (8) were designated as part of the high risk zone, 
whereas the provinces of West Flanders (1), East Flanders (2), Hainaut (6), Namur 
(7) and Luxemburg (9) belonged to the low risk zone. The observed minimum, 
maximum and most likely predicted probabilities of infection per province were used 
to describe the relative risk of being infected in the high risk zone branch versus low 
risk zone branch and fitted with a Pert distribution (Pert (1.28; 1.53; 1.98)). The low-
risk zone branch, used as reference, was attributed a relative risk value of 1 (Table 
1).  




Figure 2 Map characterising the BTV risk zones in Belgium 
 
VECTOR ACTIVITY 
In 2007 in Belgium, the period from the 30th of March until the 13th of December in 
2007 was considered to be the high vector activity period, whilst the remaining 
months of the year were considered to be in the low vector activity period (EC, 2007; 
FAFSC, 2012). The relative risk of being infected during the low vector activity period 
was used as reference, with a value of 1. To estimate the relative risk of being 
infected during the high vector activity period, results of export testing were explored. 
Export testing is carried out using serology as first line test and virological isolation as 
confirmation test and during the whole year. This provides some indication of the 
infection incidence during the high vector activity season compared to the low vector 
activity season. The minimum, maximum, most likely monthly proportions of positive 
results during the high vector activity period were used to characterise the relative 
risk of infection during the high vector activity period branch (Pert Distr (1; 1.9; 3.14)) 
(Table 1).  
  




For two reasons cattle were considered more at risk compared to small ruminants in 
the present study. They are more likely to be infected (higher prevalence in cattle vs 
sheep) and because they exhibit less clinical signs (Elbers et al, 2008a, b; 
Saegerman et al., 2010), the infection could go unnoticed and spread before it is 
detected. The minimum, maximum and most likely values of seroprevalence 
proportions in both groups (bovine vs ovine) found in literature (Durand et al., 2010) 
were used to model the relative risk with a Pert distribution (Pert Distr (1.05; 2.61; 
4.16)). The ovine branch, used as reference, was attributed a relative risk value of 1 
(Table 1). 
DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS SENSITIVITY 
The diagnostic testing sensitivity for all components was the serial combination of 
both the sensitivity of the antibody ELISA test (Ab-ELISA) for BTV (ID-VET®, France) 
and the virological isolation PCR test (PCR) for BTV (RT-qPCR_S5), carried out as 
confirmation test (Vandenbussche et al., 2008). Due to the species differences, a 
triangular distribution (characterised by minimum, most likely and maximum values) 
was used for cattle for the sensitivity of the Ab-ELISA test (Triangular (0.85; 0.89; 
0.92)) and for the sensitivity of the PCR (Triangular (0.99; 0.99; 1)), whereas for 
sheep a different triangular distribution was used for the sensitivity of the Ab-ELISA 
test (Triangular (0.78; 0.85; 0.91)) and for the sensitivity of the PCR (Triangular (0.99; 
0.99; 1)) (Vandenbussche et al., 2008). For the Clinical component, besides the 
diagnostic test sensitivity of the ELISA test, the whole diagnostic process was taken 
into account; probability of cattle (Pert  (0;0.025;0.116)) or sheep (Pert 
(0;0.077;0.097)) showing clinical signs (Elbers et al., 2008b); sensitivity of clinical 
signs for cattle (Pert (0.60;0.67;0.75)) and for sheep (Pert (0.70;0.76;0.81)) (Elbers et 
al., 2008c).  
THE POPULATION PROPORTION AND SAMPLED PROPORTION 
Table 2 represents the representative population number of herds in Belgium for 
each herd risk group within each component, as well as the number of sampled 
herds in 2007. The data were extracted from the National Animal Identification and 
Registration System (SANITEL) and the National Laboratory Information 
Management System (LIMS) of the national reference laboratory.  
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Table 2 Representative herd population and sampled herds in the different risk groups, 
defined by the combination of the infection category nodes and branches within each 
component (Winter screening (WS), Sentinel, Export, Clinical).  
 Reference Sampled 
Risk Group Population WS Sentinel Export Clinical 
HRZ/VAH/BV 14060 0 108 55 14060 
HRZ/VAH/OV 11184 0 0 3 11184 
HRZ/VAL/BV 14060 144 6 21 14060 
HRZ/VAL/OV 11184 0 0 1 11184 
LRZ/VAH/BV 24745 0 131 121 24745 
LRZ/VAH/OV 20593 0 0 5 20593 
LRZ/VAL/BV 24745 200 21 24 24745 
LRZ/VAL/OV 20593 0 0 0 20593 
HRZ/VAH/BV: High Risk Zone/Vector Activity High/Bovine LRZ/VAH/BV: Low Risk Zone /Vector Activity High/Bovine 
HRZ/VAH/OV: High Risk Zone/Vector Activity High/Ovine LRZ/VAH/OV: Low Risk Zone/Vector Activity High/Ovine 
HRZ/VAL/BV: High Risk Zone/Vector Activity Low/Bovine LRZ/VAL/BV: Low Risk Zone/Vector Activity Low/Bovine 
HRZ/VAL/OV: High Risk Zone/Vector Activity Low/Ovine LRZ/VAL/OV: Low Risk Zone/Vector Activity Low/Ovine 
Model  
ESTIMATION OF SURVEILLANCE SENSITIVITIES AND POSTERIOR 
PROBABILITIES OF INFECTION  
The relative risks (RRxi) and the population proportion (PPrxi) of each risk node (x) 
branch (i) described above enabled the estimation of the adjusted risk of infection 
(ARxi) for each risk node branch. The obtained  ARxi together with the between-herd 
design prevalence (DPh), in turn, provided the effective probability of infection at herd 
level (EPIHj) within each risk group (j) (defined by the combination of risk nodes (risk 










S (Eq. 2) 
The effective probability of detection (EPDj) for each risk group (j) within each 
component was derived from the different diagnostic processes, and differed 
according to the component considered (WS, Sentinel Export (Eq. 3) and Clinical 
(Eq. 4)).  
𝐸𝑃𝐷𝑗 = 𝑆𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗
 (Eq. 3) 
𝐸𝑃𝐷𝑗 = 𝑃𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠𝑗 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠𝑗 ∗  𝑆𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗
(Eq. 4) 
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In turn these EPDj were used to obtain the respective probabilities of detecting at 
least one infected animal within the tested herd (HSej), taking into account the 
average number of animals sampled (na) in each herd of average size (Na) for each 
risk group in each component and the within-herd design prevalence (DPa). 
Subsequently, the probabilities of detecting at least one infected herd within the 
tested risk group (GSej) were obtained taking into account the average number of 
herds sampled (nh) for risk group size (Nh) within each component in 2007, the 
effective probabilities of infection and the obtained herd sensitivities. Appropriate 
methods taking into account the sampling probability were used as described below. 
If a large proportion of animals were tested within the herds, the hypergeometric 
approach was applied (WS, Sentinel) (Eq. 5).  




𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑗*𝑁𝑎𝑗  (Eq. 5) 
If the proportion of animals (Export) or herds (WS, Sentinel, Export) tested was 
smaller than 10%, the binomial approach was applied (Eq. 6,7).  
𝐻𝑆𝑒𝑗=1 − (1 − (𝐸𝑃𝐷𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑗))
𝑛𝑎𝑗  (Eq. 6) 
𝐺𝑆𝑒𝑗=1 − (1 − (𝐻𝑆𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐻𝑗))
𝑛ℎ𝑗  (Eq. 7) 
The exact approach was applied if all animals and herds were tested (Clinical) (Eq. 
8,9). 
𝐻𝑆𝑒𝑗=1 − (1 − 𝐸𝑃𝐷𝑗)
D𝑃𝑎𝑗*𝑁𝑎𝑗  (Eq. 8) 
𝐺𝑆𝑒𝑗=1 − (1 − 𝐻𝑆𝑒𝑗)
𝐸𝑃𝐼𝐻𝑗*𝑁ℎ𝑗  (Eq. 9) 
The estimated average number of herd and herd sizes within each component were 
obtained from the average values of the national animal population registers. The 
sampled animals and herds were obtained from surveillance results of national 
reference laboratory. The number of herds tested as well as the whole herd 
population, in each herd risk group and component over the year 2007 are shown in 
table 2. 
The mean number of sampled animals (na) within a herd in the WS component, was 
set at 50 for an average herd size (Na) of 70. In the Sentinel component, na was set 
at 15 (in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 1266/2007 (EC, 2007)). 
The na in the Export component was considered as 2, because on average 1 or 2 
animals are exported and tested per exporting herd per year. In the Clinical 
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component, na was equivalent to Na or 70 as all animals were considered to be 
looked at. 
The component sensitivities (CSek) provided insight on how effective each 
component (k) (Sentinel, Clinical, Export and WS) was for substantiating freedom of 
infection at a set design prevalence. The CSek were obtained by combining the GSej 
by the following equation (Eq. 10). 
𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑘 = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝐺𝑆𝑒𝑗)
8
𝑗=1  (Eq. 10) 
In order to gain insight into the efficacy of each component in terms of early 
detection, monthly posterior probabilities of freedom (PFreeti) were estimated for 
each component and each month (ti). The posterior probability of freedom can be 
obtained following Bayesian theorems. Instead of the negative predictive value of a 
test, the probability the country is free of infection given that the surveillance system 
did not detect the infection is estimated based on a prior probability of infection in the 
country (PInfti-1), the surveillance component sensitivity (CSeti) and assuming a 
perfect specificity (each positive results will be followed until proven to be truly 
negative). To begin the monthly simulations, it was assumed that no prior knowledge 
of the probability of infection of the previous time period (ti-1) was available; therefore 
a conservative value of probability of infection equal to 0.5 was considered. The latter 
enabled to obtain the first posterior probability of freedom after one month 






 (Eq. 11) 
Subsequently, the value PFreeti changed over time as more samples were collected. 
The probabilities of infection (PInfti) for the following months varied given the 
posterior probabilities of freedom of the previous months and the probability of 
introduction (PIntroti) (Eq. 12). The probability of introduction (PIntroti) was zero in the 
low vector activity period and three different values were simulated for the high vector 
activity period (0.25; 0.5; 0.75).  
𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡𝑖 = (1 − 𝑃𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖−1) + 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖 − (𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖−1)) (Eq. 12) 
The scenario trees were modelled in Microsoft Excel using @risk 5.0 software. The 
sensitivity estimates for the different components were obtained by separate Latin 
hypercube simulations for each component with 10,000 iterations in each simulation. 
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This provided an opportunity to consider all the possible pathways in the scenario by 
sampling from the parameter distributions. 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
To determine the input parameter that affected the component sensitivity output the 
most, a sensitivity analysis was carried out for each component. The obtained 
tornado charts allowed measuring how sensitive the output variables were to the 
input variables of interest, based on the correlation coefficients.  
In addition different scenarios were run in each component to measure the impact of 
changes in the input parameters. 
In all components, a scenario without relative risk was run to determine how effective 
the component would be without a targeted approach. For Sentinel and Export 
components, scenarios with higher relative risks were simulated. For the WS 
component, to measure how sensitive this component would be if the prevalence 
was lower, changes in the design prevalence (DPa and Dph of 2%) were simulated. 
For the Clinical component, to represent a situation with lower disease awareness, 
due for instance to immune animals showing less clinical signs two scenarios were 
simulated. The first scenario simulated only 10% of the total herd population being 
looked at and sampled and the second scenario simulated 50% of the total herd 
population.  
RESULTS 
Estimation of surveillance sensitivities and posterior probabilities of 
infection   
Table 3 illustrates the respective herd and risk group sensitivities obtained for each 
risk group in each component after a full year of surveillance.  
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Table 3 Sensitivities (Mean (Minimum-Maximum)) at herd and risk group level for each 
risk group within each component (Winter screening (WS), Sentinel, Export, Clinical). 
 WS Sentinel Export Clinical 
Risk Group level 
HRZ VAH BV  0.72(0.53-0.82) 0.09(0.06-0.11) 0.99(0.1-1) 
  OV   0(0-0) 0.99(0.85-1) 
 VAL BV 1(1-1) 0.04(0.02-0.06) 0.02(0.01-0.03) 0.98(0.06-1) 
  OV   0(0-0) 0.99(0.59-0.99) 
LRZ VAH BV  0.63(0.46-0.73) 0.12(0.07-0.15) 0.99(0.11-1) 
  OV   0(0-0) 0.99(0.90-1) 
 VAL BV 1(1-1) 0.08(0.05-0.12) 0.01(0.01-0.02) 0.98(0.07-1) 
  OV    0.99(0.69-0.99) 
Herd level      
HRZ VAH BV  0.25(0.24-0.26) 0.04(0.03-0.04) 0.03(0-0.09) 
  OV   0.03(0.03-0.04) 0.06(0-0.09) 
 VAL BV 0.99(0.99-1) 0.25(0.24-0.26) 0.04(0.03-0.04) 0.03(0-0.09) 
  OV   0.03(0.03-0.04) 0.06(0-0.09) 
LRZ VAH BV  0.25(0.24-0.26) 0.04(0.03-0.04) 0.03(0-0.09) 
  OV   0.03(0.03-0.04) 0.06(0-0.09) 
 VAL BV 0.99(0.99-1) 0.25(0.24-0.26) 0.04(0.03-0.04) 0.03(0-0.09) 
  OV   0.03(0.03-0.04) 0.06(0-0.09) 
 
 
HRZ/VAH/BV: High Risk Zone/Vector Activity High/Bovine LRZ/VAH/BV: Low Risk Zone /Vector Activity High/Bovine 
HRZ/VAH/OV: High Risk Zone/Vector Activity High/Ovine LRZ/VAH/OV: Low Risk Zone/Vector Activity High/Ovine 
HRZ/VAL/BV: High Risk Zone/Vector Activity Low/Bovine LRZ/VAL/BV: Low Risk Zone/Vector Activity Low/Bovine 
HRZ/VAL/OV: High Risk Zone/Vector Activity Low/Ovine LRZ/VAL/OV: Low Risk Zone/Vector Activity Low/Ovine 
The best herd and risk group sensitivities were obtained with the WS component, but 
only for cattle during the low vector activity period. Because no samples were taken 
during the high vector activity period and in sheep, no output was available for these 
risk groups. Sentinel component had lower herd and risk group sensitivities than WS, 
with the highest risk group sensitivities observed for cattle sampled during the high 
vector activity period. Small values were found for cattle sampled during the low 
vector activity period. These were actually remaining samples taken out of the vector 
activity period. No values were obtained for sheep risk groups as they were not 
sampled. The herd and risk group sensitivities were very low in the Export 
component, reflecting the very small number of samples taken in that component. 
Despite the very low herd sensitivities in the Clinical component, reflecting the very 
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small EPD in that component, mean risk group sensitivities were high providing that 
the sampled population consisted of all herds, but the range around these mean 
values was wide. WS, Sentinel and Clinical components appeared to be rather 
sensitive for detecting the infection after a whole year of surveillance with component 
sensitivities mean (minimum-maximum) values of 1 (1-1), 0.9 (0.77-0.95) and 1 
(0.99-1) respectively, whilst Export only had very low sensitivities of detection 0.22 
(0.17-0.26). In terms of early detection (Figure 3), the Clinical component appeared 
to be the most efficient for guaranteeing posterior probability of infection freedom. 
The WS component was also very efficient, and despite the fact that samples were 
only taken during the month of January, the posterior probability remained high until 
the probability of introduction changed which then caused a decreasing posterior 
probability of freedom. The posterior probability of freedom with the Sentinel 
component was equal to the prior probability of infection 0.5 during the low vector 
activity period as no samples were taken. It then suddenly increased in March, but 
only shortly. As probability of introduction increased the posterior probability of 
freedom decreased.  The Export component only provided very limited guarantee 
towards the country posterior probability of freedom and only during the low vector 
activity period, thereafter the posterior probability of freedom decreased drastically.  
Figure 3 Monthly posterior probabilities of disease freedom for each component 




For the Clinical component the diagnostic process was the parameter that influenced 
mostly the component sensitivity. For WS, the most influential parameters were the 
within-herd design prevalence followed by the diagnostic test sensitivity and the 
relative risks input values for the infection nodes vector activity and species. For the 
Export and Sentinel component, the sensitivity analysis showed that the most 
influential inputs were the relative risks values attributed to vector activity and 
species infection nodes followed by the diagnostic test sensitivities. The range of the 
rank correlations values differed in each component. The highest impact was for the 
WS (rho= 0.9) followed by Sentinel and Export component (rho= 0.7) and Clinical 
(rho=0.6),  
The scenario simulations enabled to further estimate the impact of the input values 
(Figure 4). For each component, the sensitivity was estimated through a simulation 
ignoring differential risk of infection in the different risk nodes. This resulted in a drop 
of 10-20% component’s sensitivities for Export and Sentinel component only. If 
higher relative risks values were considered sensitivities raised in those same 
components, reflecting the targeted approach of these components. For WS, if it was 
assumed that the disease was only present at 2% between-herd and within herd 
prevalence, the sensitivity of this component dropped from 1 to 0.99. In the Clinical 
component the estimated sampled population had a big impact. Indeed if only 10% of 
the herds were sampled the sensitivity varied much more, with a minimum value of 
only 0.26. The decrease in sensitivity was less evident if 50% were sampled with 
minimum values of 0.9.  




Figure 4 Sensitivity analysis: Impact of changes in input parameters on the 
component sensitivity 
  




The aim of the present study was to estimate the effectiveness of the Belgian 
surveillance system for bluetongue and its components in terms of substantiating 
freedom of infection, early detection and their risk-based approach. Results provided 
a good insight into the effectiveness of the targeted approach of each component. 
The scenario tree methodology, used in the present study, offers the opportunity to 
take into account all factors that can influence the probability of infection and 
detection while estimating the sensitivity of detection of a surveillance program, 
providing that information about key input parameters influencing these probabilities 
is available. Assumptions are used where information about those key input 
parameters is missing. This might be a source of bias (Dohoo et al., 2009). In the 
present study, assumptions regarding input parameters were mitigated by using field 
data from the previous year’s outbreaks. Risk groups where infection was most likely 
to cluster, were identified. Subsequently, this study provided a clear indication of the 
different herd and risk group sensitivities in the different surveillance components. 
The sensitivity analysis allowed measuring the impact of changes in the input 
parameters which provided further insight on the efficacy of each component in terms 
of early detection and freedom of infection substantiation. 
Overall high sensitivities at herd level were obtained for the WS and Sentinel 
components whilst this was not the case for the Clinical and Export component. The 
low diagnostic process sensitivity in the Clinical component explains the low 
sensitivities at herd level. In the Export component because only few animals within a 
herd were sampled, despite the good diagnostic test sensitivities, sensitivities at herd 
level remain low. When looking at the sensitivities at risk group level, the Clinical and 
WS component had higher mean sensitivities values compared to all other 
component. However, the Clinical component had a very wide range around the 
mean risk group sensitivity values. In terms of early detection and guaranteeing the 
posterior probability of freedom of infection level, the Clinical component turned out 
to be most effective, followed by the Sentinel component. Despite the very low herd 
sensitivity values in the Clinical component (Table 3), the large number of sheep and 
cattle herds processed monthly during the whole year enabled maintaining a high 
level of posterior probability of freedom throughout the year. Simulations of different 
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scenarios were carried out to measure the impact of the assumptions used in the 
model regarding sampled population, relative risks and the design prevalence.  
In a situation where disease awareness would drop down or if clinical signs would no 
longer be visible, as in a immunised population or with a different serotype then BTV-
8, the assumption that all herds and animals are looked at and sampled might no 
longer hold.   
Two different scenarios were run (Figure 4) to estimate the impact of the sampled 
population within the passive clinical component. The first one, where only 10% of 
the herds were looked at and sampled, made the sensitivity at component level drop 
down significantly with minimum values up to 0.26. When only 50 % of the herds 
were looked at and sampled, the sensitivity was acceptable but not as good as when 
100% of the herds were considered. Not only is passive clinical surveillance strongly 
dependent on disease awareness and the occurrence of clinical symptoms, but also 
farmers could be reluctant to report diseases by fear of ethical and economic 
repercussions (Elbers et al., 2010; Saegerman et al., 2010). More in depth study of 
this parameter is required in order to better estimate the sensitivity of this component. 
Furthermore, in a situation where vaccination is applied or where natural immune 
status has been established following past recurrent infections, clinical signs may no 
longer appear which may result in a decrease in disease awareness. In these 
situations case, a laboratory testing program or a syndromic surveillance probably 
would be more appropriate.   
If no relative risks were considered, component sensitivities dropped down for 
Sentinel and Export component only.  
The WS component, which displayed very good sensitivity at cattle herd and risk 
group level during the whole low vector activity period, was evaluated with a 
between-herd design prevalence of 20% and average of 23.8% within-herd design 
prevalence, as requested by the EU legislation. However, to determine the 
effectiveness of this component in terms of substantiating disease freedom, it was 
thought that 2% design prevalence would be interesting to simulate at within- and 
between-herd level. Results showed that though sensitivities at risk group level would 
be lower, the component sensitivity would be 0.99 instead of 1. This would only result 
in a slight decrease. Because this component consists only of yearly cross sectional 
survey, it is of limited value for early detection. Thus it may be concluded that WS is 
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useful for substantiating freedom of infection at the end of a year or for sero 
prevalence estimation.  
The Sentinel component showed relatively good sensitivities at herd and risk group 
level, despite the fact that not all herds and animals were sampled within this 
component. However, in terms of early detection, due to the limited number of herds 
followed-up and the high probability of introduction in the high vector activity period, 
the Sentinel component might not be optimal for detecting a 2% seroconversion and 
substantiating freedom of infection.  
Export testing only had limited value in Belgium due to the small number of samples 
taken in this component. Thus relying only on export testing, in Belgium, is not 
sufficient to substantiate infection freedom. However, it should be stated that this was 
not the primary aim of export testing.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Some recommendations for the future BTV surveillance in Belgium can be made 
from this study's output; 
• A Sentinel program is very effective to detect the infection, provided that 
sufficient samples are taken and that the sampling frequency is high enough. A 
monthly or quarterly frequency would be recommended.  
• WS is useful for substantiation of freedom an overall prevalence interpretation 
at the end of the year.  
• Export testing by itself is not enough to guarantee freedom of infection or early 
detection of infection.  
• Clinical passive surveillance is effective for both freedom of infection 
substantiation or early detection of infection but dependent on a few constraints.  
This study has enabled to better quantify the sensitivity of the main surveillance 
components and their risk-based approach for BTV detection in Belgium. Simulations 
carried out provided insight into the impact of several assumptions, which further 
enabled better quantification of the effectiveness of the different bluetongue 
surveillance components as required by the European legislation and the 
international standards.  
 





Logistic regression parameter estimates of the different risk factors used to model the 
proportion of positive farms per municipality 
 
Effect Estimate Error DF T Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept                 -7.3913 0.9203 9947 -8.03 <.0001 
P_FOREST                   0.1740 1.1775 9947 0.15 0.8825 
P_PASTURE                 -0.9095 1.1217 9947 -0.81 0.4175 
P_URBAN                    2.1159 1.6069 9947 1.32 0.1879 
P_CROP          1.7920 0.9416 9947 1.90 0.0570 
altitudemean             0.0065 0.0012 9947 5.38 <.0001 
P_FOREST*P_PASTURE        15.8376 2.1863 9947 7.24 <.0001 
P_FOREST*P_URBAN          14.8175 3.0954 9947 4.79 <.0001 
P_PASTURE*P_URBAN         12.6241 3.0000 9947 4.21 <.0001 
P_URBAN*P_CROP             6.4707 2.0652 9947 3.13 0.0017 
altitudemea*P_FOREST     -0.0121 0.0025 9947 -4.84 <.0001 
altitudemean*P_CROP      -0.0071 0.0019 9947 -3.67 0.0002 
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Effective and efficient early detection of emerging vector-borne disease as well as 
quick recovery of country’s freedom status remain a constant challenge in animal 
health surveillance. In the present study, the original scenario tree methods 
developed by Martin et al. in 2007 were adapted in order to allow comparison of the 
relative efficacy and cost efficiency of different surveillance components in proving 
the absence of infection (freedom of infection) or early detection of vector-borne 
disease in cattle populations within different countries. Bluetongue outbreak and 
surveillance data from the epidemic that occurred in the Netherlands, France and 
Belgium, in the years 2006 and 2007 provided a reliable input data for evaluating the 
different surveillance components in place in each country. In a first stage, the 
different surveillance components (sentinel, yearly cross sectional and passive 
clinical reporting) in place in 2006-2007 within each country were evaluated in terms 
of efficacy for substantiating freedom of infection. The yearly cross sectional survey 
and passive clinical reporting within each country performed well with sensitivity of 
detection values ranging around 0.99. The sentinel component had a sensitivity of 
detection around 0.7. The large number of cattle and herds sampled and the high 
diagnostic tests sensitivity contributed to these high sensitivity values within each of 
these surveillance components. In a second stage, it was investigated how effective 
the components were for (early)-detection and if syndromic surveillance using 
reproductive performance data, milk production and mortality data could be of added 
value using production data from the Netherlands and Belgium that were available 
from 2006-2007. To account for the timeliness of detection, epidemic curves obtained 
from Reed-Frost models were used to estimate the input to feed the scenario tree 
models. Depending on the expected within herd prevalence, passive clinical reporting 
and syndromic surveillance performed much better than the active components, with 
respectively 0.99-1.  
Depending on the assumed direct costs of running each of these surveillance 
components, passive clinical surveillance together with syndromic surveillance 
(based on reproductive performance data) turned out most cost efficient for detection 
of vector-borne diseases such as Bluetongue.  




To conclude, for emerging or re-emerging vector-borne disease such as Bluetongue, 
it is recommended to use passive clinical and syndromic surveillance as early 
detection systems for maximum cost efficiency. Once an infection is detected, a 
cross sectional screening is recommended for substantiating freedom of infection. 
Sentinel surveillance is useful for monitoring the disease evolution providing sufficient 
herds are sampled.  
INTRODUCTION 
In a context of globalisation and climate change, emerging and re-emerging diseases 
constitute a constant threat to animal health. During the years 2006 and 2007, an 
arthropod-borne viral disease, named Bluetongue, emerged in Northern Europe with 
major economic impacts and adverse impact on trade (Wilson and Mellor 2009; 
Zientara and Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2013). Early detection and reestablishment of 
freedom of infection were important goals to ensure rapid control of disease as well 
as national and international trade. National and international legislation standards 
set the minimum legal requirements for early detection and recovery of freedom 
status but it is also up to each country to prove the effectiveness of their surveillance 
strategies (FAO, 1999; OIE, 2014). In this context and following the major economic 
consequences of the Bluetongue outbreaks, regulation 1266/2007/EC last amended 
by 456/2012/EC (EC, 2012) prescribes the main surveillance components to 
implement in the cattle population within each country. These are active surveillance 
components (mainly characterized by yearly cross sectional surveys or sentinel 
serological/virological screening to detect seroconversion) and passive surveillance 
components such as clinical reporting. The minimum guidelines for sample size are 
laid down in the regulation together with the maximum design prevalence as well as 
desired confidence level.  
Martin et al., (2007) proposed interesting tools to evaluate surveillance systems that 
have been used extensively in numerous studies for different diseases (endemic or 
epidemic) (Frössling et al., 2013; Knight-Jones et al., 2010; Welby et al., 2013). 
These methods offer the advantage of combining several data sources when 
evaluating a national surveillance program (ie slaughterhouse surveillance, purchase 




testing, bulk milk data, etc…). It also enables to take into account, not only the 
sensitivity of the diagnostic test used, but also the whole diagnostic process, together 
with the number of herds, cattle present and tested in the population, the expected 
prevalence and differential risk of infection (if present). This provides a very powerful 
and objective tool for evaluating surveillance and obtaining reliable values about the 
effectiveness of a surveillance system in terms of guaranteeing freedom of infection. 
However, it requires, as many other statistical or mathematical models, the 
availability of data. When the input data are missing, use of literature values or 
assumptions are a possibility, but care must be taken to avoid bias (Dohoo et al., 
2009). Another limitation of the present tool is that it does not enable the evaluation 
in terms of early detection. In the present study, we propose an alternative approach 
to account for timeliness of detection using data obtained with epidemic curves from 
Reed-Frost models as inputs to feed the scenario models.  
The aim of this work was three fold:  
 First, the different surveillance components in place in Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands for Bluetongue during 2006 and 2007 were evaluated in terms 
of effectiveness for substantiating freedom of infection using the scenario tree 
methods;  
 In a second stage, effectiveness in terms of early detection of the existing 
surveillance components and the added value of using syndromic surveillance 
(based on mortality, milk production or reproductive performance data) was 
estimated combining methods of Reed-Frost and scenario tree models.  
 Finally, cost efficiency of each surveillance component was investigated. 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
Surveillance components 
Bluetongue surveillance data at the start of the epidemic in 2006 and 2007 were 
used for this study. The surveillance components conducted within each country 
during 2006 and 2007,as well as syndromic surveillance, not prescribed by the 
European regulation 1266/2007, and considered in the present study are defined in 
Table 1.  




Table 1: Definition of each surveillance component considered in the present study. 
Component Description Regulatory framework 
Cross Sectional 
Yearly cross sectional survey of a 
sample from the total cattle population 
during the winter 
Regulation 1266/2007/EC (last 
amended by 456/2012/EC 
Sentinel 
Monthly follow up of samples of 
seronegative cattle in order to detect 
seroconversion in the months were 
vectors are active 
Regulation 1266/2007/EC (last 
amended by 456/2012/EC 
Passive clinical 
Immediate reporting of relevant clinical 
signs by the farmers and vets to the 
authorities 
 
Regulation 1266/2007/EC (last 







- mortality  
Defined by the collection and analysis of 
nonspecific production data (ie milk 
production data; reproductive 
performance data; mortality data) to 




Population data and samples taken within the different surveillance components for 
BTV in 2006-2007 (Cross Sectional, Sentinel, Passive Clinical, Milk production data, 
Reproductive performance data, Mortality data) are summarised for each country 
((BE (Belgium); FR (France); NL (the Netherlands)) in Table 2. Population and 
surveillance data from official programs were obtained from the different regional and 
national laboratories in the given countries (Veterinary and Agriculture Research 
Center (CODA) in Belgium; Oniris Unité de recherche Biologie, Epidémiologie et 
analyse de risque en Santé Animale – BioEpAR in France; GD Animal Health in the 
Netherlands) and supported by literature (Méroc et al., 2008; Satman-Berends et al., 
2010; van Schaik et al., 2008). Syndromic surveillance data based on monthly milk 
production data and reproductive performance data were obtained from the Royal 
Cattle Syndicate (CRV). CRV handles monthly milk recording data of 80-85% of 
Dutch and approximately 48% of Flemish dairy herds in Belgium. An extrapolation to 
the whole country of Belgium was made based on the cattle population data. 




Mortality data were obtained from rendering plants (RENDAC) in Belgium and the 
Netherlands.   
Table 2: Cattle population and surveillance data for each surveillance component in 
place in each country ((BE (Belgium); FR (France); NL (the Netherlands)) for 












































































































Herd 36000 344 260 ALL 10000 10000 7500 
Within herd 50(1-370) 70% 15 ALL 70% 11(7-14) 2(1-2) 
FR 
Herd 190000 9300 960 ALL NA NA NA 
Within herd 100 10(1-50) 15 ALL NA NA NA 
NL 
Herd 44204 5436 275 ALL 15500 19270 9923 
Within herd 78(1-383) 1(1-12) 16 ALL 70% 11(7-14) 2(1-2) 
To account for the diversity in herd sizes, a distribution was used to model the within herd population with mean (25th 
percentile-75th percentile) of herd sizes. For cross sectional survey in Belgium and milk production data in both countries, 70% 
of the herd size was considered as it was thought that only 70% would be lactating cows and thus considered for sampling. For 
reproductive performance data and mortality data, the varying within herd sampled population mean (min-max) values was 
accounted for. All cattle within herd were considered to be looked at in the passive clinical component and a fixed number of 15 
or 16 cattle, as stated by the regulation, were considered for the sentinel component. 
Effectiveness of surveillance in terms of freedom of infection 
Scenario trees, modelling the sensitivity of detection at herd and component level, 
were designed for each bluetongue ongoing surveillance component (sentinel, yearly 
cross sectional and passive clinical reporting) in 2006-2007 within each country 
(France, the Netherlands and Belgium) in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. 
Effectiveness in terms of substantiating infection freedom was estimated based on 
the probability of detecting an infected animal or herd, in other words sensitivity, 
given a set design prevalence. Herd (HSe) (Eq.1) and component sensitivity (CSe) 
(Eq.2), were computed for each surveillance component (i) for substantiating 
freedom of infection in each country, using identical hypergeometric sampling 




approaches. Simulations were done using ModelRisk® software with 10.000 
iterations per simulation. Appropriate distributions were fitted to the data to account 
for the uncertainty and variability of the different parameters.  












Average herd (Nh) and average within herd (Na) population data as well as 
surveillance data regarding average number of herds tested (nh) and average 
animals tested per herd (na) were obtained from national cattle identification 
databases and regional/national laboratories information systems within each country 
(Table 2). The expected design prevalence at herd (DPh) and within herd (DPa) level 
was set at 2% (according to EU regulation 1266/2007/EC). The effective probabilities 
of detection (EPD) for the active surveillance components (Cross sectional and 
Sentinel) were minimum, most likely, maximum sensitivity values of the antibody 
ELISA test (Ab-ELISA) for BTV (ID-VET®, France) (Vandenbussche et al., 2008) and 
characterised by a pert distribution (Pert (0.85; 0.89; 0.92)). Because no data was 
available for the EPD sensitivities for passive clinical surveillance component, the 
diagnostic process minimum, most likely, maximum sensitivity values was modeled 
with a pert distribution (Pert (0.1; 0.5; 0.99)).   
Effectiveness of surveillance in terms of early detection 
In terms of early detection, the model described by Martin et al. (2007), was adapted 
to account for timeliness of detection. Also the added value of syndromic surveillance 
using routinely collected production data (milk production data, reproductive 
performance data (gestational length-indicators), and mortality data (obtained from 
rendering plants)) was evaluated in case it were to be in place. The EPD values were 
adjusted using the number of detected cases over the number of expected infected 
cases obtained with epidemic curves. The epidemic curves were obtained using 
between herd reproductive ratios for BTV in 2006 and 2007 obtained from literature 
(de Koeijer et al., 2011; Santman-Berends et al., 2013) and simulated by Reed Frost 
Models (RFM) in Winepiscope 2.0.®, with monthly time intervals. Different epidemic 
curves were obtained using different between herd reproductive ratios (R-values) 




(R=1; R=2; R=3; R=4 and R=5). The number of cases, infected and susceptible cattle 
were obtained for each month from April 2006 (time at which the bluetongue virus 
was assumed to be introduced in Belgium in an area near the Dutch border 
(Saegerman et al., 2011) until December 2006 (time at which the first epidemic wave 
stopped). Subsequently, the same exercise was done for 2007 (April to December). 
For that period the susceptible and infected population, remaining at the end of 2006, 
was used as starting point to simulate the RFM. The number of detected infected 
cattle at time of first alerts observed with milk production data, reproductive 
performance data, mortality data or dates of first case notification with the sentinel, 
cross sectional and passive clinical component separately were used to compute the 
EPD (Eq. 3).  
𝐸𝑃𝐷𝑖 =
1(detected) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖
N (infected) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖
    (Eq. 3) 
The number of detected cattle was always one and corresponded to the first case 
identified or notified at time of first alert. The number of infected cattle in the same 
month was obtained from the RFM output. This was conducted for each simulated 
epidemic curve obtained from the different transmission ratios (R-values). Finally the 
mean, minimum and maximum of the different EPD values obtained for each 
simulated R-value were used for characterising the distribution of the EPD value of 
each component. The same exercise was done for both countries. The dates of first 
alerts triggered by syndromic surveillance were obtained from a study of Veldhuis et 
al., (submitted) and the dates of first cases by Passive Clinical, Sentinel and Cross 
Sectional surveillance were obtained using historic laboratory data (CODA and GD). 
For example, the passive clinical surveillance component in Belgium detected the 
first case in August 2006, therefore to obtain the EPD of the passive clinical 
component, we used 1 over the expected infected population in the month of August 
2006 simulated by the RFM (Méroc et al., 2008; Santman-Berends et al., 2010). 
Similarly, the first alerts with syndomic surveillance based on reproductive 
performance data in Belgium were estimated to be observed in August 2007, 
therefore we used 1 over the expected infected population in the month of August 
2007 to estimate the EPD of that syndromic surveillance component. 




The effective probabilities of detection (EPD) mean (min-max) values obtained for 
each epidemic curve simulated are summarised in Table 3. The herd and component 
sensitivities were obtained using eq. 1 and 2. Because the legislation for BTV only 
prescribes design prevalence at animal level, two different simulations were 
considered to estimate the impact of considering a clustering effect at herd level. In 
each simulation the herd prevalence was held constant at a value of 2%, whereas 
the within herd prevalence varied between 2 (simulation 1) and 20% (simulation 2) in 
order to measure the impact of the expected within herd design prevalence on the 
effectiveness of detection. 
Table 3: Parameters regarding effective probabilities of detection (EPD) mean (min-
max) values, for Belgium (BE) and the Netherlands (NL) in each surveillance 
component. 
Component BE NL 
EPD Cross Sectional (0.00003;0.02266;0.11111) (0.00002;0.02265;0.11111) 
EPD Sentinel (0.00003;0.0171;0.08333) (0.00002;0.01709;0.08333) 
EPD Passive Clinical (0.00641;0.07197;0.25) (0.01176;0.08836;0.25) 
EPD Milk production data (0;0;0) (0.00027;0.03726;0.16667) 
EPD Reproductive performance data (0.00003;0.01581;0.07692) (0.00002;0.0158;0.07692) 
EPD Mortality data (0;0;0) (0.00007;0.03038;0.14286) 
No significant deviation from the baseline trend were identified using reproductive 
performance data and mortality data in Belgium 
Posterior probabilities of Freedom 
The monthly posterior probabilities of freedom (PFree) were obtained for each 
component (i) (Eq. 4, 5) taking into account the probability of introduction (Pintro), 






𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝑃𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 − (𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡−1)) (Eq. 5) 
As no prior knowledge regarding the probability of introduction per month was 
available we assumed a conservative value of 0.5 as probability of introduction and 
constant through the year. Only the sensitivity values for those months where the 




components were effective were considered (i.e. yearly cross sectional only carried 
out during the winter). During the remaining months the component sensitivity was 
considered null.  
Cost efficiency 
In a last stage, the cost of each component for early detection in Belgium was 
estimated, which enabled quantification of the economic efficiency of each 
component (Table 4) including syndromic surveillance if it were to be in place. 
Because cost data was only available for Belgium, the exercise regarding cost 
efficiency was only conducted for Belgium.   
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Farm visit by 
vet 
25€/visit 
 Data analysis 
Belgian National 












Laboratory: Data cost 





Laboratory: 3 person 
month 
120000€/year 
For each ongoing active and passive surveillance component (sentinel, cross 
sectional, passive clinical), the cost estimation over the year consisted of a farm visit 
by the vet (times number of farms visited yearly) and sample collection, preparation 
and analysis (times number of animals sampled in each visited farm yearly). For the 




syndromic surveillance components (milk production data, reproductive performance 
data, mortality), the considered costs were estimated as follows: the cost of data 
deliveries, and the cost of data analysis and interpretation of signals. The cost of 
hardware and software development as well as overall management was assumed 
common and constant to all surveillance systems and thus not accounted in the cost 
efficiency calculations. The yearly cost efficiency ratio was obtained using the mean 
component sensitivity over the total estimated cost. 
RESULTS 
Effectiveness of surveillance in terms of freedom of infection 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the iteration results (1st-50th-99th percentiles) for the 
obtained sensitivity values (probability of detecting an infected cow or herd given it is 
infected at the set design prevalence) obtained at herd and component level for each 
the surveillance components in place in 2006-2007. 
    
 
Figure 1: Simulated herd sensitivities (1st-50th-99th percentiles) in each component 
(CSS (Cross Sectional); SENT (Sentinel); PC (Passive Clinical)) in each country ((BE 





















Country Surveillance Component 





Figure 2: Simulated component sensitivities (1st-50th-99th percentiles) in each 
component (CSS (Cross Sectional); SENT (Sentinel); PC (Passive Clinical)) in each 
country ((BE (Belgium); FR (France); NL (the Netherlands)).  
 
Though the mean herd sensitivities (depending on the diagnostic test used, number 
of cattle sampled within a herd and expected design prevalence) varied among the 
components considered, values were similar between countries, except for cross 
sectional surveys in the Netherlands (mainly due to the very small number of 
sampled cattle within herd). Component sensitivities were around 0.99 for most of the 
components except for the sentinel component (around 0.7).  
  
Effectiveness of surveillance in terms of early detection 
Table 5 displays the distribution of surveillance component sensitivity values 
obtained for early detection. Values are shown at herd (HSe) and component level 
(CSe). Two different simulations were done to account for the different within herd 
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Table 5: Mean (Minimum-Maximum) sensitivity values obtained at herd (HSe) and 
component level (CSe) for each component in Belgium and the Netherlands for each 
simulated scenario (2% (Sim1) and 20% (Sim2) simulated within herd prevalence). 
Component 
level 
SIM 1_BE SIM 1_NL SIM 2_BE SIM 2_NL 






























0.999) CSe 0.999(0.375-1) .999(0.837-1) . (0.995-1) . (0.999-1) 




0.998) CSe 0(0-0) .985(0.035-1) 0(0-0) . 9(0.525-1) 






0.158) CSe 0.578(0.005-0.971) .76 (0.012-
0.998) 
.977(0.090-1) .992(0.029-1) 











In general, sensitivities at herd and component level increased when the expected 
within herd design prevalence is set at 20%, with the exception of the component 
sensitivities of the passive clinical component and syndromic surveillance component 
based on milk production data.  
In terms of early detection, it’s mainly the passive clinical component and syndromic 
components that performed best (Table 5). In Belgium, using reproductive 
performance data was effective for early detection. No alerts were triggered using 
milk production and mortality data in Belgium; therefore CSe values were null for 
these components in Belgium. In the Netherlands, reproductive performance data 
and milk production data were effective for early detection as well as mortality data 
but the CSe of mortality was slightly lower compared to the other syndromic 
surveillance components. 




Posterior probabilities of Freedom 
Figure 4 displays the monthly posterior probabilities of freedom obtained in each 
month for each component in each country (using a within herd prevalence of 20%, 
probability of introduction per month of 0.5 constant throughout the year) and 
component sensitivities for the month in which the component was carried out. 
   
Figure 4: Monthly probability of freedom for each component (CSS (Cross Sectional); 
SENT(Sentinel); PC (Passive Clinical); MILK(Milk production data); 
REP(Reproductive performance data); MORT(Mortality)) in Belgium (BE) and the 
Netherlands (NL) given a constant probability of introduction (=0.5). 
 
Assuming passive clinical surveillance is properly carried out, that component alone 
could provide sufficient guarantee towards freedom (CSe > 99%) in both countries. 
Syndromic surveillance based on reproductive performance data provided similar 
guarantees in both countries. Only in the Netherlands, milk production data provided 
sufficient guarantee of freedom. Despite the relatively good sensitivity of detection 
values for the remaining components, the limited monthly or daily sampling frequency 
and/or the limited number of herds surveyed were not enough to ensure freedom if 
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Table 6 displays the mean cost efficiency ratio, taking into account the mean 
component sensitivity (CSe) values for early detection in Belgium (assuming an 
expected within herd prevalence of 20%) and cost estimation, taking into account the 
number of animals and herds sampled.  
 
Table 6: Mean sensitivity values obtained at component level (CSe) for each 
component in Belgium and cost estimation (in euros), taking into account the number 




Sampled  within 
herd 
Cost total (in 
euros) 
CSe CSe/Cost 



























For the purpose of early detection, total direct costs were lowest for sentinel and 
passive clinical surveillance. Passive clinical surveillance was most cost efficient, 
followed by syndromic surveillance based on reproductive performance data.  
DISCUSSION  
International standards more and more require surveillance to be fit for purpose and 
tailored according to the minimum guidelines and country needs. Moreover, 
effectiveness (FAO, 1999; OIE, 2014) and efficiency (Drewe et al., 2012; Häsler et 
al., 2011) are important parameters to consider while evaluating surveillance. Our 
first aim was to evaluate the effectiveness of each ongoing component for 




substantiating freedom of disease, taking into account the minimum guidelines stated 
in the different European regulations, using Bluetongue surveillance as a case study. 
Using surveillance data of 2006-2007, the passive clinical surveillance components in 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands and cross sectional surveillance components in 
Belgium and the Netherlands were effective for substantiating freedom of infection 
after a whole year with component sensitivities values around 0.99, assuming a 
design prevalence of 2%. The sentinel component, mainly due to the small number of 
herds sampled, was of limited value with a CSe around 0.7. The herd sensitivities 
were slightly lower yet very much influenced by the number of animals sampled 
within a herd.  
Our second aim was to determine effectiveness of the ongoing surveillance 
components for early detection as well as quantifying the added value of syndromic 
surveillance. Syndromic surveillance has gained increasing interest in recent years 
(Dorea, 2013; Madouasse et al., 2014). These studies have shown how syndromic 
surveillance could trigger alerts, but to date none published their effectiveness and 
cost efficiency in comparison to existing systems. In the present study we tried to 
tackle this issue and propose a method that could be used for this purpose. The 
approach elaborated in the present study combined existing methods, namely 
scenario tree models and epidemic curve models. A mathematical model, using 
epidemic curves obtained with Reed-Frost models, was developed for quantifying the 
effective probabilities of early detection for each surveillance component. This 
allowed comparison between components using a standardised approach. The 
effective probabilities of detection obtained revealed the subjective hypothesis that 
syndromic surveillance did not perform better than existing active surveillance 
components for sensitivity of early detection. Using this approach, passive clinical 
surveillance remained the best component in both countries. However over the year, 
syndromic surveillance based on routinely collected reproductive performance data in 
the Netherlands and Belgium and milk production data in the Netherlands could be of 
added value to declare freedom. No alerts were observed using mortality data in the 
Netherlands and Belgium and milk production data in Belgium, therefore sensitivity of 
these components were null. It could be argued that the reproductive ratio values 
used in the current study might change according to the disease under investigation. 




However the stochasticity of the model took into account variability around the 
reproductive ratio and therefore provided reliable output that could be transposed to 
other epidemic diseases with similar transmission parameters to bluetongue. Despite 
the fact that the model provides interesting insight, relying on historical data for 
comparing surveillance components with a standardised approach and evaluating 
effectiveness of surveillance for similar diseases as Bluetongue, care must be taken 
in the interpretation of the output. Also, should a new disease emerge (with different 
clinical symptoms as Bluetongue) the outcome could change. If clinical signs are 
non-visible (subclinical infection/vaccination/natural immunity) or if repercussion on 
production data is not as evident the output is likely to change and these components 
might no longer be as effective. In the latter situation carrying out sentinel 
surveillance once suspicions are raised could definitely be effective. It must be noted 
that in the Netherlands during the second bluetongue epidemic wave that occurred in 
2007, the first cases were found with the sentinel component (Santman-Berends et 
al., 2010). Also the efficacy of syndromic surveillance is strongly dependent on the 
alerts which are only triggered once sufficient amount of herds are affected by the 
disease. In addition, a main assumption is that the availability of data and regression 
lines and deviations of trends should be investigated on a daily basis. Therefore, it 
might be questionable in that respect whether syndromic surveillance will really 
enable early detection.  
The EU legislation does not consider a herd effect for BT while estimating 
appropriate sample sizes. Therefore it can be expected that once the virus is present 
in a region it will rapidly spread to reach a within herd and between herd close to 
100%. However, previous studies have shown that at the start of the epidemic the 
within herd prevalence was much lower (Méroc et al., 2008; van Schaik et al., 2008), 
also in a context of disease freedom or early detection, it seems reasonable to 
consider very low within herd prevalence. This is the reason for simulating within herd 
expected prevalence of 2% and 20% and measure the impact on the herd and 
component sensitivity. The obtained sensitivities varied greatly according to the 
chosen prevalence, revealing the importance of considering correct expected within 
herd and between herd prevalence when setting up or evaluating surveillance. For 
the rest of the study we used a between herd  prevalence of 2% and within herd 




prevalence of 20%, as we considered that would a herd be infected with Bluetongue 
due the vector borne disease nature of the epidemic, it would be reasonable to 
expect a 20% within herd prevalence. 
Passive clinical surveillance and syndromic surveillance based on reproductive 
performance data in both countries, as well as syndromic surveillance based on milk 
production data in the Netherlands, provided best levels of the posterior probability of 
freedom. The daily observations generated by these components as well as the high 
number of herds included, contributed to this high level of guarantee, together with 
the ability of generating alarms. However, this capability, again, strongly relies on the 
given fact that the considered vector-borne disease will show visible clinical signs or 
reproductive effects. If the considered disease would not show significant clinical 
signs, these components would probably not be appropriate.  
From the cost point of view, the total direct cost was lower with sentinel and passive 
clinical surveillance. Yearly cross sectional surveys have the limitation that it is not 
repeated within a year therefore hampering early detection. However the aim of a 
yearly cross sectional survey is to provide information on the disease status (freedom 
or prevalence) in a country and not early detection, assuming sufficient cattle within 
herd are sampled. Passive clinical surveillance offered not only good sensitivities of 
detection, was also most cost efficient providing the assumed direct cost. Syndromic 
surveillance is also cost efficient. Should we account for indirect cost, it might be 
considerably less cost efficient. Indeed, Hanon et al., (2009) revealed the total costs 
to be over several millions of euros.  Besides the fact that, as discussed above, the 
disease under consideration must have a visible impact on the production 
parameters considered for syndromic surveillance, lack of specificity together with 
poor positive predictive value, due to the false alarms and the difficulty of 
differentiating a baseline trend behind the background noise, constitute another 
major limitations of syndromic surveillance (Hope et al., 2006). The poor specificity 
might lead to extra cost linked to confirmation testing generated in order to rule out 
the suspicious cases. In the present study we considered 15 false alarms per year. 
Despite this, syndromic surveillance offers promising diagnostics of deviations from 
trends, and measuring the impact of disease, using readily available data 
(Madouasse et al., 2014). In a context of globalisation, where emerging diseases 




spread and cross borders fairly rapidly and when disease awareness is not always 
present, syndromic surveillance definitely has an important role for surveillance.  
Data availability and quality is often neglected in surveillance evaluation, thereby 
hampering inference that can be made of surveillance simulations. The current study 
corroborated the essential preliminary requisite of data in order to guarantee 
effectiveness while conducting surveillance evaluation. Indeed the limited availability 
of data for France illustrates the importance and impact of lack of national data and 
how it affects epidemiological work.  Also, work carried out and experience within this 
transboundary project provided useful insight about the critical hurdles and solutions 
one should consider while modelling disease across borders.  
In conclusion, the standardised approach developed in the present study, can be 
considered as a powerful tool for quantifying effectiveness in early detection, and no 
matter what disease is concerned, providing reliable data is used to fit the models. 
We would recommend from the present study to use passive clinical and syndromic 
surveillance on a routine base for early detection and impact estimation, in addition, 
to implement existing traditional surveillance methods, such as repeated cross 
sectional survey surveillance, once suspicions are raised. This would probably be the 
most effective and most cost efficient option.  
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The overarching purpose of this thesis was to define a comprehensive and objective 
quantitative approach for the evaluation of animal disease surveillance systems. 
More specifically, different applications of a published method (output based 
methods) were explored to study the different possibilities offered by these tools and 
define their limits and constraints. By testing surveillance systems performance 
against stated objectives and targets, taking into account local risk factors such as 
heterogeneity of husbandry practices and epidemiological situations, as well as the 
needs and priorities expressed by the stakeholders involved, results of this thesis 
indicate what might be useful to guide prioritisation in the surveillance of animal 
health hazards and risks.  
This thesis has shown how simulation models can contribute to document the 
efficacy of surveillance but also guide decision towards most performing surveillance 
alternatives in line with international recommendations regarding transparency (EC, 
2016).  
RISK BASED SURVEILLANCE TO IMPROVE 
EFFICACY OF SURVEILLANCE COMPONENTS 
The probability that an animal or herd tested negative is truly free of disease may 
vary from one population to another. Biological variation, such as stage of infection or 
farm past disease status, can provide explanations for differences but so can non-
biological causes, such as social and political drivers between similar eradication and 
surveillance programmes as applied in different countries. In addition, similar 
surveillance and control measures may not have the same impact or value when 
applied under different epidemiological circumstances. The existence of a range of 
epidemiological factors operating at a local level (such as farm husbandry practice, 
on farm movements and biosecurity levels, for example) generates complex 
situations that influence the effectiveness of both surveillance and control activities. 
The following sections will discuss these issues and indicate ways of improving 
surveillance.    
Risk based surveillance 
Chapter III, IV, V and VI showed how output based and risk based approaches to 
surveillance have the potential to be more flexible and eventually provide higher 




confidence towards the stated objective of surveillance by taking into account country 
specific risk factors. Targeted surveillance combines the concepts of hazard specific 
surveillance (targeted to specific pathogensand of risk based sampling (targeted to 
groups with higher risk of infection) as clearly shown in chapter III in which samples 
for AI were reallocated to regions at a higher risk when compared with others. In 
chapter IV it has been made clear that the Brucellosis surveillance programme 
should make more efforts to increase the number of samples obtained from the 
abortion (protocol) component. If target surveillance is applied, it will ultimately 
enable better detection and an overall reduction of total sample size by focussing 
surveillance activities in subpopulations most at risk of infection; thereby increasing 
the probability of detection and reducing costs, as corroborated by others (Bisdorff et 
al., 2016; Hoinville, 2013; Knight-Jones, 2010; Rutten et al., 2012).  
However, in order to apply risk based surveillance, identification of risk factors is a 
crucial step to determine these different probabilities of detection/infection but it might 
also be useful to adapt control or intervention measures in line with their risk profile. 
Herds or animals can be scored on the basis of known risk factors estimated from 
literature (chapter III), by stakeholders needs and priorities (chapter IV) or from 
historical data (chapter V, VI). The advantage of the latter is seen when country 
specific data can be used to model the probability of a disease occurrence given 
known and recorded country specific risk factors (chapter V, VI). 
From the different studies outlined in the previous chapters, the key elements to 
consider in light of their differential risk of infection or infecting profile when scoring 
herds or animals surveillance & intervention programs can be summarised as follows: 
centralisation and recording of data regarding herd localisation, herd type (dairy, 
meat, hobby), ages, density or size, herd past disease status, movement records 
(making use of available national animal identification registries (SANITEL), trade 
(SANITEL, TRACES)), poor biosecurity measures, on farm delivery of raw dairy 
products, frequency of testing schemes and results (positive as well as negative or 
doubtful), herds exempted of testing schemes or not tested for long periods (i.e. 
because considered as dead-end reservoir). At the time of the study presented in 
chapter III, relative risks were estimated on the basis of literature and neighbouring 
country data. Subsequently, a research project (Flutree) (van den Berg et al., 2010), 




was initiated to better understand some specific characteristics of the Belgian poultry 
farms and wild bird populations. During this research project, it was found that 
preventing outdoor feeding could largely reduce the probability of wild bird incursions. 
Among professional poultry holdings, those with outdoor access and several bird 
species raised on the same farm had a higher probability of infection than others. 
Following these findings it could be recommended to intensify surveillance in farms 
with less biosecurity as corroborated by others (Caron et al., 2014; Conan et al., 
2013; EFSA, 2017; Ferrer et al.,2014). Compulsory testing at farms that sells cattle 
rather than at farms of arrival could potentially avoid consequences of disease 
spread, but separate barns for purchased cattle should be available in farms and 
newly introduced animals should be kept under observation for a while before mixing 
them with other animals especially on intensive production farms where disease 
introduction could affect very rapidly the whole herd. Veterinarians should inform their 
clients about correct biosecurity measures. It is comforting to notice that the same 
risk factors identified in the Belgian context have been recognised in other countries 
by others. For instance, for bovine tuberculosis surveillance, looking into Belgian 
historical cases data, past tuberculosis status of the farm, movement rate and herd 
size were clearly identified as risk factors for infection and were considered as a 
necessary surveillance focus as demonstrated by others too (Adkin et al., 2016;, 
Bisdorff et al., 2016; More et al., 2015). The risk based surveillance (essentially 
focussing surveillance on testing of abortions and herds where abortions are 
expected to have occurred but were not notified) showed that a 25-fold reduction of 
the number of samples was feasible and still maintain the desired confidence level 
regarding the country’s disease status. These implemented alternatives revealed 
themselves to be pivotal for increase confidence in bovine brucellosis surveillance 
sensitivity but also for its negative predictive value and therefore useful for both 
objectives (increasing probability of freedom and enable early detection) taking into 
account both risks probability of infection (upstream surveillance) and risk 
consequence of infection (downstream surveillance). Following this study the 
notification of abortions increased (from 4056 in 2008 to 11836 in 2015 (national 
yearly reports)). This abortion notification led to the detection of B. abortus in 2010 
and 2012 (OIE, 2012). The intense epidemiological investigation enabled rapid 




detection and limitation of the infection by massive testing and elimination of positive 
reactors. This illustrates the positive impact of campaigns that were initiated using 
incentives to encourage farmers to report abortions resulting in an increasing number 
of reported cases. Since then, similar strategies have been identified in neighbouring 
countries (Bronner et al., 2013, 2014, 2015).  
Thus, the Belgian field experience of setting up risk based surveillance confirms the 
theoretical concept that targeting sampling using risk consequence to increase 
surveillance efficiency can be implicitly considered as a way to increase case 
detection. Targeting surveillance in risk groups where probability of occurrence is 
high, allows increasing surveillance efficacy to demonstrate freedom (Cameron, 
2012).  
Perception and prioritisation of risk as well as acceptability towards the 
stated objective of surveillance 
The interplay between international and national policies, local risk factors and 
different actors in the disease surveillance highlight the complexity of surveillance. 
Indeed, risk perception and priorities may differ significantly between stakeholders 
and policy makers, emphasising the essential role of communication between all 
partners.  
Chapter IV first considered stakeholder’s opinions regarding the different relative 
risks and simulated different scenarios to determine the impact of different 
surveillance strategies for Brucellosis surveillance. After which, results of the 
simulated scenarios were shown to the same stakeholders and policy makers, whom 
then had the opportunity to review their risk estimation value. In the absence of data 
or when budgetary constraints limit field investigation, this approach showed itself of 
high value to guide decision. Following this two step process, a consensus was found 
on optimal risk parameters closest to real life. Bronner et al. (2014, 2015) confirm the 
impact of stakeholder’s involvement in surveillance such as for bovine brucellosis 
surveillance performance in France. 
Decision makers facing a situation expect guidance from experts whilst experts often 
answer “it depends on the situation”. Because a clear question or a clear model to 
answer the question is not always available, one must tailor models and adapt the 
questions to needs. Simulation models and sensitivity analysis appear to be useful 




tools that can measure the impact of over or under estimating situations such as 
experienced in this two-step EKE method.  
Participative and social epidemiology has increasingly gained interest and provides 
useful qualitative tools to ease communication and clarify expectations from 
surveillance systems (Calba et al., 2015; Cowie et al, 2015; Stark & Hasler, 2015). 
Qualitative approaches for surveillance evaluation such as the OASIS model (Calba 
et al., 2016; Hendrikx et al., 2011) or SERVAL model (Drewe et al., 2015) methods, 
measure the acceptability of surveillance. RESET (Rules, Education, Social pressure 
and Economic stimuli Tools) framework focuses on elements of farmers’ mind sets 
that are influential in disease control, including perceived threats, and perceived 
efficacy of preventative measures (Jansen et al., 2012). Initially developed for 
handling mastitis on farm these tools could be extended to disease control and 
surveillance.  
Identifying incentives to encourage farmers and veterinarians in complying with 
surveillance and acceptability of surveillance has shown to be beneficial to Belgium. 
Indeed ARSIA found in 2013 a lower reported rate of abortion in contrast to 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, where a constant increase was observed explained mainly by the 
incentives (free testing of abortions for several disease) introduced to comply with the 
benchmark set up by ERASURV in order to meet the required surveillance systems 
sensitivity (chapter IV). Following the unexpected success of these incentives the 
budget for abortion surveillance exploded in to the extent that authorities alone could 
not bear the cost of this surveillance and ARSIA accepted to fund additional analysis 
within the abortion protocol in order to guarantee the compliance of farmers and vets 
with the surveillance system. The decrease of the Schmallenberg epidemic wave in 
2012 together with the resolution of the brucellosis outbreaks could also explain this 
slight decrease in abortion reports observed in 2012-2013. However this rapidly 
shifted in 2014 in such a way that it could be concluded that abortion reporting 
incentives and target sampling of holdings that not report an abortion had enabled an 
increase of 244% compared to 2008 in Wallonia.  At national level, notification of 
abortion increased from 4056 in 2008 to 11836 in 2015. Despite this steady increase 
in abortion reporting from 2009 up to present, underreporting is still suspected and 
this will have an impact on the negative predictive value of surveillance. This is why 




brucellosis surveillance does not only rely on abortions notification in Belgium. In 
contrast to other European Member States officially free of brucellosis, in Belgium we 
have re-implemented bulk milk testing as well as during the winter target sampling of 
herds that did not notify an abortion, but yet are suspected to have had an abortion 
(based on previous year’s annual birth rates and submission of low weight carcasses 
sent to rendering plant as well as diagnostics lab results). From our experience 
during this work, a hazard analysis critical control plan (HACCP) could be considered 
simultaneously to a the output based methods using scenario trees, to identify, 
characterise and manage the critical points, gaps and needs in surveillance. This 
process should be updated constantly in the light of new evidence. Ensuring a 
comprehensive approach while evaluating surveillance systems would probably 
increase compliance and, ultimately, increase effectiveness and efficiency of 
surveillance but also, within time ensure sustainability too. Understanding the context 
and drivers of surveillance is critical in designing successful interventions actions. 
These intervention actions will only be effective if key players in the system accept 
them.  
Combining different sources of evidence for different surveillance 
objectives 
In contrast to Chapter III, which only investigated one component of surveillance (active 
monitoring program), Chapters IV, V, VI and VII combined information obtained from different 
data sources and components to strengthen the confidence in probability of freedom and/or 
case detection. Pursuing with this same notion, it can even be determined what component 
can eventually be disregarded for not bringing sufficient information, or for providing poor 
quality information (Chapter V). Indeed, pooling all components together may provide more 
guarantees than needed for a given objective, i.e. to claim freedom. However, it is important 
to measure the efficacy of each component in relation to the desired goal or attribute one 
opts to assess when conducting surveillance (Drewe et al., 2012; Hoinville et al., 2013). 
Therefore, it may be useful to maintain some components, such as purchase testing or 
abortion testing (Chapter IV, V) to maintain disease awareness and early detection. However 
there will be population overlap as the same population might be looked at in several 
surveillance components, meaning that surveillance components are not totally independent. 
The overall surveillance system sensitivity will be increased if several surveillance 
components are in place, in such a way that it might lead to an overestimation of the 
negative predictive value of your surveillance system if this overlap is not taken into account.  




Methods proposed by Martin et al. (2007) enable to take into account this overlap by 
adjusting the effective probability of infection within the current component by posterior 
probability of infection gained from the previous surveillance component. One could measure 
the population overlap (=animals sampled in several components and remove them from the 
calculation of the given component if one has already counted them in the previous 
component). It might be useful to consider each component separately as it may be desirable 
to maintain each different component even though the total surveillance system sensitivity 
will be reached with or without each of them, as each component might have different 
purposes.    
In this respect, Chapter VII looked at the cost efficiency and effectiveness ratios of 
conventional surveillance components compared with emerging surveillance 
techniques such as syndromic surveillance in relation to the stated objective. It was 
discovered that although the cheapest alternatives were sentinel surveillance and 
passive clinical surveillance for substantiating freedom, passive clinical and 
syndromic surveillance were, in contrast, were most cost efficient for early detection 
and provided best posterior probabilities of freedom , by accumulating evidence dayly 
over time. In addition, syndromic surveillance could be useful to carry out impact 
analysis or increase specificity once disease is detected. As suggested by Drewe et 
al. (2012), it is useful to consider more than two attributes to evaluate surveillance 
performance in addition to clearly stating the objective. Our findings suggest that 
sensitivity, negative predictive value, specificity, timeliness and data quality are 
fundamentally important to measure and that they could all be reduced to gauging 
efficacy and efficiency of surveillance system performance for possibly different 
stated objectives. In addition, performance of surveillance systems should be 
expanded to all sectors (from field to food and/or human cases) while evaluating 
surveillance measures but also all different possible data sources contributing to 
surveillance, providing in such a way an integrated approach to optimise surveillance 
and sampling (Häsler et al., 2016; Martins et al., 2016). Acceptability should also be 
assessed from a public health and social point of view for prioritisation of disease 
surveillance or eradication measures. International requirements, but also animal 
welfare issues, economical consequences, zoonotic potentialof risks should be 
accounted for in the evaluation of the cost of surveillance. 




ESSENTIAL ASSUMPTIONS IMPACTING 
SURVEILLANCE PERFORMANCE 
Design prevalence  
Design prevalence is part of the design of the model and is not related to actual 
prevalence; it is set for the purpose of drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of 
the surveillance component against an agreed standard. Design prevalence will 
enable to test how confident one can be in a surveillance system given no test 
positive animals are found. It It could be argued that the lower the deisign prevalence 
the better the ‘early detection’ in the sense that waiting for disease prevalence to 
reach a higher level does not coincide with ‘early detection’. However, to measure 
the surveillance system’s reliability in early detection one would rather recommend to 
use the approach developed in chapter VII, using reed frost models outputs to feed 
the scenario tree inputs and measure the performance of surveillance in terms of 
early detection. Although most official regulations do mention requirements in terms 
of maximum tolerable herd prevalence, very few mention tolerable within herd or 
animal prevalence. Examples of this are the Council’s directive 64/432/EEC 
regarding Brucellosis and Tuberculosis, where nothing is mentioned regarding 
expected animal prevalence. This is in contrast with the legislation on avian influenza 
(2007/268/EU), where design prevalence requirements for between herd (5%) and 
within herd (30%) are clearly mentioned. Despite the fact that these official 
requirements can be questioned to be rightly selected or not, surveillance 
programmes often rely on such values for their design and hence will influence the 
results of these programmes. Either one can assume 100% herd sensitivity, implying 
the right tests are used and the right number of animals per herd are sampled 
depending on the herd size, or one can assume that if disease occurs within a herd 
the whole herd will shortly be infected to reach 100% within herd prevalence, thus 
maximising herd sensitivity near 100%. In practice, and especially for diseases such 
as Brucellosis and Tuberculosis, neither of the assumptions (all animals tested with 
perfect test sensitivity and specificity or 100% homogeneous prevalence within the 
herd) can be verified and thus, 100% herd sensitivity is rarely met. In Belgium, during 
the last outbreaks of Brucellosis, within herd prevalence was rarely above 2-3% and 
in some very rare cases it was no higher than 12% (AFSCA outbreak data). In 




Chapter V, because again nothing is mentioned regarding minimal expected within 
herd prevalence for bovine tuberculosis, it was assumed that 17% was reasonable to 
expect, based on historical data investigation data (AFSCA outbreak data). This 
underlines the importance of adapting sample size accordingly (Chapter VII). Also 
herds tend to get larger and larger, triggering the need to adapt within herd sample 
size accordingly (Eurostat, 2013).  
According tochapter VII, simulations carried out regarding bluetongue also clearly 
proved the importance and impact of assumptions regarding expected within herd 
prevalence. Ensuring disease freedom just below the official design prevalence, 
which satisfies international standards, does not explicitly mean one is totally free. 
Also, a country with weak surveillance may achieve the minimum requirements more 
easily than a country having a more stringent surveillance (Stärk and Häsler, 2015). 
This could be the paradox of official minimum requirements and freedom when 
designing surveillance. Maybe an alternative could be to allow each EU Member 
State to demonstrate freedom with a matching maximum tolerable prevalence. This 
matching prevalence would have to be proven. This would clearly be of value to 
countries with highly heterogeneous herd sizes (i.e., very small and very large) where 
it will be complex to obtain 100% herd sensitivity. It must therefore be argued 
whether sensitivity of surveillance assessed at the prescribed design prevalence 
ensures an acceptable negative predictive value of surveillance (Bisdorff et al., 2016; 
Cameron 2012).  
Diagnostic tools: sensitivity, specificity and timeliness 
In contrast to public health essentially relying on passive notification, animal health 
surveillance relies on active surveillance involving the selection and testing of 
animals. Our different chapters illustrated the great range of variability in different 
outputs arising from uncertain test characteristics, underlining thereby the strong 
emphasis that should be placed on this parameter. More specifically, Chapter V 
showed that for bovine tuberculosis the impact of meat visual inspection sensitivity 
on the confidence level of our posterior probability of freedom. Our results 
corroborate previous findings and the repercussion on surveillance negative 
predictive value suggested by others (Calvo-Artavia 2013; Foddai et al., 2015; Stärk 
et al., 2014). Besides the diagnostic test sensitivity, the completeness and coverage 




of slaughterhouse surveillance will naturally impact the performance of surveillance 
as well (Jajosky and Groseclose , 2004; Reijn et al., 2011; Welby et al., 2012, 2015). 
However, specificity, often disregarded in these methods as considered to be 100% 
since it is assumed that any positive result in surveillance will be investigated until 
confirmed negative), merits to be considered as well in certain circumstances. Few 
publications in animal health surveillance highlight the impact of this assumption and 
often consider this same assumption as an asset. However, in a context of budget 
restriction and moving towards more cost efficient surveillance, we believe this is a 
major assumption that cannot be considered as an asset while considering the 
performance of surveillance. For diseases such as bovine tuberculosis, specificity 
plays a major role on cost efficiency of surveillance (Welby et al., 2015). At farm level 
this might seem of insignificant impact, however in a surveillance component 
processing over 345,000 cattle (as purchase testing in Belgium), when specificity is 
less than 100 per cent, this will have a major impact. Indeed, this means, a 
proportion of animals not infected will have a (false) positive reaction to the test, 
leading to further confirmation test or slaughter. In some cases as for bovine 
tuberculosis, a false positive test result will initiate or prolong the suspended 
tuberculosis free status, meaning in Belgium no more movements or on farm delivery 
of dairy products, which indirectly increases the costs of eradication campaigns to 
farmers and government and undermines stakeholder confidence (Goodchild et al., 
2015; Nielsen et al., 2015). Imperfect specificity cannot be neglected and this of 
greater challenge when prevalence is very low (More and Good, 2015). Indeed, the 
cost of errors when prevalence reaches very low values, near zero (as in disease 
free situation), will be mainly driven by false positives reactions generated by a lack 
of specificity. While evaluating surveillance performance, these false positives 
reactions costs can neither be ignored nor neglected as this will generate extra costs. 
One way to take the specificity into account would be to consider it in the 
denominator of the cost efficiency ratio equation (numerator being sensitivity) and 
adapt control measures in case of suspicion proportional to the risk (Welby et al., 
2015). Similarly, in chapter VII, cost of false alarms in syndromic surveillance showed 
that specificity should not be neglected. Vial et al. (2015) suggest, that in order to be 
cost efficient, false alarms should not be over 2 and at 6 monthly intervals, and they 




also suggest to increase specificity with the use of a multivariate approach while 
using syndromic surveillance (not only relying on slaughterhouse data or mortality 
data but rely on milk production data and/or fertility data too), as corroborated in 
chapter VII. The same authors suggest that timeliness linked to processing and 
analyses should not be neglected as this adds to the cost as well (Vial et al., 2015). 
In chapter VII, timeliness was assessed using Reed-Frost models and the sensitivity 
of the diagnostic process was adjusted accordingly. To facilitate future comparisons 
of reporting timeliness across components and countries we also would recommend 
to include an explicit description of the surveillance system reporting process and 
interval. Additionally, surveillance information systems must support the collection of 
appropriate reference dates to allow for the assessment of the timeliness of specific 
surveillance processes. 
Most EU countries rely on passive surveillance components as diagnostic process for 
case detection and confidence level in disease freedom. Impact of disease 
awareness or total number of animals inspected during passive clinical surveillance 
was investigated in Chapter VI, and the much larger confidence interval around the 
obtained output further confirmed the huge variability and uncertainty if one was to 
rely on this component alone. Fear of ethical or economic repercussions or 
repressive measures triggers underreporting. This apparent poor disease awareness 
amongst farmers and or vets in turn hampers effective surveillance as shown in 
chapter VI and VII and underlined by others (Bisdorff et al., 2016; Bronner et al., 
2014, 2015). Representativeness as well as timeliness of passive surveillance 
remains a challenging issue for public health in general (Jajosky and Groseclose, 
2004; Reijn et al., 2011). Despite the yearly steady increase in abortion notifications, 
a study carried out by ERASURV (Welby et al., 2014) corroborates findings of ARSIA 
(ARSIA, 2014) and French colleagues (Bronner et al., 2013) regarding suspicious 
under reporting of abortions. Rendering plant data (carcasses less than 10 kg or 
between 10-25 kg) and yearly birth rates for each active cattle farm in Belgium in 
2012-2013 enabled ERASURV to conclude that only 36% of the herds that submitted 
low weight carcasses to RENDAC reported and submitted an abortion for further 
analysis in 2013. In other words, 64% of the herds did not report any abortion and yet 
submitted a low weight foetal carcass to RENDAC. These figures are similar to data 




reported by our French colleagues (Bronner et al., 2013, 2014). There are some of 
the reasons that could explain this: foeti of poor quality and/or discovered too late in 
the field and contaminated to such an extent that is impossible to be analysed. In 
addition, 113 herds submitted low weight carcasses to RENDAC in 2013 and did not 
report any births neither did they notify abortions that could underline a fertility 
problem in those herds. This highlights that approximately 50% of abortions are not 
reported, despite all efforts by the competent authority to simulate and compensate 
the reporting and analysis of any abortion. Methods we would recommend to improve 
reporting of abortions are: i) Win-Win approach to surveillance (i.e. abortion protocol 
incentive: panel of test free of charge for the voluntary submission of abortive tissue 
samples); ii) Winter target sampling of herds not reporting abortion but suspected to 
have had an abortion in the past three years (based on birth rates, population data, 
rendering plant data, abortion diagnostic data); iii) Information campaigns for farmers 
and vets (conference, debates, flyers, mails); iv) Using tools at herd level to assess 
herd health; v) Increase compliance & acceptability (i.e. information campaigns, by 
providing incentives or reduce restriction measures applied to suspicious farms, 
avoid using tests with false positives reactions that could undermine the farmers 
believe in surveillance). Applying system thinking (conditional loops and behavioural 
over time plots) to veterinary epidemiology could help to better understand and 
increase disease awareness. 
Input validation versus output validation 
As the need for better quality control continues and standardisation is introduced in 
an emerging diversity of surveillance systems, validation surveillance systems 
evaluation is an essential step. Although sensitivity analysis using internal validation 
techniques provides useful insight, it will be strongly influenced and driven by the 
variability and uncertainty around the given inputs. Chapters VI and VII tested 
assumptions by changing one parameter while keeping all others unchanged. 
Through these studies, validation provided useful insight into the robustness of 
results and models as well as the magnitude of possible over and under estimation of 
outputs. However, besides quantitative validation, qualitative validation should be 
assessed too. Validation can be made in terms of effectiveness, using different 
attributes described to assess it, such as compliance to a surveillance system by 




animal industry partners concerned. Where ante mortem and post mortem diagnostic 
tools have neither perfect sensitivity nor specificity as seen above this can lead to 
major impacts. In some cases, such as in bovine tuberculosis diagnostic testing 
schemes, clear discrepancies may be observed, leading to a wide variability of 
reported values (Bezos et a., 2014; Casal et al., 2015; Schiller et al., 2010). Internal 
sensitivity analyses carried out as in chapter V clearly corroborates this and 
illustrated the impact of imperfect diagnostic assays have on a larger scale. But 
external validation carried out as in chapter V, also revealed what was more fitting in 
a Belgian context. Exploring the 7,403,826 cattle movement history records that were 
obtained for the 2,678,020 cattle and 36,059 herds still active in 2009, coupled with 
historical bovine tuberculosis outbreak data, provided an insight into the main risk 
factors for bovine tuberculosis infections in Belgium (Chapter V). In addition, 
validation of component's performance was investigated, looking at historical data 
and modelling the detection odds of each component, using a generalised equation 
model. Results of the validation models suggested that despite cattle purchases 
identified as a significant risk factor, purchase testing with the single intradermal 
tuberculin test was non-efficient for the detection of outbreaks in Belgium, raising 
serious doubts on the trust one could place on Belgium’s official and bacteriological 
freedom status, since one of the main pillars (after slaughterhouse surveillance) of 
bovine tuberculosis surveillance in Belgium is purchase testing. It also highlighted the 
importance of recording data at an individual level in a centralised data base, 
currently not done for tuberculin tests carried out in Belgium. In addition the results 
showed the importance of risk based slaughterhouse surveillance to increase total 
sensitivity as demonstrated in other studies (Calvo-Artavia et al., 2012; Calvo-Artavia 
2013; EFSA, 2013; Foddai et al., 2015; Stärk et al., 2014). The low sensitivity of 
intradermal skin test can be counteracted by larger sample sizes and this test has 
been reported to be a valid test at herd level (Schiller et al., 2010). However, despite 
the factual increased sample size, this test has shown its limits in the Belgian field. A 
benchmarking study ,carried out by ERASURV, showed that the amount of false 
positive reactions reported with this test, when used during purchase testing, was still 
worryingly low in comparison with the false positive reactor rate expected and 
observed in other circumstance (ie testing of dairy cattle with on farm delivery) 




(Welby et al., 2015). This study revealed similar findings regarding slaughterhouse 
surveillance, thereby highlighting the major importance of awareness for the 
performance of these surveillance components (Welby et al., 2015). In addition, we 
would recommend addressing timeliness of detection when evaluating surveillance 
diagnostics, in order to enable fair comparison between countries and components, 
i.e. using Reed-Frost models (Chapter VII).  
PERFORMANCE OF SURVEILLANCE:  ACROSS 
COUNTRIES AND EMERGING DISEASES 
Cross border surveillance and emerging or re-emerging disease  
In 2006, an unexpected vector borne disease, named bluetongue serotype 8, 
emerged in three countries in Northern Europe, Belgium, Germany and The 
Netherlands. It had devastating effects on both trade and productivity. In order to 
regain an official freedom status and re-establish safe trade, Belgium had to 
demonstrate the efficacy of its surveillance to EU authorities, in both freedom of 
disease and early detection.  
Chapter VII specifically explored different surveillance components across countries 
and their capacity to detect bluetongue serotype 8 at an early stage. The 
heterogeneous sampling scheme in the three countries was taken into account and 
compared from the angles of given output, herd sensitivity and component 
sensitivity. For most components, due to the different herd population structure and 
sampling schemes, herds' sensitivity outputs differed substantially from country to 
country.  However, at component level differences disappeared and countries 
performed similarly. The output based methods from the comparison between and 
within countries revealed that in spite of surveillance designs being fairly different, 
performances seemed to be comparable across countries. In addition, timeliness of 
detection and the possibility of adding syndromic surveillance were investigated. 
Syndromic surveillance has increasingly gained interest and it clearly has the 
advantage of using readily available data for surveillance purposes. However, the 
study showed that the costs that would be generated by false alarms, as well as 
indirect costs caused by delays in detection (signals only appear once a significant 
number of herds are affected), would be higher than any other conventional 




surveillance components. Based on these results, one should not rule out the 
possibility of using these components for emerging or re-emerging diseases but 
caution is recommended. 
Data & Cost for surveillance 
Both actions (surveillance and intervention) imply certain costs. For a thorough 
assessment of surveillance performance and activities, cost of changes must be 
considered in relation to the added benefit of surveillance (Dehove et al., 2012; Calba 
et al., 2015; Stärk and Häsler, 2015). Integrating the cost of surveillance into other 
costs is important to consider too, so one is not blinded by the illusion of conducting 
surveillance with apparent efficiency, when in fact it is not seen as such when 
brought to attention at higher levels (Drewe et al., 2014). Though tools developed in 
chapter III and IV were not explicitly drawn with the aim of reducing cost, they 
revealed themselves interesting to optimise sample size and design to such an 
extent that a total cost reduction was allowed while improving surveillance system 
performance as a whole. In contrast, in chapter VII, the aim was amongst others 
investigating the best cost efficient alternative for early detection. Sensitivity and 
specificity of surveillance were used to measure impact on cost. Indeed while 
sensitivity drives performance, specificity will mainly drive the cost. High performance 
diagnostic tests could be abandoned for less sensitive diagnostic tests due to lack of 
specificity (EFSA, 2012). The aim of surveillance could be to spare budgets, but the 
cost as well as expenditure (stakeholder covering the cost (politician, farmer, and 
meat industry)) must be considered for sustainable change. Synergies can be found 
and mutualisation of animal health must be considered; authorities must not be alone 
in funding. In addition, cost saving should be considered on a larger scale, involving 
a one health approach to surveillance by taking into account animal welfare, zoonotic 
potential as well as social and economical impact of disease. Cost efficiency should 
be evaluated using a cross species and multi component/perspective analysis 
integrated approach rather than according to a sector specific approach (Häsler et 
al., 2016; Martins et al., 2016). 
In addition, over the last decade, much effort was exercised on improving 
surveillance systems, while data quality generated by the surveillance system was 
often considered as an asset. However, the value of information will be hampered by 




poor data quality and management. Collecting and analysing surveillance data was a 
constant challenge whilst compiling this thesis. The lack of consensus regarding 
motives at a dossier level and/or the interpretation of work results by various 
laboratories made data exchanges between regional and national laboratories a time 
consuming task. The lack of standardised formats to report results, to test procedures 
and diagnostic tests cut off’s also lead to difficulties. Thus, as a prerequisite, 
monitoring data flow, checking data quality, analysing data and ensuring feedback 
must be carried out in order to provide reliable information. Data generated by 
surveillance must be recorded and centralised at some level. Means to do so and 
clear coding and definitions are essential. Also, expected outputs and goals of data 
records will determine and guide what inputs are needed (FAO, 2011; Stärk and 
Häsler, 2015).  
The challenge while looking into data, not only lies in finding adapted software to 
analyse terra sized sets of data (i.e., animal movements) or to combine outputs from 
various databases, or to develop visual tools to view and to represent information 
gathered from data, it lies mostly in the exercise of inferring from data exploration. 
The danger of big data comes from overestimating events meaning all assumptions 
are significant as they diminish variance. Similarly, establishing links between events 
becomes possible. However, the link does not mean the cause. The rise of molecular 
typing and the great interest generated by these new tools must be considered with 
caution. Other factors acting in the triangular interaction (human, host, environment; 
to which one may add political and social elements) play a crucial role in the spread 
of diseases. In future, data communication will certainly play a major role and will 
certainly be a pivotal challenge for surveillance. 
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When evaluating surveillance programs, the key questions are: Is the surveillance 
effective and is it worth the money?  
In this thesis different aspects of the output based methods were explored and its 
applications to specific issues relating to surveillance were tested, using avian 
influenza, brucellosis, tuberculosis and bluetongue as case studies. The time that 
has gone since the changes inspired by these studies were implemented has proven 
the use and added value of risk based surveillance in disease control programmes 
and shown how better surveillance could be achieved with less money.  
The following conclusions and recommendations can be drawn from these 
evaluations for the design and assessment of surveillance, notably for official disease 
surveillance programmes. 
Because surveillance will only be effective if those who benefit and/or pay comply 
with surveillance, a prerequisite prior to surveillance evaluation is for each 
surveillance programme to have a clear definition of the objectives and clear 
communication with all stakeholders involved, thereby including all respective 
needs and priorities. Reporting clinical cases is one of the cornerstones of efficient 
disease surveillance as it will ensure rapid detection and control. Greater incentives, 
such as compensations, or allowances for veterinarian visits, should be considered; 
else, setting constraints for non-complying farmers could be a way to increase 
reporting and increasing surveillance awareness. 
Combining different sources of evidence increases the confidence in the country’s 
disease status. Sources of evidence may expand beyond thescope that simple 
surveillance components encompass, covering that way the whole system from field 
to fork.  
Risk based surveillance is a very attractive alternative, provided knowledge about 
the main risk factors is available and that one takes into account the fact that they are 
not necessarily constant over time and across levels (i.e. farm, animal, region, social, 
political, educational, economical), as well as risk probability of occurrence and 
consequence. Data quality at an individual level, recorded and centralised in a 





data on a platform owned by a national organisation should be available and 
regulated by data sharing protocols in order to respect privacy and ownership issues.  
Validation of inputs and outputs are essential to assess surveillance trends to 
gauge efficacy and track implemented measures. Imperfect test characteristics 
should be accounted for in the modelling process as well as impact of design 
prevalence. Finally, whilst evaluating effectiveness for freedom one can ensure 
efficacy in case detection simultaneously. Upstream surveillance focussing on 
probability of risk and downstream surveillance will focus on consequence of risk.  
An ideal surveillance system would be one with high efficacy and low costs. 
Although, surveillance activities should be conducted independently and impartially 
by the public sector to ensure credibility, the public sector alone, cannot support all 
funding for surveillance activities, especially in countries where the farming industry is 
increasingly intensive. A minimal financial contribution into a common fund, such as 
carried out in Belgium by intensive production farms will ensure financial support for 
surveillance activities on one hand, but, on the other, it will also ensure that 
compensations can be paid to the sector in case of epidemics.  
For high efficacy and low costs, not only sensitivity and direct cost should be 
accounted for but also specificity and indirect cost of restriction measures applied in 
surveillance. This surely will impact acceptability and ultimately compliance to 
surveillance measures. Data quality, representativeness, timeliness during the whole 
surveillance process whether in active surveillance, syndromic surveillance or 
passive surveillance remain a challenge and should be assessed in terms of cost 
efficiency. Finally, expenditure for surveillance should be balanced in relation to other 
hazards or threats. A one health approach to surveillance, taking into account the 
disability-adjusted life year (DALY) or quality-adjusted life-year (QALY), should 
definitely be further investigated to enable a cost efficient approach to surveillance 
but also societal cost of surveillance in terms of animal welfare. 
And to conclude, tools explored during this thesis revealed interesting perspectives 
for evaluation and design of surveillance taking into account Belgian country specific 
data and risk factors. Alternatives explored enables conciliating different objectives 
encountered by the different animal health surveillance stakeholders therby 





taking into account specificity, not only to improve confidence level in freedom but 
also to enhance disease detection. In addition, consumers and different partners in 
animal health are getting more and more concerned about the reliability of 
surveillance effectiveness but also its cost efficiency. Local initiatives are arising for 
surveillance of non-notifiable diseases, for which mutual trust is desirable to allow for 
free trade but for sustainable production too. These tools definitely could offer 
promising perspectives in this context for assessing cost efficiency of other non-
regulated diseases and sustainable one health surveillance as a whole across the 
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